الفراء نظام مصنع التجارة

الفراء نظام مصنع التجارة

استراتيجية التداول دما
الفوركس الخيار الثنائي 4 تحميل مجاني
الفوركس الأعضاء منطقة مسبقة


تداول الفوركس نيو زيلاند تداول الفوركس كبار التجار تعريف الفوركس للمتداولين الخيار الثنائي الفوركس مؤشر الأخبار الفوركس التطبيق لالروبوت استراتيجية الحفاظ على التنوع البيولوجي

التاريخ الاقتصادي لتجارة الفور: من 1670 إلى 1870. آن م. كارلوس، جامعة كولورادو. فرانك D. لويس، كوين & # 8217؛ s الجامعة. المقدمة. نمت تجارة الفراء التجارية في أمريكا الشمالية من الاتصال المبكر بين الصيادين الهنود والصيادين الأوروبيين الذين كانوا يقطعون القد على الضفة الكبرى قبالة نيوفاوندلاند وعلى خليج غاسبي بالقرب من كيبيك. وسيتاجر الهنود بقرى الحيوانات الصغيرة مثل المنك والسكاكين وغيرها من المنتجات القائمة على الحديد أو للمنسوجات. وكان التبادل في البداية عشوائيا، وكان فقط في أواخر القرن السادس عشر، عندما كان ارتداء قبعات سمور أصبح من المألوف، أن الشركات أنشئت التي تعاملت حصريا في الفراء. وتتوافر أغطية عالية الجودة فقط حيث تكون شتاءا شديدة، لذلك كانت التجارة تتم في الغالب في المناطق التي نعرفها الآن ككندا، على الرغم من أن بعض النشاط قد حدث إلى الجنوب على امتداد نهر المسيسيبي وفي جبال روكي. كان هناك أيضا سوق في جلود الغزلان التي سادت في أبالاشيانز. وكانت الشركات الفرنسية الأولى التي شاركت في تجارة الفراء هي الفرنسية، وتحت الحكم الفرنسي انتشرت التجارة على طول نهري سانت لورانس وأوتاوا، وإلى أسفل نهر المسيسيبي. في القرن السابع عشر، وبعد الهولنديين، وضعت اللغة الإنجليزية التجارة من خلال ألباني. ثم في 1670، تم منح ميثاق من قبل التاج البريطاني لشركة هدسون & # 8217؛ ق خليج، التي بدأت تعمل من الوظائف على طول ساحل خليج هدسون (انظر الشكل 1). على مدى ما يقرب من مائة سنة، شهدت هذه المنطقة الشمالية المنافسة من كثافة متفاوتة بين الفرنسية والإنجليزية. مع غزو فرنسا الجديدة في عام 1763، تحولت التجارة الفرنسية إلى التجار الاسكتلنديين العاملين خارج مونتريال. بعد التفاوض على معاهدة جاي (1794)، تم تعريف الحدود الشمالية وانتقلت التجارة على طول المسيسيبي إلى شركة الفور الأمريكية تحت جون جاكوب أستور. في عام 1821، اندمج المشاركون الشماليون تحت اسم شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ ق، وعلى مدى عقود عديدة استمرت هذه الشركة المدمجة في تجارة الفراء. وأخيرا، في التسعينات، تحت ضغط من جماعات حقوق الحيوان، شركة هدسون & # 8217؛ ق خليج، التي في القرن العشرين قد أصبحت متاجر التجزئة الكندية الكبيرة، وانتهت مكون الفراء من عملها. هدسون & # 8217؛ s خليج شركة هينتيرلاندس. المصدر: راي (1987، لوحة 60) واستندت تجارة الفراء إلى لباد متجهة إما إلى سوق الملابس الفاخرة أو للصناعات الملتهبة، التي كانت أهمها. وكانت هذه تجارة عبر الأطلسي. وكانت الحيوانات محاصرة وتبادلت البضائع في أمريكا الشمالية، ونقلت إلى أوروبا لبلاط لتجهيز وبيع النهائي. ونتيجة لذلك، فإن القوى العاملة على جانب الطلب في السوق في أوروبا وعلى جانب العرض في أمريكا الشمالية تحدد الأسعار والأحجام؛ بينما حدد الوسطاء الذين ربطوا المنطقتين المنفصلتين جغرافيا كيفية إجراء التجارة. الطلب على الفور: القبعات والأحزمة والأسعار. ومع ذلك قد تعتبر القبعات الكبيرة ملحق اليوم، كانت لقرون جزءا إلزاميا من اللباس اليومي، لكل من الرجال والنساء. وبطبيعة الحال تغيرت الأنماط، واستجابة لتقلبات الموضة والسياسة، أخذت القبعات بأشكال وأشكال مختلفة، من قبعة ذات توجهات عريضة ذات حواف عريضة من أول ستوارتس إلى قبعة ذات شكل مخروطي الشكل، المتشددون. أعاد ترميم شارل الثاني في إنجلترا عام 1660 والثورة المجيدة في عام 1689 تغييراتها الخاصة في الأسلوب (كلارك، 1982، الفصل 1). ما تبقى ثابتة كانت المواد التي تم صنع القبعات & # 8211؛ ورأى الصوف. وجاء الصوف من الحيوانات المختلفة، ولكن في نهاية القرن الخامس عشر بدأ سمور الصوف أن تكون سائدة. مع مرور الوقت، أصبحت القبعات القندس شعبية متزايدة في نهاية المطاف تهيمن على السوق. فقط في القرن التاسع عشر حل الحرير محل سمور في القبعات ذات الموضة العالية للرجال. وقد صنفت الفراء منذ فترة طويلة إما الهوى أو التيلة. يتوهم الفراء هي تلك التي تطلب لجمال وبريق من بيلت بهم. هذه الفراء & # 8211؛ مينك، فوكس، أوتر & # 8211؛ هي التي كتبها الفراء في الملابس أو الجلباب. يتم طلب فراء التيلة لصوفهم. جميع فراء التيلة لها طلاء مزدوج من الشعر مع طويلة، قاسية، الشعر على نحو سلس دعا الشعر الحرس التي تحمي أقصر، ليونة الشعر، ودعا الصوف، التي تنمو بجانب الجلد الحيوان. فقط الصوف يمكن أن تكون ملبدة. كل من الشعر أقصر هو الشائكة ومرة ​​واحدة في نهاية المطاف في نهاية الشعر، يمكن ضغط الصوف في قطعة صلبة من المواد ودعا شعر. وكان الفراء الرئيسي الرئيسي سمور، على الرغم من أن المسكرات والأرانب كما استخدمت. تم استخدام شعر الصوف لأكثر من قرنين لجعل القبعات ذات الموضة العالية. ورأى هو أقوى من المواد المنسوجة. فإنه لن المسيل للدموع أو كشف في خط مستقيم. هو أكثر مقاومة للماء، وأنه سيعقد شكله حتى لو كان يحصل الرطب. هذه الخصائص المصنوعة شعرت المواد الرئيسية ل هاترز وخصوصا عندما دعا الأزياء للقبعات مع بريمز كبيرة. وستكون القبعات ذات الجودة العالية مصنوعة بالكامل من صوف القندس، بينما تشمل القبعات ذات الجودة المنخفضة الصوف السفلي، مثل الأرنب. صنع فيلت. وكان التحول من جلود سمور في شعرت ثم القبعات نشاطا من ذوي المهارات العالية. العملية المطلوبة أولا أن يتم فصل الصوف سمور من الشعر الحرس والجلد، وأن بعض من الصوف لها أعمدة مفتوحة، منذ شعرت المطلوبة بعض الصوف الشائكة مفتوحة في الخليط. ورأى يعود إلى البدو من آسيا الوسطى، الذين يقال أنهم اخترعوا عملية التلبيد وجعل خيامهم من هذا الضوء ولكن المواد المعمرة. على الرغم من أن فن التلبيد اختفى من جزء كبير من أوروبا الغربية خلال الألفية الأولى، إلا أن صنع شعره نجا في روسيا والسويد وآسيا الصغرى. ونتيجة للحروب الصليبية في القرون الوسطى، أعيد إدخال الخيط عبر البحر المتوسط ​​إلى فرنسا (كريان، 1962). في روسيا، كانت صناعة التلبيد تقوم على القندس الأوروبي (ألياف الخروع). ونظرا لتقاليدهم الطويلة في العمل مع قندس القندس، كان الروس قد أتقن فن تمشيط الشعر القصير الشائكة من بين الشعر الحرس الطويل، وهي التكنولوجيا التي صونها. ونتيجة لذلك، كان على الصناعات المبكرة في إنجلترا وفرنسا أن تعتمد على صوف القندس المستورد من روسيا، على الرغم من أنها تستخدم أيضا الإمدادات المحلية من الصوف من الحيوانات الأخرى، مثل الأرنب والأغنام والماعز. ولكن بحلول نهاية القرن السابع عشر، كانت الإمدادات الروسية تجف، مما يعكس الاستنزاف الخطير لسكان القندس الأوروبيين. كان من قبيل الصدفة مع تراجع في الأسهم سمور الأوروبية ظهور التجارة في أمريكا الشمالية. تم استيراد سمور أمريكا الشمالية (الخروع كانادنسيس) من خلال وكلاء في المستعمرات الإنجليزية والفرنسية والهولندية. على الرغم من أن العديد من الطرود تم شحنها إلى روسيا لمعالجة أولية، أدى نمو سوق القندس في انكلترا وفرنسا إلى تطوير التكنولوجيات المحلية، والمزيد من المعرفة من فن تمشيط. وكان فصل الصوف سمور من شعر فقط الخطوة الأولى في عملية التلبيد. كان من الضروري أيضا أن يتم رفع بعض من الأشرطة على الشعر القصير أو مفتوحة. على الحيوان كانت هذه الشعرات مغطاة بشكل طبيعي بالكراتين لمنع الانفجارات من الانفتاح، وبالتالي لجعل شعر، كان الكيراتين تجريد من بعض على الأقل من الشعر. وكان من الصعب صقل هذه العملية واستتبعت تجارب كبيرة من قبل صناع الشعر. على سبيل المثال، شعرت واحدة صانع & # 8220؛ المجمعة [جلود] في كيس من الكتان والمغلي لهم لمدة اثني عشر ساعة في المياه التي تحتوي على العديد من المواد الدهنية وحامض النيتريك & # 8221؛ (كريان، 1962، ص 381). على الرغم من أن هذه العمليات إزالة الكيراتين، فعلوا ذلك بسعر الصوف أقل جودة. وفتح التجارة في أمريكا الشمالية لم يزيد فقط من توريد الجلود في صناعة التعبئة، بل وفر أيضا مجموعة فرعية من الجلود التي أزيلت بالفعل شعيرات الحرس، وانكسر الكيراتين. تم تصنيف بئر القندس المستوردة من أمريكا الشمالية إما على شكل سمور رخامي (القشرة سيك & # 8211؛ سمور جاف)، أو سمور معطف (كاستور غرا & # 8211؛ سمور دهني). وكانت سمكة البرشمان من الحيوانات التي تم صيدها حديثا، والتي جفت جلودها ببساطة قبل تقديمها للتجارة. وكان سمور معطف جلود التي كان يرتديها الهنود لمدة سنة أو أكثر. مع ارتداء، سقطت الشعر الحرس خارج وأصبحت بيلت الزيتية وأكثر مرونة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، الكيراتين تغطي الشعر أقصر كسر. وبحلول منتصف القرن السابع عشر، جاء حاضن وصناع شعر لمعرفة أن الرقعة وسمور معطف يمكن الجمع بين لإنتاج قوية، على نحو سلس، طيعة، وذات جودة عالية مواد مضادة للماء. حتى 1720s، تم إنتاج شعر سمور مع نسب ثابتة نسبيا من معطف والجلود الرق، مما أدى إلى نقص دوري في واحد أو نوع آخر من بيلت. وقد تم تخفيف القيد عندما تم تطوير الكاروتينغ، وهي عملية كيميائية تحولت من خلالها جلود المخطوطات إلى نوع من سمور معطف. وكانت صيغة الجزرة الأصلية تتألف من أملاح الزئبق المخفف في حامض النيتريك، الذي كان يفرش على الأعمدة. وكان استخدام الزئبق تقدما كبيرا، ولكنه كان له أيضا عواقب صحية خطيرة على الحشيش والفلاحين، الذين أجبروا على تنفس بخار الزئبق لفترات طويلة. التعبير & # 8220؛ جنون كما هاتر & # 8221؛ من هذه الفترة، حيث هاجم البخار الجهاز العصبي لهؤلاء العمال. أسعار الرق و معطف بيفر. مستمدة من حسابات شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s، الجدول 1 يعرض بعض أسعار القرن الثامن عشر من رقعة سمكية و معطف سمور. من 1713 إلى 1726، قبل أن تصبح عملية الكارتينغ المعمول بها، سمى معطف سمور عموما سعر أعلى من سمور الرق، متوسط ​​6.6 شلن لكل بيلت بالمقارنة مع 5.5 شلن. وبمجرد استخدام الكاروتينغ على نطاق واسع، ومع ذلك، تم عكس الأسعار، ومن 1730 إلى 1770 مخطوطة تجاوزت معطف في كل عام تقريبا. وينظر إلى نفس النمط العام في بيانات باريس، على الرغم من أن هناك انعكاس تأخر، مما يشير إلى تباطؤ نشر في فرنسا تكنولوجيا الكاروتينغ. كما لاحظ كريان (1962، ص 382)، نوليت & # 8217؛ ق & لوت؛ 8217؛ آرت دي فير ديس تشابيلز وشملت الصيغة بالضبط، ولكن لم ينشر حتى 1765. ويكشف المتوسط ​​المرجح لأسعار الرقائق والمعاطف في لندن عن ثلاث حلقات. من 1713 إلى 1722 كانت الأسعار مستقرة جدا، وتذبذب ضمن النطاق الضيق من 5.0 و 5.5 شلن لكل بيلت. وخلال الفترة من 1723 إلى 1745، ارتفعت الأسعار ارتفاعا حادا وظلت في حدود 7 إلى 9 شلن. شهدت السنوات 1746 إلى 1763 زيادة كبيرة أخرى إلى أكثر من 12 شلن لكل قشر. وهناك عدد أقل بكثير من الأسعار المتاحة لباريس، ولكننا نعلم أنه في الفترة من 1739 إلى 1753 كان هذا الاتجاه أيضا أعلى بشكل حاد مع ارتفاع الأسعار أكثر من الضعف. سعر بئر بيفر في بريطانيا: 1713-1763. (الشلن في الجلد) (أ) المتوسط ​​المرجح لأسعار الرق، والمعطف، ونصف البرسيم. وتستند الأوزان على التجارة في هذه الأنواع من الفراء في فورت ألباني. أسعار الأنواع الفردية من الطوب غير متوفرة للسنوات، 1727-1735. المصدر: كارلوس ولويس، 1999. الطلب على القبعات بيفر. وكان السبب الرئيسي لارتفاع أسعار القندس في إنجلترا وفرنسا هو الطلب المتزايد على قبعات القندس، والتي شملت القبعات المصنوعة حصرا مع صوف سمور ويشار إلى & # 8220؛ القبعات القندس، & # 8221؛ وهذه القبعات التي تحتوي على مزيج من سمور وصوف تكلفة أقل، مثل الأرنب. هذه كانت تسمى & # 8220؛ شعرت القبعات. & # 8221؛ لسوء الحظ، سلسلة الاستهلاك الكلي للقرن الثامن عشر أوروبا غير متوفرة. ومع ذلك، لدينا عمل غريغوري كينغ & # 8217 المعاصر لإنجلترا الذي يوفر نقطة انطلاق جيدة. في جدول بعنوان & # 8220؛ الاستهلاك السنوي من أباريل، أنو 1688، & # 8221؛ وحسب الملك أن استهلاك جميع أنواع القبعات كان حوالي 3.3 مليون، أو ما يقرب من قبعة واحدة للشخص الواحد. وشمل الملك أيضا فئة ثانية، قبعات من جميع الأنواع، حيث قدر استهلاكها في 1.6 مليون (هارت، 1991، ص 293). وهذا يعني أنه في وقت مبكر من عام 1700، كانت السوق المحتملة للقبعات في إنجلترا وحدها حوالي 5 ملايين في السنة. خلال القرن القادم، كان الطلب المتزايد على لباد القندس نتيجة لعوامل عدد منها النمو السكاني، وسوق تصدير أكبر، والتحول نحو القبعات القندس من القبعات المصنوعة من مواد أخرى، والتحول من القبعات إلى القبعات. وتشير بيانات الصادرات البريطانية إلى أن الطلب على قبعات القندس كان ينمو ليس فقط في إنجلترا، ولكن في أوروبا أيضا. في عام 1700 تم تصدير 69،500 قبعة سمور متواضعة من انكلترا ونفس العدد تقريبا من القبعات شعرت؛ ولكن بحلول عام 1760، تم شحن أكثر قليلا من 500،000 القبعات سمور و 370،000 شعرت توقف من الموانئ الإنجليزية (لوسون، 1943، التطبيق I). في المجموع، على مدى السنوات السبعين إلى 1770، تم تصدير 21 مليون سمور وقبعات شعرية من انكلترا. بالإضافة إلى المنتج النهائي، صدرت إنجلترا المواد الخام، سمور بيلتس. في عام 1760، تم تصدير 15،000 جنيه استرليني في قوارض سمور جنبا إلى جنب مع مجموعة من الفراء الأخرى. تميل القبعات والجلود إلى الذهاب إلى أجزاء مختلفة من أوروبا. تم شحن البواخر الخام أساسا إلى شمال أوروبا، بما في ذلك ألمانيا، فلاندرز، هولندا وروسيا؛ في حين ذهبت القبعات إلى الأسواق الأوروبية الجنوبية من إسبانيا والبرتغال. في عام 1750، استوردت ألمانيا 16،500 القبعات سمور، في حين استوردت اسبانيا 110،000 والبرتغال 175،000 (لوسون، 1943، والملاحق F & G). على مدى العقود الستة الأولى من القرن الثامن عشر، نمت هذه الأسواق بشكل كبير، بحيث بلغت قيمة مبيعات قبعة سمور للبرتغال وحدها 89،000 £ في 1756-1760، والتي تمثل حوالي 300،000 قبعات أو ثلثي تجارة التصدير بأكملها. الوسطاء الأوروبيون في تجارة الفور. وبحلول القرن الثامن عشر، كان الطلب على الفراء في أوروبا يستجيب أساسا للصادرات من أمريكا الشمالية حيث يلعب الوسطاء دورا أساسيا. تم تنظيم التجارة الأمريكية، التي انتقلت على طول شبكات المياه الرئيسية، إلى حد كبير من خلال شركات مستأجرة. في أقصى الشمال، التي تعمل من خليج هدسون، كانت شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s المستأجرة في 1670. كومبانيي د & # 8217؛ أوتسيدنت، التي تأسست في 1718، كان الأكثر نجاحا في سلسلة من الشركات الفرنسية الاحتكارية. وهي تعمل من خلال نهر سانت لورانس وفي منطقة شرق البحيرات الكبرى. وكانت هناك أيضا تجارة إنجليزية من خلال ألباني ونيويورك، وتجارة فرنسية أسفل ميسيسيبي. و هدسون & # 8217؛ ق شركة خليج و كومباني د & # 8217؛ الغرب، على الرغم من أن مماثلة في العنوان، وكان هياكل داخلية مختلفة جدا. تم تنظيم التجارة الإنجليزية على طول خطوط هرمية مع مديري الرواتب، في حين أن الاحتكار الفرنسي أصدر تراخيص (كونجيس) أو تأجيرها من استخدام وظائفها. وقد سمح هيكل الشركة الإنجليزية بمزيد من السيطرة من المكتب الرئيسي في لندن، لكنه طلب أنظمة يمكن أن ترصد مديري المراكز التجارية (كارلوس ونيكولاس، 1990). وقد جعلت ترتيبات التأجير والترخيص للفرنسيين المراقبة غير ضرورية، ولكنها أدت إلى نظام لم يكن للمركز فيه تأثير يذكر على سير التجارة. وتميز الفرنسيون والإنجليزية كذلك بكيفية تفاعلهم مع المواطنين الأصليين. أنشأت شركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s خليج المشاركات حول خليج وانتظرت للهنود، في كثير من الأحيان الوسطاء، ليأتي إليهم. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، انتقل الفرنسيون إلى الداخل، حيث يتاجرون مباشرة مع الهنود الذين حصدوا الفراء. وكان الترتيب الفرنسي أكثر ملاءمة للتوسع، وبحلول نهاية القرن السابع عشر، انتقلوا إلى ما وراء نهري سانت لورانس وأوتاوا إلى منطقة البحيرات العظمى الغربية (انظر الشكل 1). وفي وقت لاحق أقاموا مواقع في قلب منطقة خليج هدسون النائية. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، استكشف الفرنسيون أنظمة الأنهار في الجنوب، وأنشأوا وظيفة في مصب نهر المسيسيبي. وكما ذكر آنفا، بعد توقيع معاهدة جاي، تم استبدال الفرنسيين في منطقة المسيسيبي بالمصالح الأمريكية التي شكلت لاحقا شركة الفور الأمريكية (هيجر، 1991). إن الاستيلاء الانجليزي على فرنسا الجديدة في نهاية الحروب الفرنسية والهندية في 1763 لم، في البداية، تغيير جذري في هيكل التجارة. بدلا من ذلك، تم استبدال الإدارة الفرنسية من قبل التجار الاسكتلنديين والإنجليزيين العاملين في مونتريال. ولكن في غضون عقد من الزمان، أعيد تنظيم تجارة مونتريال إلى شراكات بين التجار في مونتريال والتجار الذين شتاءوا في المناطق الداخلية. وأهم هذه الترتيبات أدى إلى تشكيل الشركة الشمالية الغربية، التي تنافست في العقدين الأولين من القرن التاسع عشر مع شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ ق (كارلوس وهوفمان، 1986). وبحلول العقود الأولى من القرن التاسع عشر، كانت شركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s باي، والشركة الشمالية الغربية، وشركة الفور الأمريكية، مجتمعة، نظاما للمناصب التجارية في جميع أنحاء أمريكا الشمالية، بما في ذلك الوظائف في ولاية أوريغون وكولومبيا البريطانية وعلى نهر ماكنزي. في عام 1821، اندمجت الشركة الشمالية الغربية وشركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s باي تحت اسم شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s. ثم قامت شركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s باي بالتجارة كاحتكار حتى أواخر 1840 عندما بدأت تواجه منافسة خطيرة من الصيادين إلى الجنوب. تغير دور الشركة في الشمال الغربي مرة أخرى مع الكونفدرالية الكندية في عام 1867. على مدى العقود القادمة وقعت مع العديد من القبائل الشمالية القبائل تغيير إلى الأبد نظام تجارة الفراء القديم في كندا. توريد الفراء: حصاد القندس والنضوب. خلال القرن الثامن عشر، تم تلبية التكنولوجيا المتغيرة للإنتاج المحسوس والطلب المتزايد على القبعات شعرية من خلال محاولات لزيادة المعروض من الفراء، وخاصة توريد لباد القندس. غير أن أي زيادة دائمة تعتمد في نهاية المطاف على قاعدة الموارد الحيوانية. كيف يجب أن تتغير القاعدة مع مرور الوقت يجب أن يكون مسألة تكهنات لأنه لا توجد تهم الحيوان من تلك الفترة؛ ومع ذلك، فإن الأدلة التي نقوم بها تشير إلى السيناريو الذي الإفراط في الحصاد، على الأقل في بعض السنوات، أدى إلى استنزاف خطير من القندس وربما غيرها من الحيوانات مثل الدلق التي تم تداولها أيضا. لماذا كان القندس الإفراط في حصاد كان مرتبطا ارتباطا وثيقا الأسعار كان السكان الأصليين يتلقون، ولكن المهم أيضا كان طبيعة حقوق الملكية الأصلية إلى المورد. حصاد في فورت ألباني ويورك مناطق المصنع. وقد استنزفت أعداد السماوات على طول مناطق الساحل الشرقي في أمريكا الشمالية، حيث حظيت تجارة الفراء بالقبول على نطاق واسع. والواقع أن البحث عن مصادر جديدة للإمداد إلى الغرب، بما في ذلك منطقة خليج هدسون، يعزى جزئيا إلى انخفاض مخزونات القندس في المناطق التي كانت فيها تجارة الفراء قائمة منذ فترة طويلة. على الرغم من أنه كان هناك نقاش ضئيل حول تأثير شركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s باي والفرنسية، الذين يتاجرون في منطقة خليج هدسون، وكان على الأسهم القندس، والسجلات كاملة بشكل ملحوظ من خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s توفر الشركة الأساس لاستدلالات معقولة حول النضوب. من 1700 هناك سلسلة سنوية دون انقطاع من عودة الفراء في فورت ألباني. تبدأ عوائد الفراء من مصنع يورك في عام 1716 (انظر الشكل 1). ويذكر في القصة سمور يعود في فورت ألباني ومصنع يورك للفترة 1700 حتي 1770 في الشكل 2. في فورت ألباني بلغ عدد جلود سمور خلال الفترة 1700 حتي 1720 حوالي 19،000، مع تقلبات واسعة من سنة إلى أخرى. وكان نطاق حوالي 15،000 إلى 30،000. بعد عام 1720 وحتى أواخر 1740s انخفض متوسط ​​العائدات بنحو 5000 جلود، وظلت ضمن نطاق أضيق نوعا ما من ما يقرب من 10،000 إلى 20،000 جلود. تم كسر فترة الاستقرار النسبي في السنوات الأخيرة من 1740s. في 1748 و 1749، ارتفعت العائدات إلى ما يقرب من 23،000 في المتوسط. وعقب هذه السنوات القوية على نحو غير عادي، انخفضت التجارة هبوطا حادا بحيث تم في عام 1756 تلقي أقل من 6000 بئر سمور. كان هناك انتعاش قصير في أوائل ستينيات القرن الماضي ولكن بحلول نهاية العقد انخفضت التجارة إلى ما دون مستويات منتصف القرن السابع عشر. في 1770، استغرق فورت ألباني في فقط 3،600 بيلفر بيلتس. هذا النمط & # 8211؛ عوائد كبيرة بشكل غير عادي في أواخر 1740s وعوائد منخفضة بعد ذلك & # 8211؛ يشير إلى أن القندس في منطقة فورت ألباني يجري استنفادها بشكل خطير. بيفر متداول في فورت ألباني ويورك فاكتوري 1700 & # 8211؛ 1770. المصدر: كارلوس ولويس، 1993. يعود القندس في مصنع يورك من 1716 إلى 1770، كما هو موضح في الشكل 2، وبعض من السمات الرئيسية للبيانات فورت ألباني. بعد بعض العائدات المنخفضة في وقت مبكر (من 1716 إلى 1720)، ارتفع عدد من سمور الطوب إلى متوسط ​​35،000. كانت هناك عائدات غير عادية في 1730 و 1731، عندما كان المتوسط ​​55600 جلود، ولكن إيصالات سمور ثم استقر عند حوالي 31،000 على مدى ما تبقى من العقد. وجاء الانقطاع الأول في نمط في أوائل 1740s بعد فترة وجيزة من تأسيس الفرنسية العديد من الوظائف التجارية في المنطقة. ومن المثير للدهشة أنه نظرا للتنافس المتزايد، زادت التجارة في قندس سمور في شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s إلى 34300، وهذا على مدى الفترة من 1740 إلى 1743. والواقع أن عودة 1742 من 38،791 جلود كانت الأكبر منذ وقد أنشأ الفرنسيون أي وظائف في المنطقة. وكانت العائدات في عام 1745 قوية أيضا، ولكن بعد ذلك العام بدأت التجارة في لباد سمور انخفاضا استمر حتى 1770. وكان متوسط ​​عوائد على مدى العقد الماضي 25،000؛ وكان المتوسط ​​خلال 1750s 18،000، و 15،500 فقط في 1760s. يعود نمط القندس إلى مصنع يورك & # 8211؛ عوائد عالية في أوائل 1740s تليها انخفاض كبير & # 8211؛ تشير بقوة إلى أنه، كما هو الحال في المناطق الجبلية فورت ألباني، انخفض عدد القندس إلى حد كبير. وتعتمد القدرة الاستيعابية الإجمالية لأي منطقة، أو حجم المخزون الحيواني، على طبيعة التضاريس والمحددات البيولوجية الكامنة مثل معدلات المواليد والوفيات. والعلاقة القياسية بين الحصاد السنوي وعدد الحيوانات هي لوتكا فولتيرا لوجستية، وتستخدم عادة في نماذج الموارد الطبيعية لربط النمو الطبيعي للسكان إلى حجم السكان: حيث X هو عدد السكان، F (X) هو النمو الطبيعي للسكان، و هو أقصى معدل نمو نسبي للسكان، و b = a / X، حيث X هو الحد الأعلى لحجم السكان. تعتمد الديناميات السكانية للأنواع المستغلة على الحصاد كل فترة: حيث دكس هو التغير السنوي في السكان و H هو الحصاد. ويعتبر اختيار المعلمة (أ) والحد الأقصى للسكان X عنصرا محوريا بالنسبة لتقديرات السكان، وقد استند إلى حد كبير إلى التقديرات المستمدة من أدبيات علم السموم والتقارير الميدانية لمقاطعات أونتاريو لكثافات القندس (كارلوس أند لويس، 1993). وتشير المحاكاة القائمة على المعادلة 2 إلى أنه حتى 1730، بقيت أعداد القندس عند مستويات تتفق تقريبا مع أقصى إدارة مستدامة للغلة، يشار إليها أحيانا على أنها الأمثل البيولوجي. ولكن بعد 1730s كان هناك انخفاض في الأسهم سمور إلى ما يقرب من نصف الحد الأقصى لمستويات الغلة المستدامة. وكان سبب الاستنفاد وثيق الصلة بما يحدث في أوروبا. وهناك، أدى الطلب المتزايد على القبعات الشعرية وتضاؤل ​​الإمدادات المحلية من الفراء إلى ارتفاع أسعار أسماك القندس. وقد أدت هذه الأسعار المرتفعة، بالاقتران مع المنافسة الناتجة من الفرنسيين في منطقة خليج هدسون، إلى تقديم شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ شروطا أفضل بكثير للمواطنين الذين جاءوا إلى مراكزهم التجارية (كارلوس ولويس، 1999). ويبين الشكل 3 مؤشر أسعار الفراء في فورت ألباني وفي مصنع يورك. ويمثل المؤشر مقياسا لما تلقاه المواطنون في السلع الأوروبية لفرائهم. في فورت ألباني، كانت أسعار الفراء قريبة من 70 من 1713 إلى 1731، ولكن في 1732، ردا على ارتفاع أسعار الفراء الأوروبية ودخول فيرندري، وهو تاجر فرنسي مهم، ارتفع السعر إلى 81. بعد ذلك العام، واصلت الأسعار ليرفع. كان النمط في مصنع يورك مشابها. على الرغم من أن الأسعار كانت مرتفعة في السنوات الأولى عندما تم إنشاء الوظيفة، ابتداء من عام 1724 استقر السعر إلى حوالي 70. في مصنع يورك، وجاء القفزة في السعر في عام 1738، وهو العام الذي أنشأ فيرندري وظيفة تجارية في المصنع النائي يورك. ثم استمرت الأسعار في الارتفاع. وكانت هذه أسعار الفراء الأعلى التي أدت إلى الإفراط في الحصاد، وفي نهاية المطاف انخفاض في مخزونات القندس. مؤشر أسعار الفراء: فورت ألباني ويورك فاكتوري، 1713 & # 8211؛ 1770. المصدر: كارلوس ولويس، 2001. أنظمة حقوق الملكية. إن الزيادة في السعر المدفوع للصيادين المحليين لم يكن من الضروري أن تؤدي إلى انخفاض في المخزونات الحيوانية، لأن الهنود يمكن أن تختار للحد من حصادها. فلماذا لم ترتبط ارتباطا وثيقا بنظام حقوق الملكية. يمكن للمرء أن يصنف حقوق الملكية على طول الطيف مع، في نهاية واحدة، الوصول المفتوح، حيث يمكن لأي شخص أن مطاردة أو الأسماك، ومن ناحية أخرى، الملكية الخاصة كاملة، حيث يملك المالك الوحيد السيطرة الكاملة على المورد. بين، هناك مجموعة من أنظمة حقوق الملكية مع إمكانية الوصول إليها من قبل مجتمع أو حكومة، وحيث الأفراد الأفراد في المجموعة ليس بالضرورة حقوق الملكية الخاصة. ويخلق الوصول المفتوح وضعا يكون فيه الحافز أقل للحفظ، لأن الحيوانات التي لا يحصدها صياد معين ستكون متاحة للصيادين الآخرين في المستقبل. وبالتالي كلما اقتربت من ذلك نظام لفتح إمكانية الوصول، كلما زاد احتمال استنفاد الموارد. وعبر مجتمعات السكان الأصليين في أمريكا الشمالية، يجد المرء مجموعة من أنظمة حقوق الملكية. كان لدى الأمريكيين الأصليين مفهوم التعدي والممتلكات، ولكن الحقوق الفردية والأسرية للموارد لم تكن مطلقة. في بعض الأحيان يشار إليها باسم مبدأ السامري السليم (مكمانوس، 1972)، لم يسمح الغرباء لحصاد الفراء في منطقة أخرى للتجارة، ولكن سمح لهم مطاردة اللعبة وحتى سمور للطعام. وكان جنبا إلى جنب مع هذا القيد على الملكية الخاصة أخلاق الكرم التي شملت ليبرالية تقديم الهدايا حيث كان أي زائر إلى واحد في المخيم كان ليتم توفيره مع الغذاء والمأوى. لماذا ظهرت قاعدة اجتماعية مثل تقديم الهدايا أو مبدأ السامري الصالح ذي الصلة بسبب طبيعة البيئة الأصلية. والهدف الرئيسي من مجتمعات السكان الأصليين هو البقاء. وكان الصيد محفوفا بالمخاطر، ولذلك وضعت قواعد من شأنها أن تقلل من خطر المجاعة. وكما يشير بيرك وآخرون) 1989، ص 153 (، فإن هذه املوارد تخضع للمبادئ األساسية التي ال ميكن ألي شخص أن يحول دون حصوله على ما يحتاج إليه من أجل بقاء أسرته. . & # 8221؛ وكانت هذه الإجراءات متبادلة، ولا سيما في العالم شبه القطب الشمالي، وهي آلية للتأمين. غير أن هذه المعايير خفضت أيضا الحافز على حفظ القندس والحيوانات الأخرى التي كانت جزءا من تجارة الفراء. وقد أدى الجمع بين هذه المعايير وارتفاع الأسعار المدفوعة إلى التجار المحليين إلى الحصاد الكبير في الأربعينيات واستنفاد المخزون الحيواني في نهاية المطاف. التجارة في السلع الأوروبية. وكان الهنود هم العاملون الرئيسيون في تجارة الفراء التجارية في أمريكا الشمالية. كانوا هم الذين اصطادوا الحيوانات، ونقلوا وتداولوا القشور أو الجلود إلى وسطاء أوروبيين. وكان التبادل طوعيا. في مقابل فراءهم، حصل الهنود على حد سواء الوصول إلى تكنولوجيا الحديد لتحسين الإنتاج والوصول إلى مجموعة واسعة من السلع الاستهلاكية الجديدة. غير أنه من المهم أن ندرك أنه على الرغم من أن السلع الأوروبية كانت جديدة بالنسبة للسكان الأصليين، فإن مفهوم التبادل لم يكن كذلك. وتشير الدلائل الأثرية إلى وجود تجارة واسعة بين القبائل الأصلية في شمال وجنوب أمريكا الشمالية قبل الاتصال الأوروبي. السجلات الاستثنائية لشركة هدسون & # 8217؛ s خليج تسمح لنا لتشكيل صورة واضحة عن ما كان الهنود شراء. ويبين الجدول 2 السلع التي تلقاها السكان الأصليون في مصنع يورك، الذي كان إلى حد بعيد أكبر المراكز التجارية لشركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ وكما يتضح من الجدول، فإن التجارة التجارية كانت أكثر من الحبات والحلي أو حتى البنادق والكحول؛ ولكن التجار الأصليون كانوا يتلقون مجموعة واسعة من المنتجات التي حسنت قدرتهم على تلبية احتياجاتهم المعيشية وسمحت لهم برفع مستوى معيشتهم. تم تجميع العناصر حسب الاستخدام. وكانت فئة السلع المنتجة تهيمن عليها الأسلحة النارية، بما في ذلك البنادق والطلقات والمسحوق، ولكنها تشمل أيضا السكاكين والأوزان والخيوط. المواطنين المتداولة للبنادق من أطوال مختلفة. تم استخدام بندقية 3 أقدام أساسا للطيور المائية وفي المناطق ذات الغابات الكثيفة حيث يمكن اطلاق النار على لعبة في مسافة قريبة. كان بندقية 4 أقدام أكثر دقة ومناسبة للمساحات المفتوحة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، يمكن أن بندقية 4 أقدام تلعب دورا في الحرب. كان الحفاظ على البنادق في البيئة القارية شبه القطبية مشكلة خطيرة، وفي نهاية المطاف، اضطرت شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s إلى إرسال تاجر السلاح إلى وظائفها التجارية لتقييم الجودة والمساعدة في الإصلاحات. كانت الغلايات والبطانيات هي العناصر الرئيسية في & # 8220؛ السلع المنزلية & # 8221؛ الفئة. هذه السلع ربما أصبحت ضرورات للمواطنين الذين تبناهم. ثم كانت هناك السلع الفاخرة، والتي تم تقسيمها إلى فئتين واسعتين: & # 8220؛ التبغ والكحول، & # 8221؛ و & # 8220؛ الكماليات الأخرى، & # 8221؛ (كارلوس ولويس، 2001؛ 2002). قيمة السلع المستلمة في مصنع يورك في عام 1740 (صنع سمور) لدينا معلومات أقل بكثير عن التجارة الفرنسية. وأفادت التقارير بأن الفرنسيين قد تبادلوا بنودا مماثلة، على الرغم من ارتفاع تكاليف النقل، على حد سواء، فإن الفراء المستلمة والسلع المتداولة تميل إلى أن تكون أعلى من حيث القيمة بالنسبة للوزن. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن الأوروبيين لم يقدموا أي غذاء للتجارة في القرن الثامن عشر. في الواقع، ساعد الهنود على توفير الوظائف مع الأسماك والطيور. وقد نما هذا الدور الممول للأغذية في القرن التاسع عشر كمجموعات تعرف باسم & # 8220؛ حارس المنزل كري & # 8221؛ جاء للعيش حول الوظائف؛ فضلا عن البميكان، التي قدمها السكان الأصليين، أصبحت مصدرا هاما من مصادر التغذية للأوروبيين المشاركين في الصيد الجاموس. ويعبر عن قيمة السلع المدرجة في الجدول 2 من حيث وحدة الحساب، القندس المصنوع، والتي تستخدمها شركة خليج هدسون & # 8217؛ s لتسجيل معاملاتها وتحديد سعر الصرف بين الفراء والسلع الأوروبية. وكان سعر قشر سمور رئيس 1 القندس مصنوعة، وكل نوع آخر من الفراء وجيدة تم تعيين سعر على أساس تلك الوحدة. على سبيل المثال، كان الدخان (نوع من المنك) سمور صنع، بطانية 7 صنع سمور، غالون من براندي، 4 صنع سمور، وفناء من القماش، 3؟ بيفر. وكانت هذه الأسعار الرسمية في مصنع يورك. وهكذا، تلقى الهنود، الذين يتاجرون بهذه الأسعار، على سبيل المثال، غالون من البراندي لأربع قوارير سمور رئيس، واثنان ياردة من القماش لسبعة قندس سمور، وبطانية ل 21 لبنة الدلق. وكان هذا هو التجارة المقايضة في أنه لم يتم استخدام أي عملة. وعلى الرغم من أن الأسعار الرسمية تنطوي على بعض أسعار الصرف بين الفراء والبضائع، فقد تم تشجيع عوامل شركة هدسون وشركة خليج للتجارة على أسعار أكثر ملاءمة للشركة. ومع ذلك، فإن المعدلات الفعلية تعتمد على ظروف السوق في أوروبا، والأهم من ذلك، مدى المنافسة الفرنسية في كندا. ويوضح الشكل 3 ارتفاع سعر الفراء في مصنع يورك وفورت ألباني استجابة لارتفاع أسعار القندس في لندن وباريس، فضلا عن وجود فرنسي أكبر في المنطقة (كارلوس ولويس، 1999). The increase in price also reflects the bargaining ability of Native traders during periods of direct competition between the English and French and later the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Northwest Company. At such times, the Native traders would play both parties off against each other (Ray and Freeman, 1978). The records of the Hudson’s Bay Company provide us with a unique window to the trading process, including the bargaining ability of Native traders, which is evident in the range of commodities received. Natives only bought goods they wanted. Clear from the Company records is that it was the Natives who largely determined the nature and quality of those goods. As well the records tell us how income from the trade was being allocated. The breakdown differed by post and varied over time; but, for example, in 1740 at York Factory, the distribution was: producer goods – 44 percent; household goods – 9 percent; alcohol and tobacco – 24 percent; and other luxuries – 23 percent. An important implication of the trade data is that, like many Europeans and most American colonists, Native Americans were taking part in the consumer revolution of the eighteenth century (de Vries, 1993; Shammas, 1993). In addition to necessities, they were consuming a remarkable variety of luxury products. Cloth, including baize, duffel, flannel, and gartering, was by far the largest class, but they also purchased beads, combs, looking glasses, rings, shirts, and vermillion among a much longer list. Because these items were heterogeneous in nature, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s head office went to great lengths to satisfy the specific tastes of Native consumers. Attempts were also made, not always successfully, to introduce new products (Carlos and Lewis, 2002). Perhaps surprising, given the emphasis that has been placed on it in the historical literature, was the comparatively small role of alcohol in the trade. At York Factory, Native traders received in 1740 a total of 494 gallons of brandy and “strong water,” which had a value of 1,976 made beaver . More than twice this amount was spent on tobacco in that year, nearly five times was spent on firearms, twice was spent on cloth, and more was spent on blankets and kettles than on alcohol. Thus, brandy, although a significant item of trade, was by no means a dominant one. In addition, alcohol could hardly have created serious social problems during this period. The amount received would have allowed for no more than ten two-ounce drinks per year for the adult Native population living in the region. The Labor Supply of Natives. Another important question can be addressed using the trade data. Were Natives “lazy and improvident” as they have been described by some contemporaries, or were they “industrious” like the American colonists and many Europeans? Central to answering this question is how Native groups responded to the price of furs, which began rising in the 1730s. Much of the literature argues that Indian trappers reduced their effort in response to higher fur prices; that is, they had backward-bending supply curves of labor. The view is that Natives had a fixed demand for European goods that, at higher fur prices, could be met with fewer furs, and hence less effort. Although widely cited, this argument does not stand up. Not only were higher fur prices accompanied by larger total harvests of furs in the region, but the pattern of Native expenditure also points to a scenario of greater effort. From the late 1730s to the 1760s, as the price of furs rose, the share of expenditure on luxury goods increased dramatically (see Figure 4). Thus Natives were not content simply to accept their good fortune by working less; rather they seized the opportunity provided to them by the strong fur market by increasing their effort in the commercial sector, thereby dramatically augmenting the purchases of those goods, namely the luxuries, that could raise their living standards. Native Expenditure Shares at York Factory 1716 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 2001. A Note on the Non-commercial Sector. As important as the fur trade was to Native Americans in the sub-arctic regions of Canada, commerce with the Europeans comprised just one, relatively small, part of their overall economy. Exact figures are not available, but the traditional sectors; hunting, gathering, food preparation and, to some extent, agriculture must have accounted for at least 75 to 80 percent of Native labor during these decades. Nevertheless, despite the limited time spent in commercial activity, the fur trade had a profound effect on the nature of the Native economy and Native society. The introduction of European producer goods, such as guns, and household goods, mainly kettles and blankets, changed the way Native Americans achieved subsistence; and the European luxury goods expanded the range of products that allowed them to move beyond subsistence. Most importantly, the fur trade connected Natives to Europeans in ways that affected how and how much they chose to work, where they chose to live, and how they exploited the resources on which the trade and their survival was based. المراجع. Berkes, Fikret, David Feeny, Bonnie J. McCay, and James M. Acheson. “The Benefits of the Commons.” Nature 340 (July 13, 1989): 91-93. Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. Carlos, Ann M., and Elizabeth Hoffman. “The North American Fur Trade: Bargaining to a Joint Profit Maximum under Incomplete Information, 1804-1821.” Journal of Economic History 46, no. 4 (1986): 967-86. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Indians, the Beaver and the Bay: The Economics of Depletion in the Lands of the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1700-1763.” Journal of Economic History 53, no. 3 (1993): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights, Competition and Depletion in the Eighteenth-Century Canadian Fur Trade: The Role of the European Market.” Canadian Journal of Economics 32, no. 3 (1999): 705-28. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights and Competition in the Depletion of the Beaver: Native Americans and the Hudson’s Bay Company.” In The Other Side of the Frontier: Economic Explorations in Native American History , edited by Linda Barrington, 131-149. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Trade, Consumption, and the Native Economy: Lessons from York Factory, Hudson Bay.” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (2001): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Marketing in the Land of Hudson Bay: Indian Consumers and the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670-1770.” Enterprise and Society 2 (2002): 285-317. Carlos, Ann and Nicholas, Stephen. “Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson’s Bay Company.” Journal of Economic History 50, no. 4 (1990): 853-75. Clarke, Fiona. Hats . London: Batsford, 1982. Crean, J. F. “Hats and the Fur Trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28, no. 3 (1962): 373-386. Corner, David. “The Tyranny of Fashion: The Case of the Felt-Hatting Trade in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Textile History 22, no.2 (1991): 153-178. de Vries, Jan. “Between Purchasing Power and the World of Goods: Understanding the Household Economy in Early Modern Europe.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 85-132. London: Routledge, 1993. Ginsburg Madeleine. The Hat: Trends and Traditions . London: Studio Editions, 1990. Haeger, John D. John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic . Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991. Harte, N.B. “The Economics of Clothing in the Late Seventeenth Century.” Textile History 22, no. 2 (1991): 277-296. Heidenreich, Conrad E., and Arthur J. Ray. The Early Fur Trade: A Study in Cultural Interaction . Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976. Helm, Jane, ed. Handbook of North American Indians 6, Subarctic . Washington: Smithsonian, 1981. Innis, Harold. The Fur Trade in Canada (revised edition) . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956. Krech III, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History . New York: Norton, 1999. Lawson, Murray G. Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943. McManus, John. “An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American Fur Trade.” Journal of Economic History 32, no.1 (1972): 36-53. Ray, Arthur J. Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. Ray, Arthur J. and Donald Freeman. “Give Us Good Measure”: An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company before 1763 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Ray, Arthur J. “Bayside Trade, 1720-1780.” In Historical Atlas of Canada 1 , edited by R. Cole Harris, plate 60. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Rich, E. E. Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670 – 1870 . 2 فولس. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960. Rich, E.E. “Trade Habits and Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26, no. 1 (1960): 35-53. Shammas, Carole. “Changes in English and Anglo-American Consumption from 1550-1800.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 177-205. London: Routledge, 1993. Wien, Thomas. “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association , New Series 1 (1990): 293-317. The Economic History of the Fur Trade: 1670 to 1870. Ann M. Carlos, University of Colorado. Frank D. Lewis, Queen’s University. المقدمة. A commercial fur trade in North America grew out of the early contact between Indians and European fisherman who were netting cod on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland and on the Bay of Gaspé near Quebec. Indians would trade the pelts of small animals, such as mink, for knives and other iron-based products, or for textiles. Exchange at first was haphazard and it was only in the late sixteenth century, when the wearing of beaver hats became fashionable, that firms were established who dealt exclusively in furs. High quality pelts are available only where winters are severe, so the trade took place predominantly in the regions we now know as Canada, although some activity took place further south along the Mississippi River and in the Rocky Mountains. There was also a market in deer skins that predominated in the Appalachians. The first firms to participate in the fur trade were French, and under French rule the trade spread along the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, and down the Mississippi. In the seventeenth century, following the Dutch, the English developed a trade through Albany. Then in 1670, a charter was granted by the British crown to the Hudson’s Bay Company, which began operating from posts along the coast of Hudson Bay (see Figure 1). For roughly the next hundred years, this northern region saw competition of varying intensity between the French and the English. With the conquest of New France in 1763, the French trade shifted to Scottish merchants operating out of Montreal. After the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty (1794), the northern border was defined and trade along the Mississippi passed to the American Fur Company under John Jacob Astor. In 1821, the northern participants merged under the name of the Hudson’s Bay Company, and for many decades this merged company continued to trade in furs. Finally, in the 1990s, under pressure from animal rights groups, the Hudson’s Bay Company, which in the twentieth century had become a large Canadian retailer, ended the fur component of its operation. Hudson’s Bay Company Hinterlands. Source: Ray (1987, plate 60) The fur trade was based on pelts destined either for the luxury clothing market or for the felting industries, of which hatting was the most important. This was a transatlantic trade. The animals were trapped and exchanged for goods in North America, and the pelts were transported to Europe for processing and final sale. As a result, forces operating on the demand side of the market in Europe and on the supply side in North America determined prices and volumes; while intermediaries, who linked the two geographically separated areas, determined how the trade was conducted. The Demand for Fur: Hats, Pelts and Prices. However much hats may be considered an accessory today, they were for centuries a mandatory part of everyday dress, for both men and women. Of course styles changed, and, in response to the vagaries of fashion and politics, hats took on various forms and shapes, from the high-crowned, broad-brimmed hat of the first two Stuarts to the conically-shaped, plainer hat of the Puritans. The Restoration of Charles II of England in 1660 and the Glorious Revolution in 1689 brought their own changes in style (Clarke, 1982, chapter 1). What remained a constant was the material from which hats were made – wool felt. The wool came from various animals, but towards the end of the fifteenth century beaver wool began to be predominate. Over time, beaver hats became increasingly popular eventually dominating the market. Only in the nineteenth century did silk replace beaver in high-fashion men’s hats. Furs have long been classified as either fancy or staple. Fancy furs are those demanded for the beauty and luster of their pelt. These furs – mink, fox, otter – are fashioned by furriers into garments or robes. Staple furs are sought for their wool. All staple furs have a double coating of hair with long, stiff, smooth hairs called guard hairs which protect the shorter, softer hair, called wool, that grows next to the animal skin. Only the wool can be felted. Each of the shorter hairs is barbed and once the barbs at the ends of the hair are open, the wool can be compressed into a solid piece of material called felt. The prime staple fur has been beaver, although muskrat and rabbit have also been used. Wool felt was used for over two centuries to make high-fashion hats. Felt is stronger than a woven material. It will not tear or unravel in a straight line; it is more resistant to water, and it will hold its shape even if it gets wet. These characteristics made felt the prime material for hatters especially when fashion called for hats with large brims. The highest quality hats would be made fully from beaver wool, whereas lower quality hats included inferior wool, such as rabbit. Felt Making. The transformation of beaver skins into felt and then hats was a highly skilled activity. The process required first that the beaver wool be separated from the guard hairs and the skin, and that some of the wool have open barbs, since felt required some open-barbed wool in the mixture. Felt dates back to the nomads of Central Asia, who are said to have invented the process of felting and made their tents from this light but durable material. Although the art of felting disappeared from much of western Europe during the first millennium, felt-making survived in Russia, Sweden, and Asia Minor. As a result of the Medieval Crusades, felting was reintroduced through the Mediterranean into France (Crean, 1962). In Russia, the felting industry was based on the European beaver ( castor fiber ). Given their long tradition of working with beaver pelts, the Russians had perfected the art of combing out the short barbed hairs from among the longer guard hairs, a technology that they safeguarded. As a consequence, the early felting trades in England and France had to rely on beaver wool imported from Russia, although they also used domestic supplies of wool from other animals, such rabbit, sheep and goat. But by the end of the seventeenth century, Russian supplies were drying up, reflecting the serious depletion of the European beaver population. Coincident with the decline in European beaver stocks was the emergence of a North American trade. North American beaver ( castor canadensis ) was imported through agents in the English, French and Dutch colonies. Although many of the pelts were shipped to Russia for initial processing, the growth of the beaver market in England and France led to the development of local technologies, and more knowledge of the art of combing. Separating the beaver wool from the felt was only the first step in the felting process. It was also necessary that some of the barbs on the short hairs be raised or open. On the animal these hairs were naturally covered with keratin to prevent the barbs from opening, thus to make felt, the keratin had to be stripped from at least some of the hairs. The process was difficult to refine and entailed considerable experimentation by felt-makers. For instance, one felt maker “bundled [the skins] in a sack of linen and boiled [them] for twelve hours in water containing several fatty substances and nitric acid” (Crean, 1962, p. 381). Although such processes removed the keratin, they did so at the price of a lower quality wool. The opening of the North American trade not only increased the supply of skins for the felting industry, it also provided a subset of skins whose guard hairs had already been removed and the keratin broken down. Beaver pelts imported from North America were classified as either parchment beaver ( castor sec – dry beaver), or coat beaver ( castor gras – greasy beaver). Parchment beaver were from freshly caught animals, whose skins were simply dried before being presented for trade. Coat beaver were skins that had been worn by the Indians for a year or more. With wear, the guard hairs fell out and the pelt became oily and more pliable. In addition, the keratin covering the shorter hairs broke down. By the middle of the seventeenth century, hatters and felt-makers came to learn that parchment and coat beaver could be combined to produce a strong, smooth, pliable, top-quality waterproof material. Until the 1720s, beaver felt was produced with relatively fixed proportions of coat and parchment skins, which led to periodic shortages of one or the other type of pelt. The constraint was relaxed when carotting was developed, a chemical process by which parchment skins were transformed into a type of coat beaver. The original carrotting formula consisted of salts of mercury diluted in nitric acid, which was brushed on the pelts. The use of mercury was a big advance, but it also had serious health consequences for hatters and felters, who were forced to breathe the mercury vapor for extended periods. The expression “mad as a hatter” dates from this period, as the vapor attacked the nervous systems of these workers. The Prices of Parchment and Coat Beaver. Drawn from the accounts of the Hudson’s Bay Company, Table 1 presents some eighteenth century prices of parchment and coat beaver pelts. From 1713 to 1726, before the carotting process had become established, coat beaver generally fetched a higher price than parchment beaver, averaging 6.6 shillings per pelt as compared to 5.5 shillings. Once carotting was widely used, however, the prices were reversed, and from 1730 to 1770 parchment exceeded coat in almost every year. The same general pattern is seen in the Paris data, although there the reversal was delayed, suggesting slower diffusion in France of the carotting technology. As Crean (1962, p. 382) notes, Nollet’s L’Art de faire des chapeaux included the exact formula, but it was not published until 1765. A weighted average of parchment and coat prices in London reveals three episodes. From 1713 to 1722 prices were quite stable, fluctuating within the narrow band of 5.0 and 5.5 shillings per pelt. During the period, 1723 to 1745, prices moved sharply higher and remained in the range of 7 to 9 shillings. The years 1746 to 1763 saw another big increase to over 12 shillings per pelt. There are far fewer prices available for Paris, but we do know that in the period 1739 to 1753 the trend was also sharply higher with prices more than doubling. Price of Beaver Pelts in Britain: 1713-1763. (shillings per skin) a A weighted average of the prices of parchment, coat and half parchment beaver pelts. Weights are based on the trade in these types of furs at Fort Albany. Prices of the individual types of pelts are not available for the years, 1727 to 1735. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 1999. The Demand for Beaver Hats. The main cause of the rising beaver pelt prices in England and France was the increasing demand for beaver hats, which included hats made exclusively with beaver wool and referred to as “beaver hats,” and those hats containing a combination of beaver and a lower cost wool, such as rabbit. These were called “felt hats.” Unfortunately, aggregate consumption series for the eighteenth century Europe are not available. We do, however, have Gregory King’s contemporary work for England which provides a good starting point. In a table entitled “Annual Consumption of Apparell, anno 1688,” King calculated that consumption of all types of hats was about 3.3 million, or nearly one hat per person. King also included a second category, caps of all sorts, for which he estimated consumption at 1.6 million (Harte, 1991, p. 293). This means that as early as 1700, the potential market for hats in England alone was nearly 5 million per year. Over the next century, the rising demand for beaver pelts was a result of a number factors including population growth, a greater export market, a shift toward beaver hats from hats made of other materials, and a shift from caps to hats. The British export data indicate that demand for beaver hats was growing not just in England, but in Europe as well. In 1700 a modest 69,500 beaver hats were exported from England and almost the same number of felt hats; but by 1760, slightly over 500,000 beaver hats and 370,000 felt halts were shipped from English ports (Lawson, 1943, app. I). In total, over the seventy years to 1770, 21 million beaver and felt hats were exported from England. In addition to the final product, England exported the raw material, beaver pelts. In 1760, £15,000 in beaver pelts were exported along with a range of other furs. The hats and the pelts tended to go to different parts of Europe. Raw pelts were shipped mainly to northern Europe, including Germany, Flanders, Holland and Russia; whereas hats went to the southern European markets of Spain and Portugal. In 1750, Germany imported 16,500 beaver hats, while Spain imported 110,000 and Portugal 175,000 (Lawson, 1943, appendices F & G). Over the first six decades of the eighteenth century, these markets grew dramatically, such that the value of beaver hat sales to Portugal alone was £89,000 in 1756-1760, representing about 300,000 hats or two-thirds of the entire export trade. European Intermediaries in the Fur Trade. By the eighteenth century, the demand for furs in Europe was being met mainly by exports from North America with intermediaries playing an essential role. The American trade, which moved along the main water systems, was organized largely through chartered companies. At the far north, operating out of Hudson Bay, was the Hudson’s Bay Company, chartered in 1670. The Compagnie d’Occident , founded in 1718, was the most successful of a series of monopoly French companies. It operated through the St. Lawrence River and in the region of the eastern Great Lakes. There was also an English trade through Albany and New York, and a French trade down the Mississippi. The Hudson’s Bay Company and the Compagnie d’Occident, although similar in title, had very different internal structures. The English trade was organized along hierarchical lines with salaried managers, whereas the French monopoly issued licenses ( congés ) or leased out the use of its posts. The structure of the English company allowed for more control from the London head office, but required systems that could monitor the managers of the trading posts (Carlos and Nicholas, 1990). The leasing and licensing arrangements of the French made monitoring unnecessary, but led to a system where the center had little influence over the conduct of the trade. The French and English were distinguished as well by how they interacted with the Natives. The Hudson’s Bay Company established posts around the Bay and waited for the Indians, often middlemen, to come to them. The French, by contrast, moved into the interior, directly trading with the Indians who harvested the furs. The French arrangement was more conducive to expansion, and by the end of the seventeenth century, they had moved beyond the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers into the western Great Lakes region (see Figure 1). Later they established posts in the heart of the Hudson Bay hinterland. In addition, the French explored the river systems to the south, setting up a post at the mouth of the Mississippi. As noted earlier, after Jay’s Treaty was signed, the French were replaced in the Mississippi region by U.S. interests which later formed the American Fur Company (Haeger, 1991). The English takeover of New France at the end of the French and Indian Wars in 1763 did not, at first, fundamentally change the structure of the trade. Rather, French management was replaced by Scottish and English merchants operating in Montreal. But, within a decade, the Montreal trade was reorganized into partnerships between merchants in Montreal and traders who wintered in the interior. The most important of these arrangements led to the formation of the Northwest Company, which for the first two decades of the nineteenth century, competed with the Hudson’s Bay Company (Carlos and Hoffman, 1986). By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Northwest Company, and the American Fur Company had, combined, a system of trading posts across North America, including posts in Oregon and British Columbia and on the Mackenzie River. In 1821, the Northwest Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company merged under the name of the Hudson’s Bay Company. The Hudson’s Bay Company then ran the trade as a monopsony until the late 1840s when it began facing serious competition from trappers to the south. The Company’s role in the northwest changed again with the Canadian Confederation in 1867. Over the next decades treaties were signed with many of the northern tribes forever changing the old fur trade order in Canada. The Supply of Furs: The Harvesting of Beaver and Depletion. During the eighteenth century, the changing technology of felt production and the growing demand for felt hats were met by attempts to increase the supply of furs, especially the supply of beaver pelts. Any permanent increase, however, was ultimately dependent on the animal resource base. How that base changed over time must be a matter of speculation since no animal counts exist from that period; nevertheless, the evidence we do have points to a scenario in which over-harvesting, at least in some years, gave rise to serious depletion of the beaver and possibly other animals such as marten that were also being traded. Why the beaver were over-harvested was closely related to the prices Natives were receiving, but important as well was the nature of Native property rights to the resource. Harvests in the Fort Albany and York Factory Regions. That beaver populations along the Eastern seaboard regions of North America were depleted as the fur trade advanced is widely accepted. In fact the search for new sources of supply further west, including the region of Hudson Bay, has been attributed in part to dwindling beaver stocks in areas where the fur trade had been long established. Although there has been little discussion of the impact that the Hudson’s Bay Company and the French, who traded in the region of Hudson Bay, were having on the beaver stock, the remarkably complete records of the Hudson’s Bay Company provide the basis for reasonable inferences about depletion. From 1700 there is an uninterrupted annual series of fur returns at Fort Albany; the fur returns from York Factory begin in 1716 (see Figure 1). The beaver returns at Fort Albany and York Factory for the period 1700 to 1770 are described in Figure 2. At Fort Albany the number of beaver skins over the period 1700 to 1720 averaged roughly 19,000, with wide year-to-year fluctuations; the range was about 15,000 to 30,000. After 1720 and until the late 1740s average returns declined by about 5,000 skins, and remained within the somewhat narrower range of roughly 10,000 to 20,000 skins. The period of relative stability was broken in the final years of the 1740s. In 1748 and 1749, returns increased to an average of nearly 23,000. Following these unusually strong years, the trade fell precipitously so that in 1756 fewer than 6,000 beaver pelts were received. There was a brief recovery in the early 1760s but by the end decade trade had fallen below even the mid-1750s levels. In 1770, Fort Albany took in just 3,600 beaver pelts. This pattern – unusually large returns in the late 1740s and low returns thereafter – indicates that the beaver in the Fort Albany region were being seriously depleted. Beaver Traded at Fort Albany and York Factory 1700 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 1993. The beaver returns at York Factory from 1716 to 1770, also described in Figure 2, have some of the key features of the Fort Albany data. After some low returns early on (from 1716 to 1720), the number of beaver pelts increased to an average of 35,000. There were extraordinary returns in 1730 and 1731, when the average was 55,600 skins, but beaver receipts then stabilized at about 31,000 over the remainder of the decade. The first break in the pattern came in the early 1740s shortly after the French established several trading posts in the area. Surprisingly perhaps, given the increased competition, trade in beaver pelts at the Hudson’s Bay Company post increased to an average of 34,300, this over the period 1740 to 1743. Indeed, the 1742 return of 38,791 skins was the largest since the French had established any posts in the region. The returns in 1745 were also strong, but after that year the trade in beaver pelts began a decline that continued through to 1770. Average returns over the rest of the decade were 25,000; the average during the 1750s was 18,000, and just 15,500 in the 1760s. The pattern of beaver returns at York Factory – high returns in the early 1740s followed by a large decline – strongly suggests that, as in the Fort Albany hinterland, the beaver population had been greatly reduced. The overall carrying capacity of any region, or the size of the animal stock, depends on the nature of the terrain and the underlying biological determinants such as birth and death rates. A standard relationship between the annual harvest and the animal population is the Lotka-Volterra logistic, commonly used in natural resource models to relate the natural growth of a population to the size of that population: where X is the population, F(X) is the natural growth in the population, a is the maximum proportional growth rate of the population, and b = a/X , where X is the upper limit to population size. The population dynamics of the species exploited depends on the harvest each period: where DX is the annual change in the population and H is the harvest. The choice of parameter a and maximum population X is central to the population estimates and have been based largely on estimates from the beaver ecology literature and Ontario provincial field reports of beaver densities (Carlos and Lewis, 1993). Simulations based on equation 2 suggest that, until the 1730s, beaver populations remained at levels roughly consistent with maximum sustained yield management, sometimes referred to as the biological optimum. But after the 1730s there was a decline in beaver stocks to about half the maximum sustained yield levels. The cause of the depletion was closely related to what was happening in Europe. There, buoyant demand for felt hats and dwindling local fur supplies resulted in much higher prices for beaver pelts. These higher prices, in conjunction with the resulting competition from the French in the Hudson Bay region, led the Hudson’s Bay Company to offer much better terms to Natives who came to their trading posts (Carlos and Lewis, 1999). Figure 3 reports a price index for furs at Fort Albany and at York Factory. The index represents a measure of what Natives received in European goods for their furs. At Fort Albany, fur prices were close to 70 from 1713 to 1731, but in 1732, in response to higher European fur prices and the entry of la Vérendrye, an important French trader, the price jumped to 81. After that year, prices continued to rise. The pattern at York Factory was similar. Although prices were high in the early years when the post was being established, beginning in 1724 the price settled down to about 70. At York Factory, the jump in price came in 1738, which was the year la Vérendrye set up a trading post in the York Factory hinterland. Prices then continued to increase. It was these higher fur prices that led to over-harvesting and, ultimately, a decline in beaver stocks. Price Index for Furs: Fort Albany and York Factory, 1713 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 2001. Property Rights Regimes. An increase in price paid to Native hunters did not have to lead to a decline in the animal stocks, because Indians could have chosen to limit their harvesting. Why they did not was closely related their system of property rights. One can classify property rights along a spectrum with, at one end, open access, where anyone can hunt or fish, and at the other, complete private property, where a sole owner has full control over the resource. Between, there are a range of property rights regimes with access controlled by a community or a government, and where individual members of the group do not necessarily have private property rights. Open access creates a situation where there is less incentive to conserve, because animals not harvested by a particular hunter will be available to other hunters in the future. Thus the closer is a system to open access the more likely it is that the resource will be depleted. Across aboriginal societies in North America, one finds a range of property rights regimes. Native Americans did have a concept of trespass and of property, but individual and family rights to resources were not absolute. Sometimes referred to as the Good Samaritan principle (McManus, 1972), outsiders were not permitted to harvest furs on another’s territory for trade, but they were allowed to hunt game and even beaver for food. Combined with this limitation to private property was an Ethic of Generosity that included liberal gift-giving where any visitor to one’s encampment was to be supplied with food and shelter. Why a social norm such as gift-giving or the related Good Samaritan principle emerged was due to the nature of the aboriginal environment. The primary objective of aboriginal societies was survival. Hunting was risky, and so rules were put in place that would reduce the risk of starvation. As Berkes et al .(1989, p. 153) notes, for such societies: “all resources are subject to the overriding principle that no one can prevent a person from obtaining what he needs for his family’s survival.” Such actions were reciprocal and especially in the sub-arctic world were an insurance mechanism. These norms, however, also reduced the incentive to conserve the beaver and other animals that were part of the fur trade. The combination of these norms and the increasing price paid to Native traders led to the large harvests in the 1740s and ultimately depletion of the animal stock. The Trade in European Goods. Indians were the primary agents in the North American commercial fur trade. It was they who hunted the animals, and transported and traded the pelts or skins to European intermediaries. The exchange was a voluntary. In return for their furs, Indians obtained both access to an iron technology to improve production and access to a wide range of new consumer goods. It is important to recognize, however, that although the European goods were new to aboriginals, the concept of exchange was not. The archaeological evidence indicates an extensive trade between Native tribes in the north and south of North America prior to European contact. The extraordinary records of the Hudson’s Bay Company allow us to form a clear picture of what Indians were buying. Table 2 lists the goods received by Natives at York Factory, which was by far the largest of the Hudson’s Bay Company trading posts. As is evident from the table, the commercial trade was more than in beads and baubles or even guns and alcohol; rather Native traders were receiving a wide range of products that improved their ability to meet their subsistence requirements and allowed them to raise their living standards. The items have been grouped by use. The producer goods category was dominated by firearms, including guns, shot and powder, but also includes knives, awls and twine. The Natives traded for guns of different lengths. The 3-foot gun was used mainly for waterfowl and in heavily forested areas where game could be shot at close range. The 4-foot gun was more accurate and suitable for open spaces. In addition, the 4-foot gun could play a role in warfare. Maintaining guns in the harsh sub-arctic environment was a serious problem, and ultimately, the Hudson’s Bay Company was forced to send gunsmiths to its trading posts to assess quality and help with repairs. Kettles and blankets were the main items in the “household goods” الفئة. These goods probably became necessities to the Natives who adopted them. Then there were the luxury goods, which have been divided into two broad categories: “tobacco and alcohol,” and “other luxuries,” dominated by cloth of various kinds (Carlos and Lewis, 2001; 2002). Value of Goods Received at York Factory in 1740 (made beaver) We have much less information about the French trade. The French are reported to have exchanged similar items, although given their higher transport costs, both the furs received and the goods traded tended to be higher in value relative to weight. The Europeans, it might be noted, supplied no food to the trade in the eighteenth century. In fact, Indians helped provision the posts with fish and fowl. This role of food purveyor grew in the nineteenth century as groups known as the “home guard Cree” came to live around the posts; as well, pemmican, supplied by Natives, became an important source of nourishment for Europeans involved in the buffalo hunts. The value of the goods listed in Table 2 is expressed in terms of the unit of account, the made beaver , which the Hudson’s Bay Company used to record its transactions and determine the rate of exchange between furs and European goods. The price of a prime beaver pelt was 1 made beaver , and every other type of fur and good was assigned a price based on that unit. For example, a marten (a type of mink) was a made beaver , a blanket was 7 made beaver , a gallon of brandy, 4 made beaver , and a yard of cloth, 3? made beaver . These were the official prices at York Factory. Thus Indians, who traded at these prices, received, for example, a gallon of brandy for four prime beaver pelts, two yards of cloth for seven beaver pelts, and a blanket for 21 marten pelts. This was barter trade in that no currency was used; and although the official prices implied certain rates of exchange between furs and goods, Hudson’s Bay Company factors were encouraged to trade at rates more favorable to the Company. The actual rates, however, depended on market conditions in Europe and, most importantly, the extent of French competition in Canada. Figure 3 illustrates the rise in the price of furs at York Factory and Fort Albany in response to higher beaver prices in London and Paris, as well as to a greater French presence in the region (Carlos and Lewis, 1999). The increase in price also reflects the bargaining ability of Native traders during periods of direct competition between the English and French and later the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Northwest Company. At such times, the Native traders would play both parties off against each other (Ray and Freeman, 1978). The records of the Hudson’s Bay Company provide us with a unique window to the trading process, including the bargaining ability of Native traders, which is evident in the range of commodities received. Natives only bought goods they wanted. Clear from the Company records is that it was the Natives who largely determined the nature and quality of those goods. As well the records tell us how income from the trade was being allocated. The breakdown differed by post and varied over time; but, for example, in 1740 at York Factory, the distribution was: producer goods – 44 percent; household goods – 9 percent; alcohol and tobacco – 24 percent; and other luxuries – 23 percent. An important implication of the trade data is that, like many Europeans and most American colonists, Native Americans were taking part in the consumer revolution of the eighteenth century (de Vries, 1993; Shammas, 1993). In addition to necessities, they were consuming a remarkable variety of luxury products. Cloth, including baize, duffel, flannel, and gartering, was by far the largest class, but they also purchased beads, combs, looking glasses, rings, shirts, and vermillion among a much longer list. Because these items were heterogeneous in nature, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s head office went to great lengths to satisfy the specific tastes of Native consumers. Attempts were also made, not always successfully, to introduce new products (Carlos and Lewis, 2002). Perhaps surprising, given the emphasis that has been placed on it in the historical literature, was the comparatively small role of alcohol in the trade. At York Factory, Native traders received in 1740 a total of 494 gallons of brandy and “strong water,” which had a value of 1,976 made beaver . More than twice this amount was spent on tobacco in that year, nearly five times was spent on firearms, twice was spent on cloth, and more was spent on blankets and kettles than on alcohol. Thus, brandy, although a significant item of trade, was by no means a dominant one. In addition, alcohol could hardly have created serious social problems during this period. The amount received would have allowed for no more than ten two-ounce drinks per year for the adult Native population living in the region. The Labor Supply of Natives. Another important question can be addressed using the trade data. Were Natives “lazy and improvident” as they have been described by some contemporaries, or were they “industrious” like the American colonists and many Europeans? Central to answering this question is how Native groups responded to the price of furs, which began rising in the 1730s. Much of the literature argues that Indian trappers reduced their effort in response to higher fur prices; that is, they had backward-bending supply curves of labor. The view is that Natives had a fixed demand for European goods that, at higher fur prices, could be met with fewer furs, and hence less effort. Although widely cited, this argument does not stand up. Not only were higher fur prices accompanied by larger total harvests of furs in the region, but the pattern of Native expenditure also points to a scenario of greater effort. From the late 1730s to the 1760s, as the price of furs rose, the share of expenditure on luxury goods increased dramatically (see Figure 4). Thus Natives were not content simply to accept their good fortune by working less; rather they seized the opportunity provided to them by the strong fur market by increasing their effort in the commercial sector, thereby dramatically augmenting the purchases of those goods, namely the luxuries, that could raise their living standards. Native Expenditure Shares at York Factory 1716 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 2001. A Note on the Non-commercial Sector. As important as the fur trade was to Native Americans in the sub-arctic regions of Canada, commerce with the Europeans comprised just one, relatively small, part of their overall economy. Exact figures are not available, but the traditional sectors; hunting, gathering, food preparation and, to some extent, agriculture must have accounted for at least 75 to 80 percent of Native labor during these decades. Nevertheless, despite the limited time spent in commercial activity, the fur trade had a profound effect on the nature of the Native economy and Native society. The introduction of European producer goods, such as guns, and household goods, mainly kettles and blankets, changed the way Native Americans achieved subsistence; and the European luxury goods expanded the range of products that allowed them to move beyond subsistence. Most importantly, the fur trade connected Natives to Europeans in ways that affected how and how much they chose to work, where they chose to live, and how they exploited the resources on which the trade and their survival was based. المراجع. Berkes, Fikret, David Feeny, Bonnie J. McCay, and James M. Acheson. “The Benefits of the Commons.” Nature 340 (July 13, 1989): 91-93. Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. Carlos, Ann M., and Elizabeth Hoffman. “The North American Fur Trade: Bargaining to a Joint Profit Maximum under Incomplete Information, 1804-1821.” Journal of Economic History 46, no. 4 (1986): 967-86. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Indians, the Beaver and the Bay: The Economics of Depletion in the Lands of the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1700-1763.” Journal of Economic History 53, no. 3 (1993): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights, Competition and Depletion in the Eighteenth-Century Canadian Fur Trade: The Role of the European Market.” Canadian Journal of Economics 32, no. 3 (1999): 705-28. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights and Competition in the Depletion of the Beaver: Native Americans and the Hudson’s Bay Company.” In The Other Side of the Frontier: Economic Explorations in Native American History , edited by Linda Barrington, 131-149. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Trade, Consumption, and the Native Economy: Lessons from York Factory, Hudson Bay.” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (2001): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Marketing in the Land of Hudson Bay: Indian Consumers and the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670-1770.” Enterprise and Society 2 (2002): 285-317. Carlos, Ann and Nicholas, Stephen. “Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson’s Bay Company.” Journal of Economic History 50, no. 4 (1990): 853-75. Clarke, Fiona. Hats . London: Batsford, 1982. Crean, J. F. “Hats and the Fur Trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28, no. 3 (1962): 373-386. Corner, David. “The Tyranny of Fashion: The Case of the Felt-Hatting Trade in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Textile History 22, no.2 (1991): 153-178. de Vries, Jan. “Between Purchasing Power and the World of Goods: Understanding the Household Economy in Early Modern Europe.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 85-132. London: Routledge, 1993. Ginsburg Madeleine. The Hat: Trends and Traditions . London: Studio Editions, 1990. Haeger, John D. John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic . Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991. Harte, N.B. “The Economics of Clothing in the Late Seventeenth Century.” Textile History 22, no. 2 (1991): 277-296. Heidenreich, Conrad E., and Arthur J. Ray. The Early Fur Trade: A Study in Cultural Interaction . Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976. Helm, Jane, ed. Handbook of North American Indians 6, Subarctic . Washington: Smithsonian, 1981. Innis, Harold. The Fur Trade in Canada (revised edition) . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956. Krech III, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History . New York: Norton, 1999. Lawson, Murray G. Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943. McManus, John. “An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American Fur Trade.” Journal of Economic History 32, no.1 (1972): 36-53. Ray, Arthur J. Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. Ray, Arthur J. and Donald Freeman. “Give Us Good Measure”: An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company before 1763 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Ray, Arthur J. “Bayside Trade, 1720-1780.” In Historical Atlas of Canada 1 , edited by R. Cole Harris, plate 60. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Rich, E. E. Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670 – 1870 . 2 فولس. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960. Rich, E.E. “Trade Habits and Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26, no. 1 (1960): 35-53. Shammas, Carole. “Changes in English and Anglo-American Consumption from 1550-1800.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 177-205. London: Routledge, 1993. Wien, Thomas. “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association , New Series 1 (1990): 293-317. The Economic History of the Fur Trade: 1670 to 1870. Ann M. Carlos, University of Colorado. Frank D. Lewis, Queen’s University. المقدمة. A commercial fur trade in North America grew out of the early contact between Indians and European fisherman who were netting cod on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland and on the Bay of Gaspé near Quebec. Indians would trade the pelts of small animals, such as mink, for knives and other iron-based products, or for textiles. Exchange at first was haphazard and it was only in the late sixteenth century, when the wearing of beaver hats became fashionable, that firms were established who dealt exclusively in furs. High quality pelts are available only where winters are severe, so the trade took place predominantly in the regions we now know as Canada, although some activity took place further south along the Mississippi River and in the Rocky Mountains. There was also a market in deer skins that predominated in the Appalachians. The first firms to participate in the fur trade were French, and under French rule the trade spread along the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, and down the Mississippi. In the seventeenth century, following the Dutch, the English developed a trade through Albany. Then in 1670, a charter was granted by the British crown to the Hudson’s Bay Company, which began operating from posts along the coast of Hudson Bay (see Figure 1). For roughly the next hundred years, this northern region saw competition of varying intensity between the French and the English. With the conquest of New France in 1763, the French trade shifted to Scottish merchants operating out of Montreal. After the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty (1794), the northern border was defined and trade along the Mississippi passed to the American Fur Company under John Jacob Astor. In 1821, the northern participants merged under the name of the Hudson’s Bay Company, and for many decades this merged company continued to trade in furs. Finally, in the 1990s, under pressure from animal rights groups, the Hudson’s Bay Company, which in the twentieth century had become a large Canadian retailer, ended the fur component of its operation. Hudson’s Bay Company Hinterlands. Source: Ray (1987, plate 60) The fur trade was based on pelts destined either for the luxury clothing market or for the felting industries, of which hatting was the most important. This was a transatlantic trade. The animals were trapped and exchanged for goods in North America, and the pelts were transported to Europe for processing and final sale. As a result, forces operating on the demand side of the market in Europe and on the supply side in North America determined prices and volumes; while intermediaries, who linked the two geographically separated areas, determined how the trade was conducted. The Demand for Fur: Hats, Pelts and Prices. However much hats may be considered an accessory today, they were for centuries a mandatory part of everyday dress, for both men and women. Of course styles changed, and, in response to the vagaries of fashion and politics, hats took on various forms and shapes, from the high-crowned, broad-brimmed hat of the first two Stuarts to the conically-shaped, plainer hat of the Puritans. The Restoration of Charles II of England in 1660 and the Glorious Revolution in 1689 brought their own changes in style (Clarke, 1982, chapter 1). What remained a constant was the material from which hats were made – wool felt. The wool came from various animals, but towards the end of the fifteenth century beaver wool began to be predominate. Over time, beaver hats became increasingly popular eventually dominating the market. Only in the nineteenth century did silk replace beaver in high-fashion men’s hats. Furs have long been classified as either fancy or staple. Fancy furs are those demanded for the beauty and luster of their pelt. These furs – mink, fox, otter – are fashioned by furriers into garments or robes. Staple furs are sought for their wool. All staple furs have a double coating of hair with long, stiff, smooth hairs called guard hairs which protect the shorter, softer hair, called wool, that grows next to the animal skin. Only the wool can be felted. Each of the shorter hairs is barbed and once the barbs at the ends of the hair are open, the wool can be compressed into a solid piece of material called felt. The prime staple fur has been beaver, although muskrat and rabbit have also been used. Wool felt was used for over two centuries to make high-fashion hats. Felt is stronger than a woven material. It will not tear or unravel in a straight line; it is more resistant to water, and it will hold its shape even if it gets wet. These characteristics made felt the prime material for hatters especially when fashion called for hats with large brims. The highest quality hats would be made fully from beaver wool, whereas lower quality hats included inferior wool, such as rabbit. Felt Making. The transformation of beaver skins into felt and then hats was a highly skilled activity. The process required first that the beaver wool be separated from the guard hairs and the skin, and that some of the wool have open barbs, since felt required some open-barbed wool in the mixture. Felt dates back to the nomads of Central Asia, who are said to have invented the process of felting and made their tents from this light but durable material. Although the art of felting disappeared from much of western Europe during the first millennium, felt-making survived in Russia, Sweden, and Asia Minor. As a result of the Medieval Crusades, felting was reintroduced through the Mediterranean into France (Crean, 1962). In Russia, the felting industry was based on the European beaver ( castor fiber ). Given their long tradition of working with beaver pelts, the Russians had perfected the art of combing out the short barbed hairs from among the longer guard hairs, a technology that they safeguarded. As a consequence, the early felting trades in England and France had to rely on beaver wool imported from Russia, although they also used domestic supplies of wool from other animals, such rabbit, sheep and goat. But by the end of the seventeenth century, Russian supplies were drying up, reflecting the serious depletion of the European beaver population. Coincident with the decline in European beaver stocks was the emergence of a North American trade. North American beaver ( castor canadensis ) was imported through agents in the English, French and Dutch colonies. Although many of the pelts were shipped to Russia for initial processing, the growth of the beaver market in England and France led to the development of local technologies, and more knowledge of the art of combing. Separating the beaver wool from the felt was only the first step in the felting process. It was also necessary that some of the barbs on the short hairs be raised or open. On the animal these hairs were naturally covered with keratin to prevent the barbs from opening, thus to make felt, the keratin had to be stripped from at least some of the hairs. The process was difficult to refine and entailed considerable experimentation by felt-makers. For instance, one felt maker “bundled [the skins] in a sack of linen and boiled [them] for twelve hours in water containing several fatty substances and nitric acid” (Crean, 1962, p. 381). Although such processes removed the keratin, they did so at the price of a lower quality wool. The opening of the North American trade not only increased the supply of skins for the felting industry, it also provided a subset of skins whose guard hairs had already been removed and the keratin broken down. Beaver pelts imported from North America were classified as either parchment beaver ( castor sec – dry beaver), or coat beaver ( castor gras – greasy beaver). Parchment beaver were from freshly caught animals, whose skins were simply dried before being presented for trade. Coat beaver were skins that had been worn by the Indians for a year or more. With wear, the guard hairs fell out and the pelt became oily and more pliable. In addition, the keratin covering the shorter hairs broke down. By the middle of the seventeenth century, hatters and felt-makers came to learn that parchment and coat beaver could be combined to produce a strong, smooth, pliable, top-quality waterproof material. Until the 1720s, beaver felt was produced with relatively fixed proportions of coat and parchment skins, which led to periodic shortages of one or the other type of pelt. The constraint was relaxed when carotting was developed, a chemical process by which parchment skins were transformed into a type of coat beaver. The original carrotting formula consisted of salts of mercury diluted in nitric acid, which was brushed on the pelts. The use of mercury was a big advance, but it also had serious health consequences for hatters and felters, who were forced to breathe the mercury vapor for extended periods. The expression “mad as a hatter” dates from this period, as the vapor attacked the nervous systems of these workers. The Prices of Parchment and Coat Beaver. Drawn from the accounts of the Hudson’s Bay Company, Table 1 presents some eighteenth century prices of parchment and coat beaver pelts. From 1713 to 1726, before the carotting process had become established, coat beaver generally fetched a higher price than parchment beaver, averaging 6.6 shillings per pelt as compared to 5.5 shillings. Once carotting was widely used, however, the prices were reversed, and from 1730 to 1770 parchment exceeded coat in almost every year. The same general pattern is seen in the Paris data, although there the reversal was delayed, suggesting slower diffusion in France of the carotting technology. As Crean (1962, p. 382) notes, Nollet’s L’Art de faire des chapeaux included the exact formula, but it was not published until 1765. A weighted average of parchment and coat prices in London reveals three episodes. From 1713 to 1722 prices were quite stable, fluctuating within the narrow band of 5.0 and 5.5 shillings per pelt. During the period, 1723 to 1745, prices moved sharply higher and remained in the range of 7 to 9 shillings. The years 1746 to 1763 saw another big increase to over 12 shillings per pelt. There are far fewer prices available for Paris, but we do know that in the period 1739 to 1753 the trend was also sharply higher with prices more than doubling. Price of Beaver Pelts in Britain: 1713-1763. (shillings per skin) a A weighted average of the prices of parchment, coat and half parchment beaver pelts. Weights are based on the trade in these types of furs at Fort Albany. Prices of the individual types of pelts are not available for the years, 1727 to 1735. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 1999. The Demand for Beaver Hats. The main cause of the rising beaver pelt prices in England and France was the increasing demand for beaver hats, which included hats made exclusively with beaver wool and referred to as “beaver hats,” and those hats containing a combination of beaver and a lower cost wool, such as rabbit. These were called “felt hats.” Unfortunately, aggregate consumption series for the eighteenth century Europe are not available. We do, however, have Gregory King’s contemporary work for England which provides a good starting point. In a table entitled “Annual Consumption of Apparell, anno 1688,” King calculated that consumption of all types of hats was about 3.3 million, or nearly one hat per person. King also included a second category, caps of all sorts, for which he estimated consumption at 1.6 million (Harte, 1991, p. 293). This means that as early as 1700, the potential market for hats in England alone was nearly 5 million per year. Over the next century, the rising demand for beaver pelts was a result of a number factors including population growth, a greater export market, a shift toward beaver hats from hats made of other materials, and a shift from caps to hats. The British export data indicate that demand for beaver hats was growing not just in England, but in Europe as well. In 1700 a modest 69,500 beaver hats were exported from England and almost the same number of felt hats; but by 1760, slightly over 500,000 beaver hats and 370,000 felt halts were shipped from English ports (Lawson, 1943, app. I). In total, over the seventy years to 1770, 21 million beaver and felt hats were exported from England. In addition to the final product, England exported the raw material, beaver pelts. In 1760, £15,000 in beaver pelts were exported along with a range of other furs. The hats and the pelts tended to go to different parts of Europe. Raw pelts were shipped mainly to northern Europe, including Germany, Flanders, Holland and Russia; whereas hats went to the southern European markets of Spain and Portugal. In 1750, Germany imported 16,500 beaver hats, while Spain imported 110,000 and Portugal 175,000 (Lawson, 1943, appendices F & G). Over the first six decades of the eighteenth century, these markets grew dramatically, such that the value of beaver hat sales to Portugal alone was £89,000 in 1756-1760, representing about 300,000 hats or two-thirds of the entire export trade. European Intermediaries in the Fur Trade. By the eighteenth century, the demand for furs in Europe was being met mainly by exports from North America with intermediaries playing an essential role. The American trade, which moved along the main water systems, was organized largely through chartered companies. At the far north, operating out of Hudson Bay, was the Hudson’s Bay Company, chartered in 1670. The Compagnie d’Occident , founded in 1718, was the most successful of a series of monopoly French companies. It operated through the St. Lawrence River and in the region of the eastern Great Lakes. There was also an English trade through Albany and New York, and a French trade down the Mississippi. The Hudson’s Bay Company and the Compagnie d’Occident, although similar in title, had very different internal structures. The English trade was organized along hierarchical lines with salaried managers, whereas the French monopoly issued licenses ( congés ) or leased out the use of its posts. The structure of the English company allowed for more control from the London head office, but required systems that could monitor the managers of the trading posts (Carlos and Nicholas, 1990). The leasing and licensing arrangements of the French made monitoring unnecessary, but led to a system where the center had little influence over the conduct of the trade. The French and English were distinguished as well by how they interacted with the Natives. The Hudson’s Bay Company established posts around the Bay and waited for the Indians, often middlemen, to come to them. The French, by contrast, moved into the interior, directly trading with the Indians who harvested the furs. The French arrangement was more conducive to expansion, and by the end of the seventeenth century, they had moved beyond the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers into the western Great Lakes region (see Figure 1). Later they established posts in the heart of the Hudson Bay hinterland. In addition, the French explored the river systems to the south, setting up a post at the mouth of the Mississippi. As noted earlier, after Jay’s Treaty was signed, the French were replaced in the Mississippi region by U.S. interests which later formed the American Fur Company (Haeger, 1991). The English takeover of New France at the end of the French and Indian Wars in 1763 did not, at first, fundamentally change the structure of the trade. Rather, French management was replaced by Scottish and English merchants operating in Montreal. But, within a decade, the Montreal trade was reorganized into partnerships between merchants in Montreal and traders who wintered in the interior. The most important of these arrangements led to the formation of the Northwest Company, which for the first two decades of the nineteenth century, competed with the Hudson’s Bay Company (Carlos and Hoffman, 1986). By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Northwest Company, and the American Fur Company had, combined, a system of trading posts across North America, including posts in Oregon and British Columbia and on the Mackenzie River. In 1821, the Northwest Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company merged under the name of the Hudson’s Bay Company. The Hudson’s Bay Company then ran the trade as a monopsony until the late 1840s when it began facing serious competition from trappers to the south. The Company’s role in the northwest changed again with the Canadian Confederation in 1867. Over the next decades treaties were signed with many of the northern tribes forever changing the old fur trade order in Canada. The Supply of Furs: The Harvesting of Beaver and Depletion. During the eighteenth century, the changing technology of felt production and the growing demand for felt hats were met by attempts to increase the supply of furs, especially the supply of beaver pelts. Any permanent increase, however, was ultimately dependent on the animal resource base. How that base changed over time must be a matter of speculation since no animal counts exist from that period; nevertheless, the evidence we do have points to a scenario in which over-harvesting, at least in some years, gave rise to serious depletion of the beaver and possibly other animals such as marten that were also being traded. Why the beaver were over-harvested was closely related to the prices Natives were receiving, but important as well was the nature of Native property rights to the resource. Harvests in the Fort Albany and York Factory Regions. That beaver populations along the Eastern seaboard regions of North America were depleted as the fur trade advanced is widely accepted. In fact the search for new sources of supply further west, including the region of Hudson Bay, has been attributed in part to dwindling beaver stocks in areas where the fur trade had been long established. Although there has been little discussion of the impact that the Hudson’s Bay Company and the French, who traded in the region of Hudson Bay, were having on the beaver stock, the remarkably complete records of the Hudson’s Bay Company provide the basis for reasonable inferences about depletion. From 1700 there is an uninterrupted annual series of fur returns at Fort Albany; the fur returns from York Factory begin in 1716 (see Figure 1). The beaver returns at Fort Albany and York Factory for the period 1700 to 1770 are described in Figure 2. At Fort Albany the number of beaver skins over the period 1700 to 1720 averaged roughly 19,000, with wide year-to-year fluctuations; the range was about 15,000 to 30,000. After 1720 and until the late 1740s average returns declined by about 5,000 skins, and remained within the somewhat narrower range of roughly 10,000 to 20,000 skins. The period of relative stability was broken in the final years of the 1740s. In 1748 and 1749, returns increased to an average of nearly 23,000. Following these unusually strong years, the trade fell precipitously so that in 1756 fewer than 6,000 beaver pelts were received. There was a brief recovery in the early 1760s but by the end decade trade had fallen below even the mid-1750s levels. In 1770, Fort Albany took in just 3,600 beaver pelts. This pattern – unusually large returns in the late 1740s and low returns thereafter – indicates that the beaver in the Fort Albany region were being seriously depleted. Beaver Traded at Fort Albany and York Factory 1700 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 1993. The beaver returns at York Factory from 1716 to 1770, also described in Figure 2, have some of the key features of the Fort Albany data. After some low returns early on (from 1716 to 1720), the number of beaver pelts increased to an average of 35,000. There were extraordinary returns in 1730 and 1731, when the average was 55,600 skins, but beaver receipts then stabilized at about 31,000 over the remainder of the decade. The first break in the pattern came in the early 1740s shortly after the French established several trading posts in the area. Surprisingly perhaps, given the increased competition, trade in beaver pelts at the Hudson’s Bay Company post increased to an average of 34,300, this over the period 1740 to 1743. Indeed, the 1742 return of 38,791 skins was the largest since the French had established any posts in the region. The returns in 1745 were also strong, but after that year the trade in beaver pelts began a decline that continued through to 1770. Average returns over the rest of the decade were 25,000; the average during the 1750s was 18,000, and just 15,500 in the 1760s. The pattern of beaver returns at York Factory – high returns in the early 1740s followed by a large decline – strongly suggests that, as in the Fort Albany hinterland, the beaver population had been greatly reduced. The overall carrying capacity of any region, or the size of the animal stock, depends on the nature of the terrain and the underlying biological determinants such as birth and death rates. A standard relationship between the annual harvest and the animal population is the Lotka-Volterra logistic, commonly used in natural resource models to relate the natural growth of a population to the size of that population: where X is the population, F(X) is the natural growth in the population, a is the maximum proportional growth rate of the population, and b = a/X , where X is the upper limit to population size. The population dynamics of the species exploited depends on the harvest each period: where DX is the annual change in the population and H is the harvest. The choice of parameter a and maximum population X is central to the population estimates and have been based largely on estimates from the beaver ecology literature and Ontario provincial field reports of beaver densities (Carlos and Lewis, 1993). Simulations based on equation 2 suggest that, until the 1730s, beaver populations remained at levels roughly consistent with maximum sustained yield management, sometimes referred to as the biological optimum. But after the 1730s there was a decline in beaver stocks to about half the maximum sustained yield levels. The cause of the depletion was closely related to what was happening in Europe. There, buoyant demand for felt hats and dwindling local fur supplies resulted in much higher prices for beaver pelts. These higher prices, in conjunction with the resulting competition from the French in the Hudson Bay region, led the Hudson’s Bay Company to offer much better terms to Natives who came to their trading posts (Carlos and Lewis, 1999). Figure 3 reports a price index for furs at Fort Albany and at York Factory. The index represents a measure of what Natives received in European goods for their furs. At Fort Albany, fur prices were close to 70 from 1713 to 1731, but in 1732, in response to higher European fur prices and the entry of la Vérendrye, an important French trader, the price jumped to 81. After that year, prices continued to rise. The pattern at York Factory was similar. Although prices were high in the early years when the post was being established, beginning in 1724 the price settled down to about 70. At York Factory, the jump in price came in 1738, which was the year la Vérendrye set up a trading post in the York Factory hinterland. Prices then continued to increase. It was these higher fur prices that led to over-harvesting and, ultimately, a decline in beaver stocks. Price Index for Furs: Fort Albany and York Factory, 1713 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 2001. Property Rights Regimes. An increase in price paid to Native hunters did not have to lead to a decline in the animal stocks, because Indians could have chosen to limit their harvesting. Why they did not was closely related their system of property rights. One can classify property rights along a spectrum with, at one end, open access, where anyone can hunt or fish, and at the other, complete private property, where a sole owner has full control over the resource. Between, there are a range of property rights regimes with access controlled by a community or a government, and where individual members of the group do not necessarily have private property rights. Open access creates a situation where there is less incentive to conserve, because animals not harvested by a particular hunter will be available to other hunters in the future. Thus the closer is a system to open access the more likely it is that the resource will be depleted. Across aboriginal societies in North America, one finds a range of property rights regimes. Native Americans did have a concept of trespass and of property, but individual and family rights to resources were not absolute. Sometimes referred to as the Good Samaritan principle (McManus, 1972), outsiders were not permitted to harvest furs on another’s territory for trade, but they were allowed to hunt game and even beaver for food. Combined with this limitation to private property was an Ethic of Generosity that included liberal gift-giving where any visitor to one’s encampment was to be supplied with food and shelter. Why a social norm such as gift-giving or the related Good Samaritan principle emerged was due to the nature of the aboriginal environment. The primary objective of aboriginal societies was survival. Hunting was risky, and so rules were put in place that would reduce the risk of starvation. As Berkes et al .(1989, p. 153) notes, for such societies: “all resources are subject to the overriding principle that no one can prevent a person from obtaining what he needs for his family’s survival.” Such actions were reciprocal and especially in the sub-arctic world were an insurance mechanism. These norms, however, also reduced the incentive to conserve the beaver and other animals that were part of the fur trade. The combination of these norms and the increasing price paid to Native traders led to the large harvests in the 1740s and ultimately depletion of the animal stock. The Trade in European Goods. Indians were the primary agents in the North American commercial fur trade. It was they who hunted the animals, and transported and traded the pelts or skins to European intermediaries. The exchange was a voluntary. In return for their furs, Indians obtained both access to an iron technology to improve production and access to a wide range of new consumer goods. It is important to recognize, however, that although the European goods were new to aboriginals, the concept of exchange was not. The archaeological evidence indicates an extensive trade between Native tribes in the north and south of North America prior to European contact. The extraordinary records of the Hudson’s Bay Company allow us to form a clear picture of what Indians were buying. Table 2 lists the goods received by Natives at York Factory, which was by far the largest of the Hudson’s Bay Company trading posts. As is evident from the table, the commercial trade was more than in beads and baubles or even guns and alcohol; rather Native traders were receiving a wide range of products that improved their ability to meet their subsistence requirements and allowed them to raise their living standards. The items have been grouped by use. The producer goods category was dominated by firearms, including guns, shot and powder, but also includes knives, awls and twine. The Natives traded for guns of different lengths. The 3-foot gun was used mainly for waterfowl and in heavily forested areas where game could be shot at close range. The 4-foot gun was more accurate and suitable for open spaces. In addition, the 4-foot gun could play a role in warfare. Maintaining guns in the harsh sub-arctic environment was a serious problem, and ultimately, the Hudson’s Bay Company was forced to send gunsmiths to its trading posts to assess quality and help with repairs. Kettles and blankets were the main items in the “household goods” الفئة. These goods probably became necessities to the Natives who adopted them. Then there were the luxury goods, which have been divided into two broad categories: “tobacco and alcohol,” and “other luxuries,” dominated by cloth of various kinds (Carlos and Lewis, 2001; 2002). Value of Goods Received at York Factory in 1740 (made beaver) We have much less information about the French trade. The French are reported to have exchanged similar items, although given their higher transport costs, both the furs received and the goods traded tended to be higher in value relative to weight. The Europeans, it might be noted, supplied no food to the trade in the eighteenth century. In fact, Indians helped provision the posts with fish and fowl. This role of food purveyor grew in the nineteenth century as groups known as the “home guard Cree” came to live around the posts; as well, pemmican, supplied by Natives, became an important source of nourishment for Europeans involved in the buffalo hunts. The value of the goods listed in Table 2 is expressed in terms of the unit of account, the made beaver , which the Hudson’s Bay Company used to record its transactions and determine the rate of exchange between furs and European goods. The price of a prime beaver pelt was 1 made beaver , and every other type of fur and good was assigned a price based on that unit. For example, a marten (a type of mink) was a made beaver , a blanket was 7 made beaver , a gallon of brandy, 4 made beaver , and a yard of cloth, 3? made beaver . These were the official prices at York Factory. Thus Indians, who traded at these prices, received, for example, a gallon of brandy for four prime beaver pelts, two yards of cloth for seven beaver pelts, and a blanket for 21 marten pelts. This was barter trade in that no currency was used; and although the official prices implied certain rates of exchange between furs and goods, Hudson’s Bay Company factors were encouraged to trade at rates more favorable to the Company. The actual rates, however, depended on market conditions in Europe and, most importantly, the extent of French competition in Canada. Figure 3 illustrates the rise in the price of furs at York Factory and Fort Albany in response to higher beaver prices in London and Paris, as well as to a greater French presence in the region (Carlos and Lewis, 1999). The increase in price also reflects the bargaining ability of Native traders during periods of direct competition between the English and French and later the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Northwest Company. At such times, the Native traders would play both parties off against each other (Ray and Freeman, 1978). The records of the Hudson’s Bay Company provide us with a unique window to the trading process, including the bargaining ability of Native traders, which is evident in the range of commodities received. Natives only bought goods they wanted. Clear from the Company records is that it was the Natives who largely determined the nature and quality of those goods. As well the records tell us how income from the trade was being allocated. The breakdown differed by post and varied over time; but, for example, in 1740 at York Factory, the distribution was: producer goods – 44 percent; household goods – 9 percent; alcohol and tobacco – 24 percent; and other luxuries – 23 percent. An important implication of the trade data is that, like many Europeans and most American colonists, Native Americans were taking part in the consumer revolution of the eighteenth century (de Vries, 1993; Shammas, 1993). In addition to necessities, they were consuming a remarkable variety of luxury products. Cloth, including baize, duffel, flannel, and gartering, was by far the largest class, but they also purchased beads, combs, looking glasses, rings, shirts, and vermillion among a much longer list. Because these items were heterogeneous in nature, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s head office went to great lengths to satisfy the specific tastes of Native consumers. Attempts were also made, not always successfully, to introduce new products (Carlos and Lewis, 2002). Perhaps surprising, given the emphasis that has been placed on it in the historical literature, was the comparatively small role of alcohol in the trade. At York Factory, Native traders received in 1740 a total of 494 gallons of brandy and “strong water,” which had a value of 1,976 made beaver . More than twice this amount was spent on tobacco in that year, nearly five times was spent on firearms, twice was spent on cloth, and more was spent on blankets and kettles than on alcohol. Thus, brandy, although a significant item of trade, was by no means a dominant one. In addition, alcohol could hardly have created serious social problems during this period. The amount received would have allowed for no more than ten two-ounce drinks per year for the adult Native population living in the region. The Labor Supply of Natives. Another important question can be addressed using the trade data. Were Natives “lazy and improvident” as they have been described by some contemporaries, or were they “industrious” like the American colonists and many Europeans? Central to answering this question is how Native groups responded to the price of furs, which began rising in the 1730s. Much of the literature argues that Indian trappers reduced their effort in response to higher fur prices; that is, they had backward-bending supply curves of labor. The view is that Natives had a fixed demand for European goods that, at higher fur prices, could be met with fewer furs, and hence less effort. Although widely cited, this argument does not stand up. Not only were higher fur prices accompanied by larger total harvests of furs in the region, but the pattern of Native expenditure also points to a scenario of greater effort. From the late 1730s to the 1760s, as the price of furs rose, the share of expenditure on luxury goods increased dramatically (see Figure 4). Thus Natives were not content simply to accept their good fortune by working less; rather they seized the opportunity provided to them by the strong fur market by increasing their effort in the commercial sector, thereby dramatically augmenting the purchases of those goods, namely the luxuries, that could raise their living standards. Native Expenditure Shares at York Factory 1716 – 1770. Source: Carlos and Lewis, 2001. A Note on the Non-commercial Sector. As important as the fur trade was to Native Americans in the sub-arctic regions of Canada, commerce with the Europeans comprised just one, relatively small, part of their overall economy. Exact figures are not available, but the traditional sectors; hunting, gathering, food preparation and, to some extent, agriculture must have accounted for at least 75 to 80 percent of Native labor during these decades. Nevertheless, despite the limited time spent in commercial activity, the fur trade had a profound effect on the nature of the Native economy and Native society. The introduction of European producer goods, such as guns, and household goods, mainly kettles and blankets, changed the way Native Americans achieved subsistence; and the European luxury goods expanded the range of products that allowed them to move beyond subsistence. Most importantly, the fur trade connected Natives to Europeans in ways that affected how and how much they chose to work, where they chose to live, and how they exploited the resources on which the trade and their survival was based. المراجع. Berkes, Fikret, David Feeny, Bonnie J. McCay, and James M. Acheson. “The Benefits of the Commons.” Nature 340 (July 13, 1989): 91-93. Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. Carlos, Ann M., and Elizabeth Hoffman. “The North American Fur Trade: Bargaining to a Joint Profit Maximum under Incomplete Information, 1804-1821.” Journal of Economic History 46, no. 4 (1986): 967-86. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Indians, the Beaver and the Bay: The Economics of Depletion in the Lands of the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1700-1763.” Journal of Economic History 53, no. 3 (1993): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights, Competition and Depletion in the Eighteenth-Century Canadian Fur Trade: The Role of the European Market.” Canadian Journal of Economics 32, no. 3 (1999): 705-28. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Property Rights and Competition in the Depletion of the Beaver: Native Americans and the Hudson’s Bay Company.” In The Other Side of the Frontier: Economic Explorations in Native American History , edited by Linda Barrington, 131-149. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Trade, Consumption, and the Native Economy: Lessons from York Factory, Hudson Bay.” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (2001): 465-94. Carlos, Ann M., and Frank D. Lewis. “Marketing in the Land of Hudson Bay: Indian Consumers and the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670-1770.” Enterprise and Society 2 (2002): 285-317. Carlos, Ann and Nicholas, Stephen. “Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson’s Bay Company.” Journal of Economic History 50, no. 4 (1990): 853-75. Clarke, Fiona. Hats . London: Batsford, 1982. Crean, J. F. “Hats and the Fur Trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28, no. 3 (1962): 373-386. Corner, David. “The Tyranny of Fashion: The Case of the Felt-Hatting Trade in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Textile History 22, no.2 (1991): 153-178. de Vries, Jan. “Between Purchasing Power and the World of Goods: Understanding the Household Economy in Early Modern Europe.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 85-132. London: Routledge, 1993. Ginsburg Madeleine. The Hat: Trends and Traditions . London: Studio Editions, 1990. Haeger, John D. John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic . Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991. Harte, N.B. “The Economics of Clothing in the Late Seventeenth Century.” Textile History 22, no. 2 (1991): 277-296. Heidenreich, Conrad E., and Arthur J. Ray. The Early Fur Trade: A Study in Cultural Interaction . Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976. Helm, Jane, ed. Handbook of North American Indians 6, Subarctic . Washington: Smithsonian, 1981. Innis, Harold. The Fur Trade in Canada (revised edition) . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956. Krech III, Shepard. The Ecological Indian: Myth and History . New York: Norton, 1999. Lawson, Murray G. Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943. McManus, John. “An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American Fur Trade.” Journal of Economic History 32, no.1 (1972): 36-53. Ray, Arthur J. Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. Ray, Arthur J. and Donald Freeman. “Give Us Good Measure”: An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company before 1763 . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Ray, Arthur J. “Bayside Trade, 1720-1780.” In Historical Atlas of Canada 1 , edited by R. Cole Harris, plate 60. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Rich, E. E. Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670 – 1870 . 2 فولس. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960. Rich, E.E. “Trade Habits and Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26, no. 1 (1960): 35-53. Shammas, Carole. “Changes in English and Anglo-American Consumption from 1550-1800.” In Consumption and the World of Goods , edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 177-205. London: Routledge, 1993. Wien, Thomas. “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association , New Series 1 (1990): 293-317. FUR AND PELT TRADE. The fur trade—the very phrase continues to conjure up the drama of the frontier, and for good reason. The pursuit of furs—referred to by some as "soft gold"—had an enormous impact on the exploration and colonization of North America. Reenactors dress up as voyageurs (the teamsters of the trade) and follow the paths of the fur trade in canoes along rivers and lakes, rediscovering old portages (the carrying places in between water highways). Others dress up in buckskin outfits like the mountain men who trapped beaver in the central Rockies and gathered at a summer rendezvous to trade for supplies and goods. The image of the self-reliant, wilderness-savvy individual may appeal to some in the urbanized world of modern America, but the heyday of the mountain man lasted for only fifteen years, from 1825 to 1840. This particular strategy for gathering furs never seriously challenged the dominant mode of the trade, which revolved around trading posts, Euro-American merchants, and Native American producers and consumers. significance and practices. The real significance of the fur trade lay in the fact that, in contrast to the creation of small farms and cash crop plantations, it was an economic activity that required some measure of cooperation between indigenous peoples and Europeans. The real drama of this activity lay not in the tedium of paddling thousands of miles, but in the integration of North American products and economies with global markets, requiring merchants to keep track of currencies and goods from a bewildering diversity of places. A successful fur trader had to maintain a careful and continuous correspondence with wintering partners in Indian country and agents in Europe to calculate the prices of supplies and current values and demand for various furs. In truth, the "fur trade" is a convenient shorthand for a complex business that constituted a major economic force from the beginning of European involvement in North America, through the colonial period, and into the middle of the nineteenth century. The fur trade began in the early sixteenth century as an adjunct to the cod fishing and whaling voyages off the coasts of Newfoundland and New England. A series of events occurred later in the century that cut off supplies of pelts from Siberia and stimulated the demand for North American furs. At the same time, Parisian hatters reintroduced beaver felt hats, which were superior to wool-felt hats and fetched a much higher price. (The European beaver stocks had become exhausted in the fifteenth century.) The short barbed undercoat of the beaver was perfect for the felting process. Ironically, beaver robes that had been worn by Native Americans for a year (greasy beaver, or castor gras, as opposed to castor sec, or dry beaver) were more valuable than fresh pelts. Since the long, outer guard hairs had worn off, the used robes required less processing by European hatters. The beaver remained the most important object of the trade until the 1830s, but other animals were sought after as well. Peltries ( pelleterie ), skins worn as furs or used for linings, constituted a smaller percentage of the trade. Marten, raccoon, and otter skins were preferred. Moose hides were used for leather, as were deerskins—the staple of the trade in the Southeast. Buffalo robes replaced beaver pelts as the most valuable component of the American fur trade in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Indian men obtained the majority of furs through various hunting practices. Native women processed the furs—scraping, stretching, rubbing, curing, and sewing the products of the hunt. They also provided food for all involved in the trade and manufactured snowshoes, canoes, and various articles of clothing worn by both Indians and Europeans. Native people were equally important as consumers, since merchants often obtained more profits as importers, outfitters, and retailers of European goods than they did through the sales of furs in Europe, which were often handled by agents and companies located there. Finished fabrics were the principal category of imports, and the most important of these were duffels and strouds—woolen blankets that were as warm as furs but had the advantages of being lighter and of drying faster. Reds and blues were the preferred colors. Other items of clothing exchanged included calico and linen shirts, leggings, and sleeves ( manches sauvages ). (Native consumers did not desire fitted clothes—especially breeches—which hampered their movements.) Metal tools were an equally important category of goods, though they constituted a much smaller percentage of imports. These labor-saving objects included copper kettles, axes, chisels, knives, fishhooks, and guns. The demand for such hard goods tended to be inelastic, as native communities often had limited carrying capacity. Brandy and rum made up a relatively small percentage of imports for the trade and were rarely a source of much profit; yet alcohol, then as now, facilitated commerce. Other imports included fashionable items such as tin rings, silver earrings, and gorgets manufactured in Germany specifically for the Indian trade, glass beads produced in Murano (a suburb of Venice), Chinese vermilion sold in small paper packets, Brazilian tobacco, mirrors or "looking-glasses," and even spectacles. In short, the fur trade was a global business, and historian James Axtell has suggested that the remarkable increase in native disposable income and consumption stimulated European production and might be described as the "first consumer revolution." Other scholars have insisted that Indian societies had fixed needs and a nonmaterial conception of wealth that emphasized public redistribution of goods and an ethic of sharing. Economic activities, in short, were not viewed as separate from social activities and obligations. Exchange was conceived as mutual gift giving and used to reaffirm social ties, kinship (real and metaphorical), and political and military alliances. (Such practices and notions were not uncommon in Europe, of course, and economic activities continue to be shaped and conditioned by extra-economic factors.) Still, historians agree that Indian groups did act as intermediaries and were often shrewd bargainers, insisting on "good measure" in their transactions and aware of the impact of competition on exchange rates. We may fairly say that through the fur trade, preexisting Indian patterns of village-to-village exchange were linked to a more extensive Atlantic economy and developing capitalist world system. The fur trade also changed over time. One rather consistent element of change was game depletion. This caused a search for new supplies and, at times, suppliers. Another factor that determined change was the tension between competition and monopoly. Because the trade involved a limited resource and required credit transactions due to the long delay between ordering goods and receiving payment in furs, there was a predictable tendency for merchants to try to limit their risk. This was done in various ways: buying out the competition; partnerships; restricting supplies; and being the first "in the field" to receive the products of the hunt. When profit margins increased through monopolistic practices, the temptation for independent traders to enter the field increased and the cycle began anew. A third factor that affected the trade was political rivalry. Access to hunting grounds often caused conflict between competing native groups. Trade alliances between Europeans and Indians often led to competing claims of sovereignty between empires or jurisdiction between colonies within the same empire. The interaction of these factors—ecological, economic, and political—helped to shape the course of fur trade history. the colonial trade. When Samuel Champlain established a post at Quebec in 1608, he gave permanence to the French enterprise in North America and with it, a trading network centered on the St. Lawrence River and the waterways that connected it to the rich fur-producing areas of the Great Lakes. Over the next decade, the Hurons emerged as important intermediaries in the trade. They would gather as many as thirty thousand beaver pelts in peak years. Serious competition for the French emerged shortly thereafter along the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, where the Dutch established Fort Orange (Albany) in 1614 and acquired aggressive trading partners in the Mohawks and the rest of the Iroquois Confederacy. This trading network also had access to wampum-producing native communities living along the coasts of Long Island, and wampum was used to obtain furs from inland tribes. When they faced a shortage of fur-bearing animals in their own hunting grounds, the Iroquois began a series of attacks on northern and western tribes to expand their territory and acquire new sources of furs. These Beaver Wars began in 1647 and resulted in the decline and dispersal of the Hurons and their allies, the Eries, Neutrals, and Petuns. Refugees migrated to the Ohio country and Great Lakes area (the pays d'en haut ). With the English conquest of New Netherland in 1664, the French-Iroquois rivalry took on a new imperial dimension. Although Canada seemed more than once to be poised on the brink of extinction, the French Crown assumed control of the colony in 1663 and sent an entire regiment to bolster its military strength. New native groups from the Great Lakes area joined the French side, and several of those, especially the Ottawas and the Ojibwas (Anishnaabe) replaced the Hurons as intermediaries in the trade. Montreal (1642), located at the junction of the two critical water routes (the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario and the Ottawa River to Georgian Bay and Lake Huron) became the site of annual trading fairs. A decade of calm between 1667 and 1677 allowed hundreds of unemployed French soldiers and veteran fur trade employees ( engagés ) to venture west. By 1680, encouraged by a new policy of guaranteed prices for beaver, over eight hundred illegal coureurs de bois (woodsmen) were operating in the pays d'en haut (upper country). A new phase in the fur trade had begun, with Europeans transporting goods to and from Indian country itself rather than relying on natives to make the trip to fixed posts in the East. Living in or near Indian villages, many French traders cemented their ties to their customers by marrying native women. By the end of the century, a growing Métis (children of mixed ancestry) population, constituting a distinctive fur trade society, had emerged. The fur trade had always encouraged an exchange of information between natives and Europeans. In addition to having a familiarity with each other's languages and customs, the French and Indian inhabitants of this growing "middle ground" now added a network of personal relations that would provide some balance to British military and economic strength during the various imperial wars of the late colonial period. New fur trade centers—Michilimackinac and Detroit—also emerged in the western country, and the French opened a new trading zone in the Illinois country in the first two decades of the eighteenth century. The English also developed several new fur-trading regions in this period. In 1670 the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) was granted a royal charter by King Charles II. Operating from fixed posts on Hudson Bay and James Bay, the company had access to a region rich in furs, and the Cree and Assiniboine people played a critical role as suppliers. The company faced little competition until French traders began moving into their territory from the Great Lakes in the 1740s. The company evolved away from the French pattern of geographical expansion and competition, opting instead for a tightly controlled structure run by salaried managers. The company also lowered risks by employing futures contracts with suppliers and a fixed unit of exchange (the Made Beaver) that standardized all transactions—though items had a range of markups—and simplified bookkeeping. The company's isolated position made it vulnerable to French attacks until the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) confirmed British possession of the bay. In the Southeast, traders from Virginia pioneered the commerce in deerskins in the 1640s. Carolina-based traders later bypassed their colonial neighbors and became embroiled in several wars with coastal Indian communities. The Carolinians formed alliances with the Creeks, Catawbas, and Cherokees that produced an extensive commerce in both deerskins and Indian slaves. At the end of the century the French established their own deerskin trade network further west, centered around the Choctaws and several smaller tribes. By the 1750s, New Orleans (1718) and Charleston (1670) were exporting more than 100,000 pounds of skins annually. The expansion of these various trading networks led to a series of confrontations during the eighteenth century in the Southeast and along the border between Canada and New York. The competition between French and British traders in the Ohio country led directly to the first battles of what would become the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). the american trade. The fur trade after the Seven Years' War was shaped by local, national, and international events. With the disintegration of French hegemony in 1763, the old Montreal–St. Lawrence trading system was increasingly dominated by a new group of traders (referred to by the HBC contemptuously as "pedlars"). Many were from Scotland—among them the McGills and the McTavish and McGillivray families. Various competing partnerships merged in 1784 to form the North West Company. By the end of the century, this combination of field partners and wholesale merchants had pushed westward to the Canadian Rockies, established itself in the Athabasca region, and even reached the Mackenzie River headwaters. At the same time, the North West Company and other Montreal partnerships continued to operate in the Great Lakes region, south of the international border established by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and finally made effective in 1796 following Jay's Treaty of 1794. The United States, in an attempt to redirect the flow of American furs into Canada, set up government factories to conduct trade, starting in 1796. These government operations had limited success, hampered by restrictions that disallowed credit, liquor, and imported goods. Sensing an opportunity, a German immigrant, John Jacob Astor, began purchasing furs in his home base of New York City and in Montreal. When the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) disrupted traditional fur markets, Astor took advantage of American neutrality and shipped his stock directly to France and Germany. In 1808 he received a corporate charter for his new American Fur Company from New York State. After forming a brief combination with merchants from Montreal, Astor used the conditions created by the War of 1812 to drive out his competitors. British-Indian relations had turned sour, and Astor lobbied Congress to pass an act in 1816 that excluded British citizens from trading in American territory. Astor was less successful in the Pacific Northwest. After setting up a post, Astoria, at the mouth of the Columbia River that he hoped would anchor a tripartite trade between that region, China, and the East Coast, he was forced to abandon his plans, and the post was sold to the North West Company. Nevertheless, Astor and his son William created a powerful organization built on controlling the supply of furs in Indian country from their western headquarters in Michilimackinac and on careful anticipation of world markets from their offices in New York and Europe. In Canada, the Hudson's Bay Company had responded to the incursions of the North West Company by establishing new inland posts. Several periods of intense and even bloody competition, spurred by game depletion, finally resulted in a merger of the two companies in 1821, and goods and furs gathered in the north flowed only through the bay. Montreal's long-standing connection to the trade was now lost. Ironically, even as Scottish "pedlars" had taken over the top levels of the business from the French in the Montreal fur trade network after the Seven Years' War, a new group of French fur traders had emerged in what would become American territory after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. St. Louis, founded in the winter of 1763–1764, stood on the international border between Spanish Missouri (Upper Louisiana) and the British-held Illinois country. Traders there shipped furs through both New Orleans and Montreal until the War of 1812 forced them to consider New York as an increasingly attractive alternative. The founding family of the city, the Chouteaus, monopolized the lucrative trade with the Osages, and a family partnership signed a marketing agreement with Astor in 1827. The Chouteaus and Astor had cooperated earlier in a lobbying effort that persuaded Congress to abandon the government factory system in 1822. Astor retired from the business in 1834 to devote his energies to managing his real estate interests. He sold his Western Department to the Chouteau family firm. By 1842, Pierre Chouteau Jr. and Company had become the American Fur Company, establishing its own marketing office in New York but maintaining its principal headquarters in St. Louis. The Chouteau company, taking a clue from Astor, built a fur-trading empire on a grand scale. It built or acquired trading posts throughout the area drained by the Missouri River system, some of the most famous being Fort Union at the mouth of the Yellowstone, Fort Clark in Mandan country, Fort Pierre in the heart of Dakota territory, and Fort Laramie on the northern fork of the Platte River. Company steamboats reached Fort Union in 1832, and thereafter the company controlled the flow of information and goods in the American West. Through their affiliation with Bent, St. Vrain and Company, which dominated the southwestern trade from its post, Bent's Fort, on the Arkansas River in Colorado, the Chouteaus also gathered a share of the trade in New Mexico and the southern Rockies. By the late 1830s, raccoon pelts and buffalo robes had replaced the beaver as the dominant furs in the American trade. And the fur trade had truly become a corporate enterprise dominated by several large firms in the United States and Canada. Of more significance, in its final phase, the classic fur trade became more of an "Indian business." The Chouteau company and smaller firms profited from the federal government's desire to obtain Indian lands and remove tribal communities after 1830. Traders often enjoyed a position of political and economic influence within Indian communities and were more than willing to exploit that influence during the treaty-making process. Profits accrued to fur traders primarily by providing "annuity goods" promised by the government to various tribes in treaties and land cessions and by receiving money directly from the government in payment of Indian debts. In 1842 alone, traders' claims amounted to over $2 million. Fur companies reinvested their profits, diversifying into areas such as land speculation, mining, and railroads. What had begun as a colonial enterprise that required cooperation between natives and Europeans and provided a conduit for material and cultural exchange became, in the end, a tool for dispossession. The fur trade had other dire consequences, providing a pathway into Indian villages for deadly diseases and alcohol and a commercial incentive for the decimation of fur-bearing animals across the continent. bibliography. Axtell, James. Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Foley, William E., and C. David Rice. The First Chouteaus: River Barons of Early St. Louis. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Gilman, Carolyn, et al. Where Two Worlds Meet: The Great Lakes Fur Trade. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1982. Lavender, David. The Fist in the Wilderness. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. Phillips, Paul C., with J. W. Smurr. The Fur Trade. 2 فولس. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961. Ray, Arthur J., and Donald B. Freeman. "Give Us Good Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company before 1763. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Usner, Daniel H., Jr. Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Van Kirk, Sylvia. Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670–1870. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983. White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Wishart, David J. The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807–1840: A Geographical Synthesis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979. Cite this article. اختر نمطا أدناه، وانسخ النص لببليوغرافيك. أنماط الاقتباس. موسوعة تعطيك القدرة على الاستشهاد إدخالات ومقالات وفقا للأساليب المشتركة من جمعية اللغة الحديثة (ملا)، دليل شيكاغو من نمط، والجمعية الأمريكية للعلم النفس (أبا). ضمن أداة "سيت ذيس أرتيكل"، اختر نمطا لمعرفة كيفية ظهور جميع المعلومات المتاحة عند تنسيقها وفقا لهذا النمط. ثم قم بنسخ النص ولصقه في قائمة المراجع الخاصة بك أو قائمة الأعمال المذكورة. Wisconsin Historical Society. The Fur Trade Factory System was a U.S. system used from 1796 to 1822 that gave control of the fur trade to the federal government, which in turn placed "factors" at military posts to conduct the trade alongside official Indian agents empowered to oversee treaty obligations. The factory system began as an attempt to eliminate the worst excesses of the fur trade by prohibiting alcohol sales and providing goods to Indians at wholesale prices. The system began under President George Washington and was expanded to four factories under President Thomas Jefferson in 1802. It was extended to Mackinac in 1808, and to Fort Howard at Green Bay and Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien in 1816. By then, the system was no longer simply a means of attempting to treat the tribes fairly but was also used to diminish the power and influence of British traders. For its last 15 years, the system was aggressively opposed and undermined by commercial American traders and their peers across the border in Canada. The factory system was aboloished in 1822, partly from political maneuvering by commericial fur trade companies and partly because it had failed in its original purpose. [Sources: Wyman, Mark. "The Wisconsin Frontier," Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998; Wisconsin Historical Collections, XIX: 311 and XX: xiii-xix] أعرف أكثر. See more images, essays, newspapers and records about Fur Trade in Wisconsin. Explore more than 1,600 people, places and events in Wisconsin history. معلومات عامة. Selected Programs. National History Day Wisconsin Historical Images Office of School Services Wisconsin Historical. Society Press State Historic Preservation. Services For. اتصل بنا. &نسخ؛ 1996-2017 Wisconsin Historical Society, 816 State Street, Madison, WI 53706.
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