911 التداول من الداخل وضع الخيارات

911 التداول من الداخل وضع الخيارات

الخيارات الثنائية على المدى القصير
أفضل مزود إشارة تداول العملات الأجنبية
الرسوم البيانية الحرة تداول العملات الأجنبية


أسعار العملات الأجنبية تحميل الخيارات الثنائية الآجلة الخيارات الثنائية الدورات أفضل خيارات استراتيجية للدخل الشهري إدغار الفوركس الدولي 2skies فوركس ديسكونت

911 من الداخل وضع خيارات التداول كان هناك تداول مرتفع جدا في & كوت؛ خيارات الخيارات & كوت؛ على الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية وشركة الخطوط الجوية المتحدة، قبل 11 سبتمبر مباشرة. كانت هذه المقامرة فعالة أن أسعار أسهمها سوف تنخفض، وهذا هو بالطبع ما حدث بمجرد وقوع الهجمات. وهذا يدل على أن التجار يجب أن يكون لديهم معرفة مسبقة من 9/11. هذه هي قصة معقدة، ولكن المطالبات دون & # 8217؛ ر تتطابق دائما مع الواقع. & كوت؛ مستثمر مؤسسي واحد مقره الولايات المتحدة مع عدم وجود علاقات يمكن تصورها مع القاعدة اشترى 95 في المئة من أول يضع في 6 سبتمبر كجزء من استراتيجية التداول التي شملت أيضا شراء 115،000 سهم الأمريكية في 10 سبتمبر. ولعل أقوى تحد لهذا الاستنتاج يأتي من البروفيسور ألين م بوتيشمان من جامعة إلينوي في أوربانا شامبين. وقرر التحقيق في هذا أكثر من ذلك، وتحليل بيانات السوق إحصائيا لمحاولة تقييم الصفقات & # 8217؛ الدلالة. ويشير البروفسور بوتيشمان إلى عدة أسباب تدعو إلى التشكيك في حجة المعرفة المعروفة: وعلى الرغم من وجهات النظر التي عبرت عنها وسائل الإعلام الشعبية، وأكاديميون بارزون، ومحترفون في سوق الخيارات، هناك ما يدعو إلى التساؤل حول مدى دقة الأدلة التي تفيد بأن الإرهابيين يتاجرون في سوق الخيارات قبل هجمات 11 سبتمبر. أحد الأحداث التي تلقي بظلال من الشك على الأدلة هو تحطم طائرة أمريكان إيرلاينز في مدينة نيويورك في 12 نوفمبر / تشرين الثاني. وفقا لموقع أوك على شبكة الإنترنت، قبل ثلاثة أيام من التداول، في 7 نوفمبر، كان 7.74. واستنادا الى التصريحات التي ادلى بها حول العلاقات بين نشاط سوق الخيارات والارهاب بعد وقت قصير من 11 ايلول / سبتمبر، كان من المغري الاستدلال على هذه النسبة من احتمال ان يكون الارهاب هو السبب في حادث 12 تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر. غير أن الإرهاب لم يستبعد إلا بعد ذلك. في حين أنه قد يكون هو الحال أن نسبة كبيرة جدا غير طبيعي نسبة نداء عمرو لوحظ عن طريق الصدفة في 7 نوفمبر، وهذا الحدث يثير بالتأكيد مسألة ما إذا كانت نسبة الدعوة إلى الدعوة كبيرة مثل 7.74، في الواقع، غير عادية. وبعيدا عن حادث تحطم الطائرة في 12 نوفمبر / تشرين الثاني، فإن مقال نشر في بارون & # 8217 في 8 أكتوبر (أرفيدلوند 2001) يقدم عدة أسباب إضافية للتشكك في الادعاءات بأن من المحتمل أن الإرهابيين أو شركائهم يتاجرون خيارات عمرو و أول قبل هجمات 11 سبتمبر. بالنسبة للمبتدئين، فإن المقال يشير إلى أن أثقل تداول في خيارات عمرو لم يحدث في أرخص وأقصر مؤرخة، والتي من شأنها أن توفر أكبر الأرباح لشخص يعرف من الهجمات القادمة. وعلاوة على ذلك، أصدر محلل رقم & # 8220؛ بيع & # 8221؛ توصية بشأن مقاومة مداوم الأمعاء خلال الأسبوع السابق، مما قد يدفع المستثمرين لشراء أم عمرو. وبالمثل، فقد انخفض سعر سهم شركة "أول" مؤخرا بما فيه الكفاية ليشمل التجار التقنيين الذين قد يكونون قد زادوا من شراءهم، وتتعامل الشركات التي تتعامل بشكل كبير مع خيارات أسهمها. وأخيرا، فإن التجار الذين يجعلون الأسواق في الخيارات لم يرفعوا سعر الطلب في الوقت الذي وصلت فيه الأوامر كما لو كانوا يعتقدون أن الأوامر كانت تستند إلى معلومات سلبية غير علنية: لا يبدو أن صناع السوق يجدون التداول خارجا من العادة في الوقت الذي حدث فيه. ومع ذلك، فإنه يقوم بعد ذلك باستنباط نموذج إحصائي، يقترح أنه يتسق مع المعرفة المسبقة بعد كل شيء: خيارات التجار ومديري الشركات والمحللين الأمنيين ومسؤولي الصرف والمنظمين والمدعين العامين وواضعي السياسات و & # 8212؛ في بعض الأحيان يكون لدى الجمهور عامة اهتمام بمعرفة ما إذا كان تداول الخيارات غير العادية قد حدث حول أحداث معينة. ومن الأمثلة البارزة على هذا الحدث هجمات 11 سبتمبر الإرهابية، وكان هناك بالفعل قدر كبير من التكهنات حول ما إذا كان نشاط السوق الخيار يشير إلى أن الإرهابيين أو شركائهم قد تداولوا في الأيام التي سبقت 11 سبتمبر على علم مسبق الهجمات الوشيكة. بيد أن هذه التكهنات جرت في غياب فهم للخصائص ذات الصلة بتداول السوق في الخيارات. إحدى القضايا التي تزعجنا حول هذا هو عدم وجود تحليل لسلسلة الأخبار السيئة التي قدمتها شركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية يوم 7 سبتمبر، وهو يوم التداول قبل 10 سبتمبر، عندما حدث التداول الأكثر أهمية. أستاذ بوتيشمان قال لنا عبر البريد الإلكتروني: وتشمل دراستي الانحدارات الكمية التي تمثل ظروف السوق على مخزونات معينة. وبالتالي، هناك على األقل تصويب من الدرجة األولى لألخبار السلبية التي كانت تخرج في 7 أيلول / سبتمبر بشأن مقاومة األمطار. ولكن يمكنك حقا علاج الأخبار ببساطة؟ البروفيسور بول زارمبكا يؤيد الادعاءات قائلا: يجد بوتيشمان. هذه المشتريات [من الخيارات على الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية الأسهم]. كان احتمال واحد فقط في المئة من حدوث ببساطة بشكل عشوائي. لكننا لا نقول أنهم كانوا عشوائيا، بل ربما كانوا رد فعل عقلاني على الأخبار السيئة الهامة التي سلمت في اليوم السابق. يقول بوتيشمان أساسا (فيما يتعلق عمرو) هو أن الناس اشترى الكثير من يضع لذلك أن يفسر من قبل 9/7 الأخبار، لذلك مطلوب تفسير آخر، ولكن كيف يمكنك أن تقول أنه من دون تحليل الأخبار نفسها؟ بعد كل شيء، إذا كان هذا الخبر & # 8220؛ نحن & # 8217؛ ليرة لبنانية ربما تكون مفلسة في ستة أشهر & # 8221؛ من المحتمل أن تكون نسب الفائدة أكثر أهمية، كما أن نموذج بوتيشمان & # 8217 قد أعطى تأكيدا أكثر على & نبسب؛ & نبسب؛ 8282؛ نشاط سوق الخيار غير المعتاد & # 8221؛، ولكن هل جعلت فكرة المعرفة المسبقة أكثر احتمالا؟ نحن دون & # 8217؛ ر أعتقد ذلك. من الواضح أن أخبار عمرو كانت أقل أهمية، ولكننا ما زلنا نقول أنه لا يمكنك الحكم بدقة على أهمية هذه الصفقات حتى تأخذها بعين الاعتبار. وقد اشترى مستثمر مؤسسي واحد مقره الولايات المتحدة لا علاقة له بتنظيم القاعدة 95 في المئة من قانون الاستثمار في 6 سبتمبر كجزء من استراتيجية التداول التي شملت أيضا شراء 115،000 سهم أمريكي في 10 سبتمبر. وبالمثل، فإن الكثير من التداول الذي يبدو مشبوها في الولايات المتحدة يوم 10 سبتمبر تم ارجاعه الى نشرة تداول الخيارات الامريكية مقرها الولايات المتحدة، وفاكس للمشتركين يوم الاحد، 9 سبتمبر، الذي أوصى هذه الصفقات. سيظهر 6 سبتمبر سيظهر تلقائيا بشكل كبير، ثم، على الرغم من أن مستثمرا واحدا فقط يقال وراءهم. ولكن هل هذا يعني حقا أنك يمكن أن تشير رياضيا أنه من المرجح أن المستثمر كان على علم مسبق من 9/11، دون النظر في ظروف السوق الأخرى والمعلومات المتاحة في ذلك الوقت؟

911 من الداخل وضع خيارات التداول لا يزال لديك سؤال؟ اسأل بنفسك! باستخدام تقرير لجنة 9/11 لإثبات أنه لم تكن هناك مشبوهة في الداخل الصفقات في 9/11 مثل استخدام تقرير وارن لإثبات الذي قتل جفك. وقالت لجنة 11/11 أنها قررت أنه لا يوجد أي صفقات مشبوهة لأنها لا يمكن أن تثبت تلك التجارة كانت مرتبطة إلى آل كيدا! حسنا كان هناك بن لادن يجلس في مكتب في العاصمة مع مجموعة كارلايل بما في ذلك غو بوش وجيمس بيكر في ذلك الوقت (ونحن نعلم جميعا أنها لقطات كبيرة حقا في الصناعات ميك.) ولكن وضع ذلك جانبا، كيف حول خيارات وضع وضعها بزي كرونغارد، الذي تم تعيينه مؤخرا المدير التنفيذي لل سيا من قبل جورج ووكر بوش، وكان الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة أ. ب. براون، في وقت لاحق بانكيرس تروست-A. باء - براون، الذي تناول العديد من الخيارات المشبوهة؟ وضع هو وزوجته أيضا وضعهم الخاص. ماذا عن ويرت ووكر الثالث، ابن عم جورج دبليو بوش؟ كان لديه أيضا بعض الصفقات المشبوهة، ولكن أكثر من ذلك، كان الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة ستراتسيك، الذي حدث للتو للتعامل مع الأمن لشركة الخطوط الجوية المتحدة، مطار دولس ومجمع مركز التجارة العالمي (جي، وأنا أتساءل كيف يمكن لجميع هؤلاء الناس سيئة قد حصلت على تلك الطائرات وفي مركز التجارة العالمي؟) وبعيدا عن كل ذلك، قامت ستراتسيك بمعالجة الأمن لمختبرات لوس ألاموس الوطنية، حيث تم إنتاج ثيرميت. (تتذكر أن المواد المتفجرة / قطع وجدت في كل هذا غبار مركز التجارة العالمي). ثم لدينا صديق رومي، دوف زاخيم، مراقب وزارة الدفاع الذي كان قد ظهر لتوه مع رامسفيلد في 10 سبتمبر ليعلن أنه لا يمكن أن يمثل 2.3 تريليون دولار (الآن 8.5 تريليون دولار "خسر"). ولكن الأسوأ من ذلك، زاخيم شغل منصب الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة سيستمز بلانينغ كوربوراتيون التي قامت بتسويق جهاز أنيق يسمى "نظام إنهاء الرحلات". وقد استولت على الطائرات من مكان بعيد وتجاوزت جميع الأنظمة على متن الطائرة أو الطيار الآلي أو التحكم اليدوي. لم يتمكن طاقم الطائرة من القيام بأي شيء لتجاوزه. يمكن فتس السيطرة حتى الطائرات متعددة. لن يكون هذا مفيد؟ قد ترغب في معالجة خبرتك في معهد هرتسليا للسياسة الدولية لمكافحة الإرهاب، على الرغم من أنني أشك في اعتبار تقرير لجنة 11 سبتمبر دليلا. 21 أيلول / سبتمبر 2001: معهد هرتسليا للسياسة الدولية لمكافحة الإرهاب، توثق المقالات التالية المتصلة بهجمات 11 سبتمبر / أيلول: "الثلاثاء الأسود: أكبر احتيال تداول من الداخل في العالم؟" بين 6 و 7 سبتمبر، شهد مجلس شيكاغو لتبادل الخيارات شراء 4744 خيارا على يونيتيد إيرلينس، ولكن فقط 396 خيارات الاتصال ... على افتراض أن 4000 من الخيارات تم شراؤها من قبل أشخاص لديهم معرفة مسبقة بهجمات وشيكة، فإن هؤلاء "المطلعين" قد حققت أرباحا تقارب 5 ملايين دولار. في 10 سبتمبر، تم شراء 4،516 خيارات على الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية في بورصة شيكاغو، مقارنة مع 748 فقط المكالمات. مرة أخرى، لم تكن هناك أخبار في هذه المرحلة لتبرير هذا الخلل؛ ... مرة أخرى، على افتراض أن 4000 من هذه الخيارات التجارة تمثل "المطلعين"، فإنها تمثل مكاسب من حوالي 4 ملايين دولار. [كانت مستويات خيارات الشراء التي تم شراؤها أعلاه أعلى من ست مرات أكثر من المعتاد]. لم يحدث أي تداول مماثل في شركات الطيران الأخرى في بورصة شيكاغو في الأيام التي سبقت مباشرة الثلاثاء الأسود. مورغان ستانلي دين ويتر & أمب؛ ، التي احتلت 22 طابقا من مركز التجارة العالمي، شهدت 2،157 من أكتوبر 45 $ خيارات شراءها في ثلاثة أيام التداول قبل الثلاثاء الأسود. مقارنة بمتوسط ​​27 عقدا في اليوم قبل 6 سبتمبر. انخفض سعر سهم مورغان ستانلي من 48.90 دولار إلى 42.50 دولار في أعقاب الهجمات. وعلى افتراض أن 000 2 عقد من عقود الخيارات هذه قد اشترى بناء على المعرفة بالهجمات التي تقترب، كان من الممكن للمشترين أن يستفيدوا بما لا يقل عن 1.2 مليون دولار. ميريل لينش & أمب؛ ، التي احتلت 22 طابقا من مركز التجارة العالمي، شهدت 12،215 أكتوبر 45 $ خيارات الشراء اشترى في أربعة أيام التداول قبل الهجمات؛ وكان متوسط ​​الحجم السابق في تلك الأسهم 252 عقدا في اليوم [زيادة بنسبة 1200٪!]. عند استئناف التداول، انخفضت أسهم ميريل من 46.88 $ إلى 41.50 $. على افتراض أن 11،000 عقود الخيار تم شراؤها من قبل "المطلعين"، فإن أرباحهم قد يكون حوالي 5.5 مليون دولار. ويقوم المنظمون الأوروبيون بفحص التداولات في ميونخ ري الألمانية وسويسرا ري السويسرية و أكسا من فرنسا، وجميع شركات إعادة التأمين الكبرى مع التعرض لكارثة الثلاثاء الأسود. [فتو ملاحظة: تمتلك أكسا أيضا أكثر من 25٪ من أسهم شركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية مما يجعل الهجمات & كوت؛ ضربة مزدوجة & كوت؛ بالنسبة لهم.] التداول من الداخل. ما قبل 9/11 وضع خيارات على الشركات يصب به هجوم يشير إلى المعرفة المطلقة. وتشير المعاملات المالية في الأيام التي سبقت الهجوم إلى أن بعض الأفراد استخدموا معرفة غير مسبوقة بالهجوم لجني أرباح ضخمة. (1) تشمل الأدلة المتعلقة بالتداول من الداخل ما يلي: ارتفاع كبير في شراء خيارات الخيارات على أسهم شركتي الطيران المستخدمتين في الهجوم - الخطوط الجوية المتحدة وشركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية سورجس في شراء خيارات الخيارات على أسهم شركات إعادة التأمين المتوقع أن تدفع المليارات لتغطية الخسائر من الهجوم - ميونخ ري و أكسا غروب سورجس في شراء خيارات الخيارات على أسهم شركات الخدمات المالية التي تضررت من الهجوم - ميريل لينش & أمب؛ وشركة مورغان ستانلي وبنك أوف أمريكا زيادة كبيرة في المشتريات من خيارات الدعوة من مخزون من مصنع الأسلحة المتوقع أن تكسب من الهجوم - رايثيون عواصف ضخمة في مشتريات من خمس سنوات ملاحظات الخزانة الأمريكية. وفي كل حالة، تحولت المشتريات الشاذة إلى أرباح كبيرة بمجرد أن يفتح سوق الأوراق المالية بعد أسبوع من الهجوم: استخدم خيارات على الأسهم التي يمكن أن تتضرر من الهجوم، واستخدمت خيارات الاتصال على الأسهم التي من شأنها أن تستفيد. خيارات الشراء والدعوة هي عقود تسمح لحامليها ببيع وشراء الأصول، على التوالي، بأسعار محددة في تاريخ معين. تسمح خيارات الشراء لأصحابها بالاستفادة من الانخفاض في قيم الأسهم لأنها تسمح بشراء الأسهم بسعر السوق وبيعها بسعر الخيار الأعلى. وتسمى نسبة حجم عقود خيار الشراء لعقود خيار المكالمة نسبة الطرح / المكالمة. وعادة ما تكون النسبة أقل من واحدة، مع قيمة حوالي 0.8 تعتبر طبيعية. 2. وشهدت شركات الطيران الأمريكية والخطوط الجوية المتحدة، والعديد من شركات التأمين والبنوك خسائر فادحة في قيم الأسهم عندما فتحت الأسواق في 17 سبتمبر. وضع خيارات - الأدوات المالية التي تسمح للمستثمرين بالاستفادة من انخفاض قيمة الأسهم - تم شراؤها على أسهم هذه الشركات في حجم كبير في الأسبوع قبل الهجوم. الخطوط الجوية المتحدة و الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية. وكان من بين الشركات الأكثر تضررا من الهجوم شركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية (أمريكان إيرلينس)، ومشغل الرحلة 11 والرحلة 77، وشركة الطيران المتحدة (أول)، ومشغل الرحلة 175 والرحلة 93. ووفقا ل كبس نيوس، في الأسبوع السابق والهجوم، وكانت نسبة وضع / دعوة لشركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية أربعة. 3 كانت نسبة الاستدعاء / الاتصال لشركة يونيتيد إيرلينس 25 مرة فوق المعدل الطبيعي في 6 سبتمبر. وحدثت الزيادات في خيارات الشراء في أيام كانت غير مريحة لشركات الطيران وأسعار أسهمها. وذكرت صحيفة بلومبرج نيوز أن الخيارات المعروضة على شركات الطيران ارتفعت إلى الارتفاع الهائل 285 مرة في المتوسط. عندما أعيد فتح السوق بعد الهجوم، انخفض سهم الخطوط الجوية المتحدة 42 في المئة من 30،82 $ إلى 17،50 $ للسهم الواحد، وانخفض سهم الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية 39 في المئة، من 29،70 $ إلى 18،00 $ للسهم الواحد. 7. شركات إعادة التأمين. ومن المتوقع أن تتعرض عدة شركات في قطاع إعادة التأمين لخسائر فادحة جراء الهجوم: ميونخ ري من ألمانيا وسويسرا ري السويسرية - أكبر شركات إعادة التأمين في العالم، ومجموعة أكسا الفرنسية. وفي سبتمبر 2001، تقدر التزامات سان فرانسيسكو كرونيكل بمبلغ 1.5 مليار دولار لشركة ميونخ ري و 0.55 مليار دولار لمجموعة أكسا وخصومات تلغراف.كوك تقدر ب 1.2 مليار يورو لشركة ميونخ ري و 0.83 مليار ل سويس ري. 8 9. وكان التداول في أسهم ميونخ ري ضعف مستوىه الطبيعي تقريبا في 6 سبتمبر و 7، وكان التداول في أسهم سويس ري أكثر من ضعف مستوىه الطبيعي في 7 سبتمبر. شركات الخدمات المالية. ميريل لينش ومورغان ستانلي مورغان ستانلي دين ويتر & أمب؛ و ميريل لينش & أمب؛ وكان مقر الشركة في كل من مانهاتن السفلى في وقت الهجوم. مورغان ستانلي احتلت 22 طابقا من البرج الشمالي وكان ميريل لينش مقر بالقرب من البرجين التوأمين. وكان مورغان ستانلي الذي شهد 27 خيارا على الأسهم التي اشترىها في اليوم قبل 6 ايلول / سبتمبر، شهد شراء 2،157 خيارا في الايام الثلاثة التي سبقت الهجوم. وشهدت ميريل لينش، التي شهدت 252 خيارا في المتوسط، شراء أسهمها في اليوم قبل 5 أيلول / سبتمبر، شهدت شراء 12.215 خيار شراء في الأيام الأربعة قبل الهجوم. وانخفض سهم مورغان ستانلي بنسبة 13٪ وانخفض سهم ميريل لينش بنسبة 11.5٪ عندما أعيد فتح السوق. 11. أظهر بنك أوف أميركا زيادة بمقدار خمسة أضعاف في تداول الخيارات خلال يومي الخميس والجمعة قبل الهجوم. وفي حين أن معظم الشركات ستشهد انخفاض أسعار أسهمها في أعقاب الهجوم، فإن أولئك الذين يعملون في مجال تزويد الجيش سيشهد زيادات هائلة، مما يعكس الأعمال الجديدة التي كانوا على استعداد لتلقيها. وقال رايثيون، صانع صواريخ باتريوت وتوماهوك، ان مخزونه ترتفع مباشرة بعد الهجوم. وارتفعت مشتريات خيارات المكالمة على أسهم رايثيون بمقدار ستة أضعاف في اليوم السابق للهجوم. وقد تم تغريم رايثيون بملايين الدولارات تضخيم تكاليف المعدات التي تبيعها للجيش الأمريكي. رايثيون لديها سرية سرية، E- النظم، التي شملت عملاء وكالة المخابرات المركزية ووكالة الأمن القومي. 14. ملاحظات الخزانة الأمريكية. وقد تم شراء سندات الخزانة الأمريكية لمدة خمس سنوات بأعداد كبيرة بشكل غير طبيعي قبل الهجوم، وتمت مكافأة مشتركيها بزيادة حادة في قيمتها بعد الهجوم. التحقيق سيك. بعد وقت قصير من الهجوم تداول المجلس الأعلى للتعليم قائمة الأسهم إلى شركات الأوراق المالية في جميع أنحاء العالم للحصول على المعلومات. (16) تشير المادة المعممة على نطاق واسع إلى أن المخزونات التي أبلغت عنها اللجنة العليا للأوراق المالية شملت أسهم الشركات التالية: الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية، الخطوط الجوية المتحدة، الخطوط الجوية القارية، الخطوط الجوية الشمالية الغربية، الخطوط الجوية الجنوبية الغربية، الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية، مارتن، بوينغ، شركة لوكهيد مارتن، شركة أمريكان إكسبريس كورب، مجموعة أمريكان إنترناشيونال، شركة عمرو، أكسا سا، بنك أوف أمريكا كورب، بنك نيويورك كورب، بنك بان كورب، سيجنا جروب، سنا المالية، كرنفال كورب، تشوب غروب، جون هانكوك فينانسيال سيرفيسز، هركيوليز Inc.، L-3 كومونيكاتيونس هولدينغز، Inc.، لتف كوربوراتيون، مارش & أمب؛ مكلين، كروس.، ميتليف، بروجريسف كورب، جنرال موتورز، رايثون، دبليو آر. جريس، رويال كاريبيان كرويسس، Ltd.، لوني ستار تكنولوجيز، أمريكان إكسبريس، سيتي جروب Inc.، رويال & أمب؛ سون أليانس، ليمان براذرز هولدينغز، Inc.، فورنادو ريالتي تروست، مورغان ستانلي، دين ويتر & أمب؛ زل كابيتال Ltd.، و بير ستيرنس. وفي 19 أكتوبر / تشرين الأول ذكرت مقالة في صحيفة سان فرانسيسكو كرونيكل أن المجلس الأعلى للرقابة، بعد فترة من الصمت، قام بعمل لم يسبق له مثيل من قبل نواب مئات المسؤولين الخاصين في تحقيقاته: وفي بيان من صفحتين أصدرته "جميع الكيانات ذات الصلة بالأوراق المالية" في جميع أنحاء البلاد، طلب المجلس الأعلى للتعليم من الشركات تعيين كبار الموظفين الذين يقدرون "الطبيعة الحساسة" للقضية ويمكن الاعتماد عليها "ممارسة السلطة التقديرية المناسبة" ك "نقطة" والناس الذين يربطون المحققين الحكوميين والصناعة. 17. ويوضح مايكل روبرت، وهو ضابط سابق في شرطة لوس أنجلوس، عواقب هذا الإجراء: تفسير وإعادة تفسير البيانات. ويظهر تحليل للتقارير الصحفية عن موضوع التداول الواضح من الداخل فيما يتعلق بالهجوم اتجاها، مع وجود تقارير مبكرة تسلط الضوء على حالات الشذوذ، وتفيد التقارير فيما بعد بأنها تعفيها. في كتابه عبور روبيكون مايكل C. روبرت يوضح هذه النقطة من خلال مقتطفات الأولى عدد من التقارير التي نشرت بعد وقت قصير من الهجوم: ويذكر ان القفز فى شركة الخطوط الجوية المتحدة يضع خيارات 90 مرة (وليس 90 فى المائة) فوق المعدل الاعتيادي بين 6 سبتمبر و 10 سبتمبر، و 285 مرة اعلى من المتوسط ​​يوم الخميس قبل الهجوم. - سي بي اس نيوز، 26 سبتمبر قفزة في الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية وضع خيارات 60 مرات (وليس 60 في المئة) فوق العادي في اليوم السابق للهجمات. - كبس نيوس، 26 سبتمبر لم يحدث أي تداول مماثل على أي شركات طيران أخرى. - تقرير بلومبرغ للأعمال، معهد مكافحة الإرهاب، هرتسليا، إسرائيل [نقلا عن بيانات من كبوي] 3 شهد مورجان ستانلي، بين 7 سبتمبر و 10 سبتمبر، بزيادة 27 مرة (وليس 27 في المئة) في شراء وضع خيارات على أسهمها. 4. 3. "ميكانيكا احتيال محتملة من بن لادن من الداخل"، معهد هرتسليا للسياسة الدولية لمكافحة الإرهاب، 22 سبتمبر 2001. مايكل C. روبرت، "القضية لإدارة بوش معرفة مسبقة من هجمات 11-11"، من ذي ويلدرنيس 22 أبريل 2002. نشر في مركز البحوث والعولمة & لوت؛ globalresearch.ca/articles/RUP203A.html> ؛. 4 - تكنولوجيا المعلومات والاتصالات، المرجع السابق. نقلا عن بيانات من مجلس شيكاغو لتبادل الخيارات (كبوي). [. ] "الإرهابيون المدربين في كبب". شيكاغو صن تايمز، 20 سبتمبر 2001، & لوت؛ سونتيميس / تيرور / ستوريز / ست-نوس-trade20.html & غ ؛. "دقق من خيارات التداول رابط لهجمات أكد"، [. ] شيكاغو صن تايمز، 21 سبتمبر 2001، & لوت؛ سونتيميس / تيرور / ستوريز / ست-فين-trade21.html & غ ؛. روبرت ثم يوضح محاولة واضحة لدفن القصة من خلال شرح ذلك بعيدا عن شيء غير عادي. وتدعي مقال في صحيفة نيويورك تايمز في 30 سبتمبر / أيلول أن "التفسيرات الحميدة تتحول" في تحقيق المجلس الأعلى للتعليم. 20 وتلقي المقالة باللوم على النشاط في خيارات الخيارات التي لا تحددها كميا على "التشاؤم في السوق"، لكنها تفشل في تفسير سبب عدم انعكاس سعر الأسهم في شركات الطيران على نفس التشاؤم في السوق. ولا يفسر التشاؤم في السوق على الإطلاق أن 2،5 مليون دولار من الخيارات المطروحة لم يطالب بها أحد، وهو دليل على أن المشترين في خيار الشراء كانوا جزءا من مؤامرة جنائية. 21. وضع خيارات. يطالب. واحدة من المطالبات الأكثر شيوعا المتكررة من 11/11 المعرفة غير المبنية على التجارة المالية التي وقعت قبل الهجمات مباشرة. وضع الخيارات، الرهانات أساسا أن سعر السهم سوف تقع، وضعت في مستويات مرتفعة على نحو غير عادي قبل 11/9 على كل من شركات الطيران المشاركة في الهجوم، فضلا عن الشركات الكبرى مقرها في مركز التجارة العالمي، وشركات التأمين التي اكتسبت تغطية للعالم مجمع مركز التجارة، وغيرها. وعندما أعيد فتح البورصة، هبطت جميع أسعار الأسهم هذه، وحقق المشترون أرباحا ضخمة. كان مايك روبرت من أوائل الناس الذين ربطوا القصة بالحكومة الأمريكية، مع مقالة بعنوان "التفاصيل الممنوعة للتجارة الداخلية من الداخل الرصاص مباشرة إلى أعلى رتبة في وكالة المخابرات المركزية: المدير التنفيذي لوكالة المخابرات المركزية" بزي "كرونغارد إدارة الشركة التي تعاملت مع" بوت " الخيارات على المتحدة المتحدة للطيران ": حتى عام 1997 أ. وكان "بزي" كرونغارد رئيس بنك الاستثمار A.B. بنى. A.B. تم الحصول على براون من قبل بانكر's تروست في عام 1997. ثم أصبح كرونغارد، كجزء من عملية الدمج، نائب رئيس مجلس إدارة بنك بانكر's تروست-أب براون، وهو واحد من 20 مصرفا أميركيا رئيسيا يدعى السيناتور كارل ليفين هذا العام على أنه مرتبط بغسل الأموال. وكان آخر موقف كرونجارد في بانكر's ترست (بت) هو الإشراف على "علاقات العملاء الخاصة". وبهذه الصفة كان لديه علاقات مباشرة مباشرة مع بعض أغنى الناس في العالم في نوع من العمليات المصرفية المتخصصة التي تم تحديدها من قبل ويرى مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي والمحققون الآخرون ارتباطا وثيقا بغسل أموال المخدرات. انضم كرونجارد إلى وكالة المخابرات المركزية في عام 1998 كمحامي لمدير وكالة المخابرات المركزية جورج تينيت. وقد تم ترقيته إلى المدير التنفيذي لوكالة المخابرات المركزية من قبل الرئيس بوش في مارس من هذا العام. وقد تم الحصول على بت من قبل دويتشه بنك في عام 1999. الشركة المشتركة هي أكبر بنك واحد في أوروبا. وكما سنرى، لعب دويتشه بنك العديد من الأدوار الرئيسية في الأحداث المتصلة بهجمات 11 سبتمبر. (اذهب اتبع الرابط لقراءة كل شيء). وظهرت القصة أيضا في وسائل الإعلام الرئيسية أسبوع أو نحو ذلك بعد الهجمات: جاء هذا البيان وسط جهود دولية واسعة النطاق من قبل المحققين والهيئات التنظيمية لتحديد ما اذا كان الارهابيون يحاولون الاستفادة من الاسهم والخيارات التجارية قبل الهجمات على مركز التجارة العالمى والبنتاغون. في الأيام التي سبقت الهجمات، تم شراء أعداد كبيرة بشكل غير عادي من خيارات الشراء لمخزون شركة عمرو كورب وشركة أم كورب، والشركات الأم لشركة الخطوط الجوية الأمريكية وشركة الخطوط الجوية المتحدة، التي اختطف كل منها طائرتين. ولم يكن هناك اتجاه من هذا القبيل يشمل ناقلات أخرى. خيار الشراء هو عقد يمنح صاحب الحق الحق في بيع أصل بسعر محدد قبل تاريخ معين. في 6 و 7 سبتمبر، عندما لم تكن هناك أخبار كبيرة أو حركة سعر السهم التي تنطوي على المتحدة، تعاملت بورصة شيكاغو 4،744 خيارات طرح لمخزون أول، مقارنة مع 396 فقط خيارات الاتصال - الرهانات أساسا أن السعر سيرتفع. في يوم 10 سبتمبر، يوم هادئ للولايات المتحدة، وكان حجم 748 المكالمات و 4،516 يضع، على أساس الاختيار من سجلات التداول الخيار. وفى يوم الاثنين الاول من التعامل عقب الهجمات، انخفضت اسهم شركة ام ار بنسبة 39 فى المائة، وانخفضت اسهم الشركة بنسبة 42 فى المائة. كما انخفضت اسهم شركات الطيران الاخرى بشكل حاد وارتفع معظمها بشكل طفيف يوم الثلاثاء. وقال جون كينوكان، مدير شركة برودباند ريزارتش، وهي شركة أبحاث مستقلة في مجال الاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية، لسان فرانسيسكو كرونيكل: "رأيت أرقام المكالمات أعلى مما رأيته في 10 سنوات من متابعة الأسواق، وخاصة أسواق الخيارات". "عندما يرى المرء هذا النوع من النشاط، أول شيء واحد هو أن نسأل نفسه،" ما هو التفسير؟ ما هو قلق الناس؟ " " وذكر تقرير صادر عن صحيفة وول ستريت جورنال ان اللجنة تلقت معلومات من وكالات امريكية مختلفة يوم الجمعة حول احتمال قيام ارهابيين بتداول تجارى فى الصناعات المتضررة من التفجير بما فى ذلك التأمين وشركات الطيران وكذلك حول احتمال وضع خيار او مستقبل - تداول المؤشرات. وفى يوم الاثنين قال منظم سوق الاسهم الالمانى انه يبحث فى ادعاءات البيع القصير المشبوه قبيل هجمات 11 سبتمبر. وقد حددت واشنطن والعديد من الحكومات الاخرى اسامة بن لادن كمتهم رئيسى. وقد تلقى المجلس الأعلى للتعليم معلومات من جهات تنظيمية أمريكية أخرى حول إمكانية تداول مريب فى وقت سابق من هذا الشهر فى خيارات الخيارات، وفقا لما ذكره مصدر حكومى. وتداولت بورصة شيكاغو الخيارات على أسهم حوالي 1400 شركة بالإضافة إلى 38 مؤشر قائم على الأسهم، بما في ذلك مؤشر داو جونز الصناعي، ومؤشر S & أمب؛ P 500 و ناسداك 100. كل الأنف، غطت في أعقاب الهجمات، والتي كان من شأنها أن تعني أرباحا كبيرة لكل من كان يراهن على تراجعها عن طريق شراء خيارات وضع أو من خلال بيع قصيرة. يقترض الباعة القصيرون الأسهم ويبيعونها تحسبا لشرائها لاحقا بسعر أقل. والاقتراح هو أن هذه المشتريات كانت تستهدف بشكل غير عادي الشركات التي تعاني مباشرة من الهجمات، ثم. وكانت الأحجام أعلى بكثير من المعتاد، ولم تكن هناك أي أخبار أخرى قد تفسر لماذا قد يعتقد الناس أن أسعار الأسهم هذه سوف تنخفض. ولذلك، فإنه ادعى، يجب أن يكون المشترين خيار وضع قدرا من المعرفة المسبقة عن هجمات 11 سبتمبر. حساب اللجنة. إن الجزء الرئيسي من تقرير لجنة 9/11 لم يشر إلا إلى الخيارات المعروضة، وحتى أنه كان مخفيا في حاشية: 6 سبتمبر وشركة أمريكان ايرلاينز في 10 أيلول / سبتمبر - تداول مشبوهة للغاية على وجهها.أيه، وكشف مزيد من التحقيق أن التداول لا علاقة له 9 / 11.A مستثمر مؤسسي واحد مقرها الولايات المتحدة مع عدم وجود علاقات يمكن تصوره لتنظيم القاعدة اشترى 95 في المئة من ال أول في 6 سبتمبر كجزء من استراتيجية التداول التي شملت أيضا شراء 115،000 سهم من الولايات المتحدة في 10 سبتمبر. وبالمثل، فإن الكثير من التداول على ما يبدو مشبوهة في الولايات المتحدة في 10 أيلول / سبتمبر تعزى إلى الولايات المتحدة القائمة على خيارات التداول النشرة الإخبارية، وفاكس لمشتركيها يوم الأحد 9 سبتمبر، والتي أوصت هذه الصفقات.هذه الأمثلة تطبع الأدلة التي فحصها التحقيق.المجلس الأعلى للتعليم ومكتب التحقيقات الفدرالي، بمساعدة من وكالات أخرى وصناعة الأوراق المالية، كرس موارد هائلة للتحقيق في هذه المسألة، بما في ذلك تأمين تعاون العديد من الحكومات الأجنبية.وقد وجد هؤلاء المحققين أن ما يبدو مشبوهة وثبت باستمرار حميدة. مقابلة جوزيف سيلا (16 سبتمبر / أيلول 2003؛ 7 مايو / أيار 2004؛ 10-11 مايو / أيار 2004)؛ فبي بريسينغ (15 أغسطس 2003)؛ سيك ميمو، ديفيسيون أوف إنفورسيمنت تو سيك شير أند كوميسيونيرز، "بري-سيبتمبر 11، 2001 ترادينغ ريفيو"، ماي 15، 2002؛ مقابلة كين برين. (23 أبريل 2004). مقابلة إد G. (3 فبراير 2004). الحاشية 130، الفصل 5، تقرير لجنة 11/11. وكثيرا ما رأينا أن اللجنة انتقدت هذا الأمر، ولكنها قدمت مزيدا من التفاصيل بشأن هذه المسألة في المرفق باء من وثيقة لجنة تمويل الإرهاب التابعة للجنة، التي نعرضها هنا بالكامل. الملحق ب: تداول الأوراق المالية. ويصف هذا التذييل تحقيقات الموظفين والحكومة الأمريكية في مسألة ما إذا كان أي شخص لديه معرفة مسبقة بهجمات 11 أيلول / سبتمبر قد استفاد من تجارة الأوراق المالية، ويوضح الاستنتاج الوارد في تقرير اللجنة النهائي أن التحقيقات الحكومية المكثفة لم تكشف عن أي دليل على هذا الاتجار غير المشروع. ومنذ 11 أيلول / سبتمبر نفسها تقريبا، كانت هناك تقارير متسقة تفيد بأن "التجارة الداخلية" الهائلة سبقت الهجمات، مما مكن الأشخاص الذين يبدو أنهم ينتمون إلى القاعدة من جني أرباح ضخمة. ولم تجد اللجنة أي دليل يدعم هذه التقارير. بل على العكس من ذلك، لم يجد تحقيق شامل من جانب إنفاذ القانون الاتحادي، بالاقتران مع صناعة الأوراق المالية، دليلا على أن أي شخص لديه معرفة مسبقة بالهجمات الإرهابية قد استفاد من معاملات الأوراق المالية. تحقيقات موظفي اللجنة. وكان موظفو اللجنة الوصول غير المقيد إلى المسؤولين الحكوميين في الولايات المتحدة الذين قادوا وأجرى التحقيق في تداول الأوراق المالية قبل 11 سبتمبر. وبالإضافة إلى إجراء مقابلات مع الموظفين الرئيسيين، استعرض موظفو اللجنة التقارير الحكومية غير العامة التي تلخص نتائج التحقيقات فضلا عن البيانات الاحتياطية، بما في ذلك جداول البيانات والمذكرات والتحليلات الأخرى، وتقارير المقابلات مع التجار والمشاركين في صناعة الأوراق المالية وغيرهم من الشهود. وقد حصلنا على تقارير التحقيقات التي أجرتها بعض الهيئات الرئيسية غير الحكومية في مجال صناعة الأوراق المالية والتي تتقاسم المسؤولية مع الحكومة لمراقبة تداول الأوراق المالية في الأسواق الأمريكية، بما في ذلك بورصة نيويورك والرابطة الوطنية لتنظيم تجار الأوراق المالية، ومقابلة شهود من وهي كيان رئيسي من القطاع الخاص. واستعرض موظفو اللجنة أيضا المعلومات التي قدمها منظمو الأوراق المالية الأجانب، وأجروا مقابلات مع مسؤولي إنفاذ القانون الألماني، وأجروا مقابلات مع موظفي إنفاذ القانون الأمريكيين بشأن اتصالاتهم بنظرائهم الأجانب بشأن تداول الأوراق المالية. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، استند موظفو اللجنة إلى استعراضها للمعلومات الاستخبارية السرية الموسعة المتعلقة بتنظيم القاعدة وكيفية إدارتها لعملياتها وتمويلها، فضلا عن استجواب المعتقلين من تنظيم القاعدة، بمن فيهم زعيم مؤامرة 11 أيلول / سبتمبر خالد شيخ محمد وغيرهم من المشاركين في المؤامرة. وقد أثبتت هذه المعلومات أنها مفيدة في تقييم مدى احتفاظ تنظيم القاعدة بشكل وثيق بعملية 11 سبتمبر واحتمال أن تسعى إلى الربح من الهجمات من خلال تداول الأوراق المالية. تحقيق الحكومة الأمريكية في التداول في الولايات المتحدة. وقد أجرت لجنة الأوراق المالية والبورصات ومكتب التحقيقات الاتحادي، بمشاركة وزارة العدل، التحقيق في الادعاء بوجود تداول غير مشروع قبل 11 أيلول / سبتمبر؛ لعبت وكالات أخرى عديدة دورا داعما. 166. بدأ رئيس مكتب مراقبة السوق في المجلس الأعلى للتعليم تحقيقا في تداول ما قبل 11 سبتمبر 2001 في 12 سبتمبر 2001. في اجتماع متعدد الوكالات في 17 سبتمبر بمقر مكتب التحقيقات الفيدرالي، وافقت اللجنة العليا للاستثمار على قيادة التحقيقات التجارية من الداخل، والحفاظ على مكتب التحقيقات الفدرالي حسب الاقتضاء. وقد عينت وزارة العدل مدعيا جنائيا من مكتب المدعي العام في بروكلين للعمل بدوام كامل في التحقيق؛ وانتقل الى واشنطن العاصمة يوم 18 سبتمبر. أجرى المجلس الأعلى للتعليم تحقيقا هائلا، شارك في عدة أوقات أكثر من 40 موظفا من شعبة الإنفاذ التابعة للمجلس الأعلى للتعليم ومكتب الشؤون الدولية. كما تولى المجلس الأعلى للتعليم قيادة عمليات التنسيق المكثف للتحقيقات من قبل منظمات التنظيم الذاتي التي تتقاسم المسؤولية عن مراقبة أسواق الأوراق المالية الأمريكية، بما في ذلك، من بين أمور أخرى، بورصة نيويورك، وبورصة الأوراق المالية الأمريكية، والرابطة الوطنية للأوراق المالية تنظيم المتعاملين، ومجلس شيكاغو لتبادل الخيارات. The investigation focused on securities of companies or industries that could have been expected to suffer economically from the terrorist attacks. Thus, the investigators analyzed trading in the following sectors: airlines, insurance, financial services, defense and aerospace, security services, and travel and leisure services, as well as companies with substantial operations in the area of the World Trade Center. The investigation also included broad-based funds that could have been affected by a major shock to the U.S. economy. Ultimately, the investigators analyzed trading in 103 individual companies and 32 index or exchange-traded funds and examined more than 9.5 million securities transactions. The investigators reviewed any trading activity that resulted in substantial profit from the terrorist attacks. Investments that profited from dropping stock prices drew great scrutiny, including short selling167 and the purchase of put options.168 The SEC has long experience in investigating insider trading violations, which can involve the use of these techniques by those who know of an impending event that will make stock prices fall. The investigators also sought to determine who profited from well-timed investments in industries that benefited from the terrorist attacks, such as the stock of defense and security companies, and who timely liquidated substantial holdings in companies likely to suffer from the attacks. The SEC investigators reviewed voluminous trading records to identify accounts that made trades that led to profits as a result of the attacks. The SEC followed up on any such trades by obtaining documents and, where appropriate, interviewing the traders to understand the rationale for the trades. The SEC also referred to the FBI any trade that resulted in substantial profit from the attacks—a much lower threshold for a criminal referral than it would normally employ. Consequently, the FBI conducted its own independent interviews of many of the potentially suspicious traders. The SROs, which have extensive market surveillance departments, played a key role in the SEC investigation by providing information and, in some cases, detailed reports to the commission. In addition, the SEC directly contacted 20 of the largest broker-dealers and asked them to survey their trading desks for any evidence of illicit trading activity. It also asked the Securities Industry Association—the broker-dealer trade group—to canvass its members for the same purpose. The SEC investigation had built-in redundancies to ensure that any suspicious trading would be caught. For example, the SEC reviewed massive transaction records to detect any suspicious option trading and also obtained reports, known as the Large Option Position Reports and Open Interest Distribution Reports, that identified the holders of substantial amounts of options without regard to when those options were purchased. Similarly, to ensure full coverage, the SEC obtained information from a number of entities that play a role in facilitating short sales. Between these efforts, the work of the SROs, and the outreach to industry, the chief SEC investigator expressed great confidence that the SEC investigation had detected any potentially suspicious trade. No Evidence of Illicit Trading in the United States. The U.S. government investigation unequivocally concluded that there was no evidence of illicit trading in the U.S. markets with knowledge of the terrorist attacks. The Commission staff, after an independent review of the government investigation, has discovered no reason to doubt this conclusion. To understand our finding, it is critical to understand the transparency of the U.S. markets. No one can make a securities trade in the U.S. markets without leaving a paper trail that the SEC can easily access through its regulatory powers. Moreover, broker-dealers must maintain certain basic information on their customers. It is, of course, entirely possible to trade through an offshore company, or a series of nominee accounts and shell companies, a strategy that can make the beneficial owner hard to determine. Still, the investigators could always detect the initial trade, even if they could not determine the beneficial owner. Any suspicious profitable trading through such accounts would be starkly visible. The investigators of the 9/11 trades never found any blind alleys caused by shell companies, offshore accounts, or anything else; they were able to investigate the suspicious trades they identified. Every suspicious trade was determined to be part of a legitimate trading strategy totally unrelated to the terrorist attacks. Many of the public reports concerning insider trading before 9/11 focused on the two airline companies most directly involved: UAL Corp., the parent company of United Airlines, and AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines. Specifically, many people have correctly pointed out that unusually high volumes of put options traded in UAL on September 6–7 and in AMR on September 10.169. When the markets opened on September 17, AMR fell 40 percent and UAL fell 43 percent. The suspicious options trading before the attacks fueled speculation that al Qaeda had taken advantage of the U.S. markets to make massive profits from its murderous attacks. The allegations had appeal on their face—just as al Qaeda used our sophisticated transportation system to attack us, it appeared to have used our sophisticated markets to finance itself and provide money for more attacks. But we conclude that this scenario simply did not happen. Although this report will not discuss each of the trades that profited from the 9/11 attacks, some of the larger trades, particularly those cited in the media as troubling, are illustrative and typical both of the nature of the government investigation into the trades and of the innocent nature of the trading. The put trading in AMR and UAL is a case in point: it appeared that somebody made big money by betting UAL and AMR stock prices were going to collapse, yet closer inspection revealed that the transactions were part of an innocuous trading strategy. The UAL trading on September 6 is a good example. On that day alone, the UAL put option volume was much higher than any surrounding day and exceeded the call option volume by more than 20 times—highly suspicious numbers on their face.170 The SEC quickly discovered, however, that a single U.S. investment adviser had purchased 95 percent of the UAL put option volume for the day. The investment adviser certainly did not fit the profile of an al Qaeda operative: it was based in the United States, registered with the SEC, and managed several hedge funds with $5.3 billion under management. In interviews by the SEC, both the CEO of the adviser and the trader who executed the trade explained that they—and not any client—made the decision to buy the put as part of a trading strategy based on a bearish view of the airline industry. They held bearish views for a number of reasons, including recently released on-time departure figures, which suggested the airlines were carrying fewer passengers, and recently disclosed news by AMR reflecting poor business fundamentals. In pursuit of this strategy, the adviser sold short a number of airline shares between September 6 and September 10; its transactions included the fortunate purchase of UAL puts. The adviser, however, also bought 115,000 shares of AMR on September 10, believing that their price already reflected the recently released financial information and would not fall any further. Those shares dropped significantly when the markets reopened after the attacks. Looking at the totality of the adviser’s circumstances, as opposed to just the purchase of the puts, convinced the SEC that it had absolutely nothing to do with the attacks or al Qaeda. Still, the SEC referred the trade to the FBI, which also conducted its own investigation and reached the same conclusion. The AMR put trading on September 10 further reveals how trading that looks highly suspicious at first blush can prove innocuous. The put volume of AMR on September 10 was unusually high and actually exceeded the call volume by a ratio of 6:1—again, highly suspicious on its face. The SEC traced much of the surge in volume to a California investment advice newsletter, distributed by email and fax on Sunday, September 9, which advised its subscribers to purchase a particular type of AMR put options. The SEC interviewed 28 individuals who purchased these types of AMR puts on September 10, and found that 26 of them cited the newsletter as the reason for their transaction. Another 27 purchasers were listed as subscribers of the newsletter. The SEC interviewed the author of the newsletter, a U.S. citizen, who explained his investment strategy analysis, which had nothing to do with foreknowledge of 9/11. Other put option volume on September 10 was traced to similarly innocuous trades. Another good example concerns a suspicious UAL put trade on September 7, 2001. A single trader bought more than one-third of the total puts purchased that day, establishing a position that proved very profitable after 9/11. Moreover, it turns out that the same trader had a short position in UAL calls—another strategy that would pay off if the price of UAL dropped. Investigation, however, identified the purchaser as a well-established New York hedge fund with $2 billion under management. Setting aside the unlikelihood of al Qaeda having a relationship with a major New York hedge fund, these trades looked facially suspicious. But further examination showed the fund also owned 29,000 shares of UAL stock at the time—all part of a complex, computer-driven trading strategy. As a result of these transactions, the fund actually lost $85,000 in value when the market reopened. Had the hedge fund wanted to profit from the attacks, it would not have retained the UAL shares. These examples were typical. The SEC and the FBI investigated all of the put option purchases in UAL and AMR, drawing on multiple and redundant sources of information to ensure complete coverage. All profitable option trading was investigated and resolved. There was no evidence of illicit trading and no unexplained or mysterious trading. Moreover, there was no evidence that profits from any profitable options trading went uncollected.171. The options trading in UAL and AMR was typical of the entire investigation. In all sectors and companies whose trades looked suspicious because of their timing and profitability, including short selling of UAL, AMR, and other airline stocks, close scrutiny revealed absolutely no evidence of foreknowledge. The pattern is repeated over and over. For example, the FBI investigated a trader who bought a substantial position in put options in AIG Insurance Co. shortly before 9/11. Viewed in isolation, the trade looked highly suspicious, especially when AIG stock plummeted after 9/11. The FBI found that the trade had been made by a fund manager to hedge a long position of 4.2 million shares in the AIG common stock. The fund manager owned a significant amount of AIG stock, but the fund had a very low tax basis in the stock (that is, it had been bought long ago and had appreciated significantly over time). Selling even some of it would have created a massive tax liability. Thus, the fund manager chose to hedge his position through a put option purchase. After 9/11, the fund profited substantially from its investment in puts. At the same time, however, it suffered a substantial loss on the common stock, and overall lost money as a result of the attacks. In sum, the investigation found absolutely no evidence that any trading occurred with foreknowledge of 9/11. The transparency of the U.S. securities markets almost ensures that any such trading would be detectable by investigators. Even if the use of some combination of offshore accounts, shell companies, and false identification obscured the identity of the traders themselves, the unexplained trade would stand out like a giant red flag. The absence of any such flags corroborates the conclusion that there is no evidence any such trading occurred. Indeed, the leaders of both the SEC and FBI investigations into pre-9/11 trading expressed great confidence in this conclusion. There is also no evidence that any illicit trading occurred overseas. Through its Office of International Affairs, the SEC sought the assistance of numerous foreign countries with active securities markets. The FBI also engaged with foreign law enforcement officials about overseas trading. There are two issues to consider with respect to the international investigation: overseas trading in U.S. securities and trading of foreign securities in overseas markets. Trading of U.S. securities overseas. The SEC sought the assistance of countries where there was significant trading of U.S. securities. Each of these countries had previously entered into information sharing agreements with the SEC to cooperate in securities investigations, and each willingly cooperated in the 9/11 investigation. According to the SEC, there is generally little trading of U.S. securities overseas, since U.S. securities trade primarily in U.S. markets. Thus, unusual trading in U.S. securities would not have been very hard for foreign regulators to detect. Each country the SEC contacted conducted an investigation and reported back to the SEC that there was no trading in U.S. securities in their jurisdiction that appeared to have been influenced by foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. The foreign investigators also helped investigate suspicious trading in the U.S. from offshore accounts. For example, the SEC investigation revealed that shortly before 9/11 an offshore account had taken a short position in a fund that tracked one of the major U.S. market indices—an investment that profited when the U.S. market declined. After 9/11, the offshore investor closed out the position, reaping $5 million in profit. The SEC’s Office of International Affairs solicited help from a European country to investigate further. Although this trade was highly suspicious on its face, the European country’s investigation revealed that this investor was an extremely wealthy European national who often speculated by taking short positions in the U.S. market. In fact, the same investor had employed this strategy to lose $8 million in the six months preceding 9/11. Trading of foreign securities. There is also no evidence that insider trading took place in the stock of any foreign company. The SEC asked its foreign counterparts to investigate trading in securities that trade primarily on foreign markets subject to foreign regulation. Indeed, a number of companies that suffered serious economic losses from the 9/11 attacks were foreign companies, which traded mainly on foreign markets. In particular, the insurance companies with the largest potential losses included Munich Reinsurance Co., Swiss Reinsurance Co., and Allianz AG, all foreign-based companies that primarily traded overseas.172 In addition to the SEC, the FBI team investigating the financial aspects of the 9/11 plot frequently dealt with foreign law enforcement officials after 9/11 and raised the trading issue.173 Neither the SEC nor the FBI was informed of any evidence of any illicit trading in advance of 9/11 in any foreign securities. Shortly after 9/11, Ernst Welteke, president of the German Central Bank, made a number of public statements that insider trading occurred in airline and insurance company stock, and also in gold and oil futures. These preliminary claims were never confirmed. In fact, German officials publicly backtracked fairly soon after Mr. Welteke’s statement was issued. On September 27, a spokesman for the German securities regulator, BAWe (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel), declared that while the investigation was continuing, “there is no evidence that anyone who had knowledge of the attacks before they were committed used it to make financial transactions.”174 On December 3, 2001, a spokesman for the BAWe said its investigation had revealed no evidence of illicit trading in advance of 9/11 and that the case remained open pending new information. The spokesman said separate investigations by state authorities had also yielded no information and had been closed. 175. Commission staff interviewed German law enforcement officials who said that exhaustive investigation in Germany revealed no evidence of illicit trading. Moreover, both SEC and FBI officials involved in the trading investigation told the Commission staff that German investigators had privately communicated to them that there was no evidence of illicit trading in Germany before 9/11. The FBI legal attaché in Berlin forwarded a lead to the German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt), which reported back that the trading allegations lacked merit. It appears, then, that Welteke’s initial comments were simply ill-considered and unsupported by the evidence.176. Other investigation corroborates the conclusion of no illicit trading. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has developed extensive evidence about al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks. The collected information includes voluminous documents and computers seized in raids in Afghanistan and throughout the world. Moreover, the United States and its allies have captured and interrogated hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and supporters, including the mastermind of the 9/11 plot and the three key plot facilitators. No information has been uncovered indicating that al Qaeda profited by trading securities in advance of 9/11. To the contrary, the evidence—including extensive materials reviewed by Commission staff—all leads to the conclusion that knowledge of the plot was closely held by the top al Qaeda leadership and the key planners. It strains credulity to believe that al Qaeda would have jeopardized its most important and secretive operation or any of its key personnel by trying to profit from securities speculation. 166. The SEC is an independent federal agency entrusted with enforcing the federal securities laws. Its Division of Enforcement has extensive experience in investigating insider trading. Because the SEC lacks authority to bring criminal cases, it regularly works jointly with the FBI and DOJ, as it did in this case, on potentially criminal securities law violations. 167. Short selling is a strategy that profits from a decline in stock price. A short seller borrows stock from a broker dealer and sells it on the open market. At some point in the future, he closes the transaction by buying back the stock and returning it to the lending broker dealer. 168. A put option is an investment that profits when the underlying stock price falls. A put option contract gives its owner the right to sell the underlying stock at a specified strike price for a certain period of time. If the actual price drops below the strike price, the owner of the put profits because he can buy stock cheaper than the price for which he can sell it. By contrast, a call option contract is an investment that profits when the underlying stock price rises. A call option contract gives its owner the right to buy the underlying stock at a specified strike price for a certain time period. People illicitly trading on inside information often have used options because they allow the trader to leverage an initial investment, so that a relatively small investment can generate huge profits. 169. See, e.g., September 18, 2001 Associated Press Report. 170. A high ratio of puts to calls means that on that day far more money was being bet that the stock price would fall than that the stock price would rise. Such a ratio is a potential indicator of insider trading— although it can also prove to have entirely innocuous explanations, as in this case. 171. The press has reported this claim, and the allegation even found its way into the congressional testimony concerning terrorist financing of a former government official. The government investigation would have detected such traders because the investigators focused on people who purchased profitable positions— regardless of when or whether or when they closed out the position. Moreover, officials at the SEC and the Options Clearing Corporation, a private entity that processes options trading, pointed out that any profitable options positions are automatically exercised upon the expiration date unless the customer explicitly directed otherwise. Any direction not to exercise profitable options is a highly unusual event, which the OCC double-checks by contacting the broker who gave them such instruction. The OCC personnel had no recollection of any such contacts after 9/11. 172. According to the SEC’s Chief, Market Surveillance, the countries with the most significant relevant trading of foreign corporations stock were the UK and Germany. The UK quickly and publicly reported it had found no illicit trading. See e.g., J. Moore, The Times, Bin Ladin did not Deal (October 17, 2001) (Chairman of Financial Services Authority reported that investigation failed to reveal evidence of irregular share dealings in London in advance of 9/11). Other countries publicly reported similar findings. See e.g., Associated Press Worldstream, Suspicion dispelled of insider trading in KLM shares before September 11 attacks (reporting conclusion of Dutch government investigation that sharp drop in share prices of the national airline days before 9/11 were not caused by people who knew of terrorist attacks). 173. The chief of the FBI team also raised the issue with CIA and asked it to be alert for any intelligence on illicit trading; he received no such reports from the CIA. 174. Agence France Presse (Sept. 27, 2001). 175. See Australian Financial Review (Dec 3, 2001). 176. The SEC investigated trading of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in foreign companies. ADRs are receipts issued by a U.S. bank for the shares of a foreign corporation held by the bank. ADRs publicly trade on U.S. markets. This investigation revealed no illicit trading. The Commission reported no reason for suspicion, then. And as an example explain that the purchaser of the United Airlines put options also bought 115,000 American Airlines shares on September 10, not a good sign of foreknowledge. They provide few other details, though, and so many 9/11 researchers continue to claim that only foreknowledge of the attacks could explain the put options. But in reality there were several other reasons why investors might have been gloomy about the future. General economic context. The purchase of high numbers of put options indicates a belief that share prices are about to fall. It's sometimes argued that this indicates foreknowledge of 9/11 because there was no other reason to expect falling prices at the time: However, the "no news" line isn't exactly telling you the whole truth. Here's the Washington Post discussing share prices on September 1 2001, for instance: September 1, 2001 Saturday Final Edition. Stocks Rise but End Week Sharply Lower. BYLINE: Associated Press. SECTION: FINANCIAL; Pg. E02. DATELINE: NEW YORK Aug. 31. Wall Street ended a terrible week with a gain today, but the modest advance only underscored how fragile and unruly the stock market has become. The gain wasn't enough to bring the Dow Jones industrials back above 10,000, one day after the blue-chip average fell below that mark for the first time since April 9. An unexpectedly strong report on factory orders sent stocks surging early in the session, but the good news was quickly overshadowed by investors' concerns about the lackluster economy and disappointing company profits. "There is no news here today that would say we're about to reverse this thing on a permanent basis," said Bill Barker, investment strategy consultant at Dain Rauscher in Dallas. The Dow, up more than 100 points in the early going, closed 30.17 higher at 9949.75. For the week, it was down 473.42, or 4.5 percent. Broader stock indexes also were higher. The Nasdaq composite index rose 13.75, to 1805.43, while the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index edged up 4.55 to 1133.58. For the week, the Nasdaq was down 111.37, or 5.8 percent, while the S&P 500 sank 51.35, or 4.3 percent. Today's listless performance followed four straight days of declines that sent the Dow more than 500 points lower or nearly 5 percent. On Thursday, the Dow dropped 1.7 percent after several bad economic and corporate reports. The fluctuations during today's trading were "just vacillation," said Jon Brorson, director of equities at Northern Trust in Chicago. "Investors are in an 'I don't want to shoot until I see the whites of their eyes' mode." Concerned about the market's previous sell-offs, investors have been reluctant to buy because they sense no immediate possibility of a recovery in share prices. They're also waiting for a solid string of news from the government or companies that the economy may be ready for a turnaround. "We need tangible evidence of a bottom to restore confidence," Brorson said. The Commerce Department report today that factory orders rose 0.1 percent gave investors a reason to snap up bargains, but experts said the uptick was little more than temporary burst of buying. Among Dow component stocks, Alcoa rose 63 cents, to $ 38.12, and J.P. Morgan was up 16 cents, to $ 39.40. IBM dropped 41 cents, to $ 99.95, and Hewlett-Packard fell 19 cents, to $ 23.21. Overall, August was a bad month for investors, with the Dow 560.26 lower. The index hit its high point of the month on Aug. 2, closing at 10,551.18, but ended the month down 5.3 percent. The New York Stock Exchange composite index fell 1.74, to 587.84; the American Stock Exchange index rose 2.42, to 873.40; and the Russell index of 2,000 small stocks rose 0.50, to 468.56. Advancing issues outnumbered declining ones by about 4 to 3 on the NYSE, where trading volume fell to 949.5 million shares, from 1.17 billion on Thursday. On the Nasdaq, advancers outnumbered decliners by 5 to 4 and volume totaled 1.16 billion shares, down from 1.7 billion. The price of the Treasury's benchmark 10-year note fell $ 2.19 per $ 1,000 invested, and its yield rose to 4.83 percent, from 4.80 percent late Thursday. The dollar fell against the Japanese yen and rose against the euro. In late New York trading, a dollar bought 118.79 yen, down from 119.40 yen late Thursday, and a euro bought 91.23 cents, down from 91.61 cents. Light, sweet crude oil for October delivery settled at $ 27.20 a barrel, up 65 cents, on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Gold for current delivery fell on the Commodity Exchange division of the New York Mercantile Exchange to $ 274.40 a troy ounce from $ 275.40 on Thursday. An improvement at the end of the week, but people generally think it's a blip, with the Dow Jones down 4.5% overall, and that's following a 5.3% fall in August. General pessimism continued into the following week: September 6, 2001 Thursday. Markets head lower - again. BYLINE: Tom Walker. SECTION: Financial Pages. Unless the stock market goes into reverse, the major indexes appear headed for new bear-market lows. Investors have already lost more than $2 trillion in market value since the peak of the market's spring rally. قياسي & أمب؛ Poor's 500-stock index _ regarded by analysts as the best barometer of market trends _ closed on Thursday within 3.15 points, or 0.3 percent, of its 52-week low reached on April 4. The technology-heavy Nasdaq composite index, which has suffered the biggest bear market losses, and the blue chip Dow Jones industrial average of mostly "old economy" stocks, are both within about 4 percent of their 52-week lows of five months ago. "I think the problem you have to wonder about is how far tech stocks can pull things down," said Robert S. Robbins, chief investment strategist for SunTrust Robinson Humphrey Capital Markets. It would not be unusual for the market to "test" its previous lows and even rebound for awhile. But if stocks drop below previous lows, analysts believe the indexes could wind up falling much further. Many stocks are still trading at excessively high price-to-earnings valuations, analysts warn. At some point, the market will hit bottom and begin a sustained rally. But that point appears more elusive than ever, even though some strategists think the worst is over. "What it comes down to is some fundamental catalyst is needed that gets people to put their money (back in the market)," said Robbins. That catalyst could be a major improvement in the economy. Investors will get some idea of how well the economy was doing in August when the government releases the latest unemployment and job growth reports today. Most analysts believe the reports will unemployment than the 4.5 percent of July. Everyone's waiting for the unemployment figures, then. And unfortunately, they turn out to be worse than expected: September 8, 2001 Saturday Final Edition. On Wall Street, Numbers Crush Recovery Hopes; Stocks Give Up Last Gains From Tech Boom. BYLINE: Jerry Knight and Krissah Williams, Washington Post Staff Writers. SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01. The U.S. stock market plummeted yesterday, continuing a long and painful three-month decline that has reduced prices to levels not seen since before the Internet-inspired market surge almost three years ago. The Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, a broad-based measure of U.S. stocks regarded by professional investors as the single best measure of the overall market, ended the day at its lowest close since October 1998 as professional traders and mom-and-pop mutual fund investors alike stepped up their selling. Over the past two weeks, the S&P 500 has declined 8.4 percent in the face of a relentless stream of discouraging news about corporate losses, declining sales, unemployment and the economy, both here and abroad. Stock markets around the globe also continued their steep declines yesterday. There was widespread agreement among analysts that yesterday's report that the unemployment rate had jumped to 4.9 percent was a reality check for optimists who had been counting on the economy to turn upward. "The unemployment really was shocking because it was so much greater than expected," said Mary Farrell, senior investment strategist at UBS PaineWebber. "We really are not experiencing the recovery we'd hoped for." The S&P 500 fell for the ninth time in 10 days. It dropped almost 2 percent yesterday to close at 1085.78, down 20.62 points. The S&P is off 18 percent since the beginning of the year and down 28 percent from a year ago. Two other broad-based indexes, the New York Stock Exchange composite index and the Wilshire 5000 stock index, plunged past their previous lows for the year. Those indexes hit levels not seen since November 1998. The Dow Jones industrial average of 30 blue-chip stocks of companies that are considered leaders in their industries yesterday suffered its biggest single-day loss in five months, falling 2.4 percent to 9605.85, its lowest point since April. The Nasdaq composite index recorded its worst close since April 4, down 17.94 points, or 1.1 percent, at 1687.70. For the last two weeks, investors have taken money out of mutual funds that invest in U.S. stocks. About $ 10.7 billion flowed out of equity funds in the week ending Sept. 5 and $ 6 billion left the prior week, according to TrimTabs, a research group. This is the first time funds have seen back-to-back outflows since the spring, when the market hit its low, according to Thomas McManus, equity strategist for Banc of America Securities. Market watchers said selling by mutual funds is playing a major role in driving down the markets. When individual investors pull their money out of stock funds, the fund managers are forced to go to Wall Street to unload stocks, which tends to drive prices lower. The mutual fund withdrawals could signify a sea change in the attitude of small investors, who have largely resisted the urge to bail out even though their stock portfolios and retirement savings accounts have crashed. "The psychology has changed from 'you have got to be an investor' to 'you better stay away from stock,' " said Christopher Bonavico, portfolio manager at Transamerica Premier Aggressive Growth Fund in San Francisco. "The psychology is becoming so negative that it is a good time to be a buyer," he added. But this week there were no signs that Americans are buying stocks -- or much of anything else. Several announcements led investors to worry about consumer behavior. The Big Three automakers this week all reported that their sales fell in August -- down about 8 percent at Ford and General Motors and 24 percent at DaimlerChrysler's Chrysler division. In addition, most big retail chains also reported soft August sales -- except for discount chains and warehouse stores, which traditionally benefit when customers concerned about their finances "trade down" by doing their back-to-school shopping at, for instance, Target instead of Hecht's. The hotel industry -- led by Bethesda-based Marriott -- reported this week that occupancy rates are also falling rapidly, triggering price wars that cut further into lodging industry profits. Those reports of slowing consumer spending drove down stock prices earlier in the week because of fears that if consumers cut back, the United States could fall into a recession. That fear was magnified yesterday by the stunning increase in the jobless numbers to the highest level in almost four years. "Unemployment figures have a significant psychological impact on people's propensity to consume," explained Eric Leo, chief investment officer for Allied Investment Advisors in Baltimore. "The unemployment numbers came in certainly above what Wall Street was expecting," Leo said. "It's obviously showing signs that the economy is very sluggish. Whether it means we are going into a recession or not, it is still too soon to tell." With business spending stagnant, consumers are the only bulwark between the United States and a recession, said William Meehan, chief market analyst of Cantor Fitzgerald. Investors are concerned that "if the consumer gets riled by job layoffs and they pull back or start to pay off some debt, we'll go to a full-blown recession." The market was further jolted by more signs that corporations remain reluctant to make big investments. The stocks of a pair of prominent Washington-area high-tech companies were whacked recently because their customers are holding back. The shares of Manugistics Group Inc. of Bethesda fell 35 percent this week after the company said that its quarterly sales would be only about $ 70 million instead of the expected $ 90 million and, instead of a profit, it will post a loss. Manugistics makes software that companies use to do business with each other over the Internet. Ciena Corp., of Linthicum, which manufactures fiber-optic communications hardware, warned of a similar slowdown in sales and saw its stock plunge 19 percent this week. More disappointing sales and earnings are expected to be announced by companies issuing interim reports on the third quarter of the year, which for many corporations ends Sept. 30. Yesterday's jobs report and the week's other pessimistic signals produced speculation that the Federal Reserve may be prompted to cut interest rates again soon. Meehan of Cantor Fitzgerald said that although that might help the economy, it's unlikely to boost the stock market. "There's no reason for me to expect that a move to the upside will be sustained even if the Fed cuts rates," he said. Expectation of Fed rate cuts caused the bond market to rally. Prices of two-year U.S. Treasury notes rose as their yields, which go down when prices go up, declined to their lowest level in history, 3.51 percent, from 3.63 percent at Thursday's close. Similarly, yields on five-year Treasury notes fell to 4.30 percent, their lowest level in more than 40 years. Eventually tax cuts and lower interest rates will help, said Farrell of UBS PaineWebber. "We will start seeing positive earnings comparisons and that, combined with interest rates and inflation, should get us back into bull market status," she said. "It is just a waiting game until consumer confidence builds, and it's going to take some better employment figures to have that happen." This all contributed to a significant decline in share prices just before 9/11. There were plenty of people who seemed pessimistic about the future, then. And they had specific reasons to be buy put options for some 9/11-related companies, too. Individual companies. A number of different companies have been mentioned as possible targets of "insider dealing" prior to 9/11. But do these claims stand up to examination? Or might there have been other reasons to buy put options for them? American Airlines. The American Airlines (AMR) share price had peaked at over $40 at the beginning of 2001. By August 2001 it was closer to $35, though, and on September 10 it had dipped below $30. The share price had fallen 13% in the month before 9/11, then. Might investors have thought it could fall further, and so be tempted to buy puts? What’s more, immediately before 9/11 American Airlines released a string of bad news: 12:49pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR SAYS DEFERRING JET PURCHASES BEYOND FIRM ORDERS. 12:47pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR'S AMERICAN RETIRING 5 MORE 727 AIRCRAFT EARLY. 12:48pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR: AMERICAN TO RETIRE ENTIRE 727 FLEET BY END OF 2002. 12:46pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR SEES Q3 LOSS 'CONSIDERABLY LARGER' THAN Q2'S. 12:47pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR ANTICIPATES 'SIGNIFICANT' LOSS IN Q4. 12:49pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR SAYS CUTTING 2001-02 CAPEX BY NEARLY $1.2 BLN. 12:50pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMERICAN AIR FEELS SQUEEZE OF FUEL PRICES, LABOR COSTS. 1:07pm 09/07/01 AMR warns of wider losses - William Spain. 2:44pm 09/07/01 Analyst: Airline Stocks Face At Least Another Bad Quarter. 2:51pm 09/07/01 [AMR] AMR DOWN 3.4% AT $30.08 FOLLOWING Q3 WARNING. 4:04pm 09/07/01 Boeing stock rating cut over commercial growth - August Cole. Here's the official release: FOR RELEASE: Friday, September 7, 2001. AMR EXPECTS THIRD QUARTER LOSS, RETIRES MORE AIRCRAFT IN RESPONSE TO SLUGGISH ECONOMY. FORT WORTH, Texas – AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines, Inc. and TWA Airlines LLC, said today that it expects a third quarter loss considerably larger than its second quarter loss as it continues to feel the combined effects of a weak economic climate, high fuel prices and increased labor costs. The company said that it also expects a significant fourth quarter loss. To further rein in capacity while demand is weak, the company announced today that it would retire five more Boeing 727 aircraft earlier than originally planned. These five aircraft, which would have been retired during 2003, will now be retired during first quarter 2002. This latest change means that American will retire its entire Boeing 727 fleet by the end of 2002, a full year ahead of the original plan. This latest round of capacity cuts brings to 41 the number of active aircraft that AMR will retire early in response to poor economic conditions and falling demand. As a result, capacity for the combined American/TWA entity will be flat in 2001 and will fall by almost one and a half percent in 2002. American will continue to accept aircraft that are already on firm order and currently scheduled for delivery through 2004. However, the company has passed on recent purchase rights for additional aircraft that would have been delivered in 2002 and 2003. By not exercising these purchase rights, and trimming other spending, American has reduced its 2001-2002 capital-spending plan by almost $1.2 billion since the beginning of this year. Tom Horton, AMR’s chief financial officer said the company is committed to sustaining its industry-leading financial strength. "We’ll continue to take prudent steps consistent with this very tough operating climate. American’s financial strength and flexibility are important assets at a time like this." Here's how the updates were interpreted in the Dallas Morning News of September 8, 2001: September 8, 2001, Saturday. American Airlines Warns Investors of Expected Deficit. BYLINE: By Terry Maxon. AMR Corp. warned investors Friday that it would lose a lot more money this quarter than last quarter and would have a "significant" fourth-quarter deficit. If the losses materialize as expected, it will mark the first time since 1993 that AMR has posted a full-year loss. It will also be the first time since 1992 that AMR has lost money in every quarter. AMR, parent of American Airlines Inc. and TWA Airlines LLC, said it was grounding another five Boeing 727s early in response to poor demand. That means that its entire Boeing 727 fleet will be retired by the end of 2002 -- a year ahead of the original schedule. Since early 2001, AMR said, it has cut its capital spending budget by nearly $ 1.2 million for this year and next. "We'll continue to take prudent steps consistent with this very tough operating climate," said Tom Horton, AMR's chief financial officer, in a statement. "American's financial strength and flexibility are important assets at a time like this." AMR made a less drastic warning Aug. 13 when it said it expected to lose money for the third quarter and full year 2001 "if current economic conditions persist." Airline analyst Ray Neidl with ABN Amro Securities LLC said he was struck by the firmness of AMR's warning Friday, without the ambivalence of earlier warnings. "They're more or less throwing in the towel and saying they're seeing no changes through the end of the year," Mr. Neidl said. AMR shares closed down $ 1 to $ 30.15, off 3.2 percent in trading Friday on the New York Stock Exchange, and most other airline shares also finished down. Mr. Neidl said he expects other airlines to issue similar warnings in the next few weeks as the third quarter shudders to a close. Most airlines have warned that they have seen a sharp drop in the number of high-dollar business travelers, the ones that buy the most expensive first-class and coach tickets. Continental Airlines Inc. said last week that the revenue it received last month declined 12 to 14 percent per seat mile. At the same time, high jet fuel prices and rising labor costs have increased the airlines' expenses. Traffic has remained at or near last year's levels, with leisure travelers lured by continual fare sales this summer. However, Mr. Neidl said he's worried that consumers will quit responding to the fare sales. "That's when airline profits could really start taking a whack," Mr. Neidl said. "I'm not sure we're going to reach that point, but that's the thing that worries me going forward." In the second quarter ended June 30, AMR lost $ 105 million before special items, or $ 507 million including write-offs from decreased value of assets, primarily airplanes. It lost $ 43 million in the first quarter. This year's losses will break a long winning streak for the Fort Worth-based carrier, which earned $ 813 million last year and more than $ 5 billion between 1996 and 2000. After Friday's warning, airline analyst Michael J. Linenberg of Merrill Lynch Global Securities lowered his estimates for AMR. Mr. Linenberg, who had predicted a third-quarter loss for AMR of 70 cents a share, now is predicting a loss of $ 1.10 a share. For the fourth quarter, he's predicting the airline will lose $ 1.38 a share, down from 30 cents a share. For the full year excluding the special items, he is predicting a loss of $ 3.45 per share, compared with his previous estimate of $ 1.95 a share. "And I'm not the lowest guy on the Street," Mr. Linenberg said. Each penny per share represents about $ 46 million to $ 47 million, making his prediction for a full-year loss of around $ 530 million excluding the special items. Mr. Linenberg said he believes AMR has begun accruing expenses for its new pilots contract, now under negotiation, and for Transport Workers Union contracts that are up for approval by mechanics, ground workers and others. In addition, the integration of TWA Airlines into American may be more costly than executives planned, further increasing AMR's expenses, he said. AMR said since last spring, it has decided to retire 41 airplanes early. Its revised estimate is that American and TWA will have the same capacity combined in 2001 as last year, and capacity will decline nearly 1.5 percent next year. When the year began, American had expected to expand its capacity by 3 percent in 2001. So this could be "the first time since 1993 that AMR has posted a full-year loss", earnings estimates were being downgraded, and one analyst is worried "that consumers will quit responding to the fare sales", which, if it happens, could make the situation even worse. And this is the context in which investors may have been considering American Airlines on Saturday September 8th, 2001. The 9/11 Commission tell us that a newsletter recommended buying put options one day later, on the 9th, and the largest number were bought on the 10th. It seems to us that, when you consider the economic situation at the time, and the specific problems faced by AMR, this is an entirely plausible situation. No foreknowledge of 9/11 is required. Even if you disagree, though, it's plain that a significant profit warning the trading day before the put options were purchased is at the very least a relevant factor. And yet, those pushing the "foreknowledge" argument never seem to mention it at all. Why might that be? United Airlines. United Airlines didn't see the same specific bad news as AMR, however it was already known as a very poor performer within the industry. In fact, as CNNfn pointed out on August 24th 2001, it was losing more money than anyone else: August 24, 2001 Friday. SHOW: BUSINESS UNUSUAL 08:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Decline in Business Travel, CNNfn. GUESTS: Marilyn Adams. BYLINE: Kitty Pilgrim. KITTY PILGRIM, CNNfn ANCHOR, BUSINESS UNUSUAL: The economic downturn has put the airline industry in a tail spin. Now the decline in business travel, which according to 'USA Today" accounts for 2/3 of airline revenue, has hurt companies across the board. Have we hit rock bottom? Well our next guest says no. Joining me now from Miami is Marilyn Adams, business travel writer for the money section of "USA Today." And thanks very much for joining us. MARILYN ADAMS, USA TODAY: Sure, thanks Kitty. PILGRIM: Really it is quite dire out there in terms of business travel and anyone who works for a company has had the memo, no travel. How far more can this industry take? ADAMS: Well, it's pretty bad. There was a survey recently by Delta Air Lines (Company: Delta Air Lines Inc.; Ticker: DAL; URL: delta-air/) that showed that business travel at the top 30 markets is off 19 percent on average. But in some parts of the country like San Francisco it's off 35 percent and other airlines have said that some companies are cutting their travel budgets by as much as 60 percent. As Gordon Bethune said "they're not sending poor people to the business meeting any more." Maybe they're not even sending one. ADAMS: They're doing that business by phone or on the Web. They're find other ways of doing it. PILGRIM: How much do you think the industry can absorb? You crunched the numbers of how important business travel is to airlines. How much money are airlines losing on this? ADAMS: Well, United Airlines (Company: UAL Corporation; Ticker: UAL; URL: ual) is losing the most so far this year. There has been one Wall Street estimate that they could lose in excess of $900 million this year which would set a record for any one airline's loss in a single year. It could be even worse than we saw in the early '90s when we had the Pershing Gulf war coupled with a recession. This is a very tough time and the airlines have been kind of surprised by how precipitous the cuts have been at companies. Air Transport World said the losses surprised Wall Street, especially in comparison with their trading the previous year: UAL Corp., parent of United Airlines, surprised Wall Street with a much-worsethan-anticipated loss of $292 million compared with income of $336 million in the year-ago period. Current-period results exclude potential charges associated with the failed acquisition of US Airways Group that could increase the loss by $116 million on a pre-tax basis. President Rono Dutta said, "Clearly the quarter was very challenging for us." He cited the weaker economy for causing a reduction in business travel. United has been especially hard hit owing to its exposure to high-tech West Coast-originating traffic that has dried up in the wake of the dot meltdown. Dutta also acknowledged that United has to readjust to its "high cost structure." To address the issue, it has embarked on a virtual hiring freeze and is spreading out deliveries of 18 A319/A.320 aircraft previously set to arrive in the first quarter of 2003. It previously announced plans to speed the retirement of 75 727s, taking out 33 this year, 32 in 2002 and 10 in 2003. It also is reducing nonhub flying and substituting RJ service operated by its Regional partners on some feeder flights. Capacity for the fourth quarter will decline 1%, down from previous plans to boost it by 4%. For 2002 UA will shrink capacity 1%. Dutta said the airline is not forecasting a return to profit in the third or fourth quarters and is "not forecasting anything for next year." And Business Week says that, while there are "some signs of improvement", the airline business is facing major problems: September 3, 2001. SUDDENLY, CARRIERS CAN'T GET OFF THE GROUND. BYLINE: By Michael Arndt in Chicago, with William Symonds in Boston, and bureau reports. SECTION: NEWS; Analysis & Commentary: Airlines; Number 3747; Pg. 36. LENGTH: 966 words. HIGHLIGHT: Slumping business and vacationer demand proves weighty. Travel to and from high-tech hot spots has been particularly hard hit. American Airlines Inc. says business traffic at Austin, Tex., Boston, and San Jose, Calif., is down 15% from a year earlier. At UAL Corp., parent of United Airlines, summer business bookings at San Francisco and Dallas have been down as much as 34% in some months. People are cutting discretionary spending, and unfortunately flying fits into this category, says UAL President Rono J. Dutta. UAL is forecast to lose $ 985 million this year. More bad news is on the horizon. Vacationers, previously lured by fare sales and cheap tickets, aren't filling as many seats as they did only a month ago. And once the summer ends, tourist traffic tends to dry up. Meanwhile, international traffic -- another high-margin business -- is also weakening, as the economies of Europe, Asia, and Latin America head south. When the general economy catches a cold, the airline industry catches pneumonia, says analyst Kevin C. Murphy of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & شركة Demand isn't the only problem. Fuel prices are inching higher, while wages are still climbing. Air Transport's Swierenga figures labor expenses will reach nearly $ 52 billion in 2002, up 15% from the $ 45.3 billion in 2000. He also says airlines are now paying 60% more for fuel than in 1999. REDUCTION. To gain some altitude, the biggest airlines are casting off whatever they can. Almost all are reducing the number of flights they offer. Northwest is in its second round of layoffs this year, with plans to cut 1,625 of its 53,000 workers by year-end. American has lopped $ 200 million from its capital budget this year and plans an additional $ 700 million cut in 2002. Most radical are restructuring plans at money-losing US Airways Group Inc. Blocked by the Justice Dept. from selling itself to UAL, US Airways wants to remake itself into a lower-cost regional company. It plans to replace 60 big jets with smaller regional ones that should be easier to fill and cheaper to fly. Still, there are some signs of improvement. Rosenbluth International, a large corporate travel agency, says that in the five-week period ended Aug. 17, corporate bookings were up as much as 20% for 18 of its 25 biggest accounts. And a survey of 200 companies released on Aug. 20 by the National Business Travel Assn. finds that 74% plan to spend the same or more on travel next year compared with 2001. That, of course, wouldn't restore traffic to pre-slowdown levels. Says Rosenbluth CEO Hal F. Rosenbluth, I don't think the climb out will be anywhere near as vertical as the decline was. Looks like business travelers may be forced to brown-bag it for a while, as the industry struggles to stay aloft. Even the good news came with qualifications. September 6, 2001, Thursday. United Airlines' August Traffic Rises 9.1 Percent. United Airlines' (NYSE: UAL) total scheduled revenue passenger miles (RPMs) rose 9.1 percent in August vs. the comparable month in 2000. The airline's passenger load factor increased to 78.4 percent from 75.0 percent a year ago. Seat capacity was up 4.4 percent. "While our traffic and load factor were up in August vs. last year, any comparisons should take into account the operational disruptions a year ago which sharply reduced our traffic," said Rono Dutta, United's president. That is, at least some of the increase is coming from a very low base. The end result of all this is that the share price was declining, immediately prior to 9/11. Put it all together, and some analysts have said there's no other explanation required. Historically, Hamilton continues, "airlines are a poor investment and have never made money for investors. There are lots of reasons to sell these stocks short that have nothing to do with Sept. 11. I haven't seen anything that raises any red flags on at least these two stocks when you consider the numbers. With United there were 2,075 put options, with each put option representing 100 shares of stock. So someone had control of 207,500 shares of United. The stock dropped from $31 to $18, so that's a $13 profit, or $2.7 million on the put options. If you were going to plan something as complex as taking down those towers, why wouldn't you have made a billion or $10 billion betting on oil or shorting the NASDAQ?" Anyway, says Hamilton, "recall that the market was in bad shape in the summer and early fall, and you know there were a lot of people who believed that there would be a sell-off in the market long before Sept. 11. For instance, American Airlines was at $40 in May and fell to $29 on Sept. 10; United was at $37 in May and fell to $31 on Sept. 10. These stocks were falling anyway and it would have been a good time to short them. I like to think of this as an urban legend now. I think it is the World Trade Center urban legend."(Source. In response, brokerage firms cut their ratings for AMR and other airlines. Hotel analysts, realizing that fewer travelers meant fewer overnight stays, followed suit. The short positions and volume of put options rose sharply across the travel industry -- which has been cited repeatedly in news reports as possible evidence of illegal trading. American and United were hit particularly hard. "The two airline companies that are the most closely related are American and United," said Paul Foster, a market strategist with BeyondTheBull, a market information firm. "I don't believe this has anything to do with the terrorists." (مصدر) Boeing are occasionally referenced as a target for 9/11-related insider trading. However, what you'll rarely see are any contemporary comments from the Media. For example, the Chicago Tribune published the following on Saturday September 8th: BYLINE: By Janet Kidd Stewart, Tribune staff reporter. SECTION: BUSINESS; ZONE: N; Pg. 1. The double whammy of rising unemployment and plummeting stock prices converged Friday to inflict more pain on legions of American investors. The surprise jump in August unemployment sparked a broad sell-off that pushed the Dow Jones industrial average down almost 235 points, to 9605.85, its lowest level since early April. The benchmark Standard & Poor's 500 index fell 20.62, to 1085.78, its lowest close since October 1998. Also weighing on stocks was renewed concern about corporate profits. Shares of American Airlines parent AMR fell more than 3 percent, to $30.15, after it warned of a deeper-than-expected third-quarter loss. Aircraft giant and Dow component Boeing, closing its first week as a Chicago-based company, broke through its 52-week low Friday, dropping 7.5 percent, to $45.18, after a Morgan Stanley analyst downgraded the stock and warned that a business upturn is several quarters away. No surprise about falling share prices here. With airlines already reporting bad news, it would hardly seem surprising if some investors might believe they would fall further still. British Airways. There was speculation that in the days before 11 September, terrorist groups engaged in sophisticated share trading. This involved 'short-selling' airline shares - selling the stock, waiting for the price to drop, then buying it back and pocketing the difference. The Financial Services Authority investigated a large trade in BA involving put options - share options giving the right to sell at a fixed price. In effect, this was a bet that BA shares would fall. The FSA found no evidence of terrorist involvement and said the deals were not linked to the attacks. It said: 'A sizeable put option in the shares of a British airline turned out to have been on behalf of another airline, as part of an overall hedging strategy.' Lufthansa this weekend denied the company was involved. But share traders have confirmed the German operator's connection. A stockbroker said: 'Speculating like this is an odd way for a company to use shareholder funds.' It is also surprising that Lufthansa and its advisers speculated at a time when the industry was already facing recession. The head of one of Europe's most successful airlines said: 'I don't know why one airline would be punting on a rival's shares. It's hard enough just to run an airline-without doing this fancy stuff.' Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm told parliament the sharp drop in share prices of the national airline days before the assaults was not caused by people who knew of the terrorist's plans. The Securities Board of the Netherlands, the market regulator, investigated the heavy volume of put options in KLM shares, said to be 10 times higher than normal, during a two-day period before the attacks. A put option is a contract that gives a holder the right to sell an asset at a specified price before a certain date. "We know who bought the contracts and we know why. And fortunately it had nothing to do with terrorism, or insider knowledge about that," Zalm told Dutch television. Zalm declined to give more details, but he said "everything was OK." In the three trading days prior to the attacks, KLM shares plunged from 16 euros (dlrs 14.72) to 14.20 euros (dlrs 13.06), a 12 percent fall. Swiss Re. Options Hotline. There's plenty of context around the trades to explain why they were made, then. And in one particular example, the case of the September 10th American Airlines put options, we have considerably more. A 9/11 Commission document, for instance, named the newsletter that was responsible for a large part of the unusual volume. To be clear, we're not saying you have to believe the SEC's verdict. However, they have now told us which newsletter was responsible. The tip itself isn't available online, but we obtained a copy: Stocks Skid On A Jump In The Jobless Rate. This Week, We Take To The Air. This past week, stocks were pressed to the downside -- with the highlight being Friday's blue chip decline. Wall Street was surprised by a spike, to a four-year high, in the jobless rate. And the market took its lumps. This week, I see opportunity for you to have fun and profit with an airline play. So, without further ado, here's… This Week's Option Recommendation. Buy the AMR October $30 put for $170, or less, good this week. Shares of AMR Corp. trade on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "AMR". The symbol for this option reco is "AMRVF". American Airlines closed the week at $30.15. The 52-week range for AMR is $27.62-$43.93. My downside price target is $22-$26. The major airline is under pressure. At $25, each $30 put would have $500 of intrinsic value. If AMR is at or above $30 on the third Friday in October, your option will expire worthless. That is your risk. Set your stop-loss at $100, to preserve capital, in case my expectations go awry. That's buy the AMR October $30 put for $170, or less, good this week. So this is direct evidence that a particular individual - Steve Sarnoff, the editor of the newsletter - was recommending the purchase of AMR put options based on economic arguments only, just as we've argued was appropriate. Perhaps some will want to expand the conspiracy to include Sarnoff, too, and claim he was somehow tipped off about the attacks. But this makes little sense. Why would the conspirators care about the Sarnoff or the Options Hotline? Where is the benefit in enriching a few of his subscribers? A simpler explanation, surely, is that the situation unfolded exactly as it appeared. The airlines and the US economy were in trouble throughout 2001; American delivered a series of profit warnings on Friday, September 7th; Sarnoff felt the share price had further to fall, and on Sunday recommended purchasing puts; some of his subscribers did so on Monday; and entirely coincidentally, the attacks occurred on Tuesday. Buzzy Krongard. There's still the question of a "CIA link" to these trades, of course, as discussed by Mike Ruppert: Until 1997 A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard had been Chairman of the investment bank A.B. بنى. A.B. Brown was acquired by Banker’s Trust in 1997. Krongard then became, as part of the merger, Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust-AB Brown, one of 20 major U.S. banks named by Senator Carl Levin this year as being connected to money laundering. Krongard’s last position at Banker’s Trust (BT) was to oversee “private client relations.” In this capacity he had direct hands-on relations with some of the wealthiest people in the world in a kind of specialized banking operation that has been identified by the U.S. Senate and other investigators as being closely connected to the laundering of drug money. Krongard joined the CIA in 1998 as counsel to CIA Director George Tenet. He was promoted to CIA Executive Director by President Bush in March of this year. BT was acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1999. The combined firm is the single largest bank in Europe. And, as we shall see, Deutsche Bank played several key roles in events connected to the September 11 attacks. Ruppert himself pointed out that Krongard left in 1998, though. You might have thought the link expired at that point, but apparently we're supposed to believe it was still significant. Why, though? If, let's say, Government conspirators wanted to engage in a perfectly legal transaction to purchase put options in United and American Airlines, then why would it matter which bank they used? Especially if you're assuming they had enough power to block any investigation? It's not as though the transactions could remain hidden. Presumably the explanation would be that people at this bank would be willing to help the CIA profit from the deaths of thousands of American citizens. There's not a jot of evidence for that, though, and Ruppert himself points out that Bankers Trust had changed ownership since Krongard's day, being acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1999. Are the Germans in on it, too? Finally, although some sites quote the trades as all or mostly being linked to AB Brown, you might notice they never post references to prove that. لماذا ا؟ Because if they did you'd read something like this. The best we have is an unidentified source saying that "at least some" (not "most") of the trades for one of the shares in question (not "all") was made through Alex Brown. If it was so vital to use a "CIA-linked bank" to make these trades, then why not use all of them? It's clear that, for the conspiracy to stand up, we must make an increasing number of assumptions. That the conspirators needed to use a particular bank, for instance, even though they have the power to cover up just about any investigation. That the conspirators had influence at AB Brown, even though Krongard had left years before. That the report about Deutsche Bank being involved in the first place is accurate, and that the conspirators would be stupid enough to let this information get out, but clever enough to spread the trades across other banks (which presumably must be "CIA-linked", too). Maybe this is all true, but it would help if there was some evidence to support any of these claims. Perhaps the strongest support for the "insider trading" claims comes from Professor Allen M Poteshman from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He decided to investigate this further, analysing market data statistically to try and assess the trades’ significance. Professor Poteshman points out several reasons to question the foreknowledge argument: However, he then devises a statistical model, which he suggests is consistent with foreknowledge after all: Options traders, corporate managers, security analysts, exchange officials, regulators, prosecutors, policy makers, and—at times—the public at large have an interest in knowing whether unusual option trading has occurred around certain events. A prime example of such an event is the September 11 terrorist attacks, and there was indeed a great deal of speculation about whether option market activity indicated that the terrorists or their associates had traded in the days leading up to September 11 on advance knowledge of the impending attacks. This speculation, however, took place in the absence of an understanding of the relevant characteristics of option market trading. This paper begins by developing systematic information about the distribution of option market activity. It constructs benchmark distributions for option market volume statistics that measure in different ways the extent to which non–market maker volume establishes option market positions that will be profitable if the underlying stock price rises or falls in value. The distributions of these statistics are calculated both unconditionally and when conditioning on the overall level of option activity on the underlying stock, the return and trading volume on the underlying stock, and the return on the overall market. These distributions are then used to judge whether the option market trading in AMR, UAL, the Standard and Poor’s airline index, and the S&P 500 market index in the days leading up to September 11 was, in fact, unusual. The option market volume ratios considered do not provide evidence of unusual option market trading in the days leading up to September 11. The volume ratios, however, are constructed out of long and short put volume and long and short call volume; simply buying puts would have been the most straightforward way for someone to have traded in the option market on foreknowledge of the attacks. A measure of abnormal long put volume was also examined and seen to be at abnormally high levels in the days leading up to the attacks. Consequently, the paper concludes that there is evidence of unusual option market activity in the days leading up to September 11 that is consistent with investors trading on advance knowledge of the attacks. (And note, he's only saying "consistent with". There are those who pretend this means he's proved trading with inside knowledge. They are wrong. As usual.) One issue that troubles us about this is the lack of analysis of the string of bad news delivered by American Airlines on September 7th, the trading day before September 10th, when the most significant trading occurred. Especially in the context of falling share prices at the time. Professor Poteshman told us via email: But can you really treat the news so simply? Professor Paul Zarembka supports the claims, saying: But we’re not saying they were random, rather that they may have been a rational response to significant bad news delivered the day before. Poteshman is essentially saying (with regard to AMR) is that people bought too many puts for that to be explained by the 9/7 news, therefore another explanation is required, but how can you say that without analysing the news itself? After all, if that news had been “we’ll probably be bankrupt in six months” then the put ratios would probably have been even more significant, and Poteshman’s model given even more confirmation of “unusual option market activity”, but would that have made the idea of foreknowledge more likely? بالطبع لا. Obviously the AMR news was less dramatic, but we would still say that you cannot accurately judge the significance of these trades until you take it into consideration. Another complication here comes in the fact that put volumes in these shares were normally low, from what we’ve read, and this obviously makes it easier for spikes to appear. The 9/11 Commission said: The September 6th UAL puts would automatically appear significant, then, even though only one investor was reportedly behind them. But he was an institutional investor (at least according to the Commission), someone with a lot of money to spend, his purchases are always going to stand out. But does that really mean you can mathematically indicate it’s likely that investor had foreknowledge of 9/11, without considering the other market conditions and information available at the time? And it’s a similar story with the AMR trades. Professor Poteshman appears to be saying that the traders were more pessimistic about the future of AMR than they should have been, that they over-reacted to the news and bought more puts than he’d expect, but newsletters and share tipsters regularly deliver spikes in trading, at least here in the UK. Many are followed by people who do little research themselves, and just follow the recommendations provided. So the tipster's view becomes extremely important: if he says "buy puts" then many of them will simply follow suit, and the higher the circulation of the newsletter, the greater the resulting spike of “abnormal trades” will be. What's more, as we mentioned above, we now know the newsletter whose recommendation was responsible for the purchase of many of the 9/10 AMR puts: the Options Hotline. We also know that editor Steve Sarnoff was responsible for suggesting this particular trade, and we have his alert explaining why. And so, unless Sarnoff is about to be accused of somehow capitalising on advance knowledge of the attacks, we can see that there was a reasonable economic case for purchasing AMR puts on 9/10, in which case they can't be regarded as clear foreknowledge of the attacks. (There is still an unknown institutional investor, but if Sarnoff believed the put options were a good recommendation then there's no reason to believe that others might not have thought the same.) And while this is only one date considered by Poteshman, if his measure leads to an incorrect conclusion for the September 10 trades, then how can we be sure it's accurate elsewhere? Anyway, Screw Loose Change raised a similar issue or two that you might want to consider. And please don’t end this here: go read Poteshman’s paper, just to assess this for yourself. If you’re not great at statistics then some of it will make your eyes glaze over, guaranteed, but there are also interesting comments that are accessible to everyone, so overall it’s well worth a read. Objections. There are those who say market conditions before 9/11 couldn't possibly explain the put options. A number of objections are raised to support this point of view. Too specific. The trades were "too specific", we're told. Why were only American and United Airlines affected, for instance, the two carriers that would be involved in 9/11? One partial answer here is that there were concerns over other airlines: And Alexander Rose has written that short interest in other airlines was up, if not by as much as with United and American: There was a general expectation that stock prices would fall, then. But why did these airlines suffer in particular? We've already seen that American Airlines released surprisingly bad news on the 6th of September. United was the largest carrier, so if an investor believed the downturn was a general one then it would be natural to expect them to suffer even more, and a New York Times article confirms that the companies could be expected to perform in a similar way: If you were an investor who read about the American Airlines profit warning over the weekend, then, it wouldn't be unreasonable for you to assume that United Airlines next figures would be even worse, and that you could profit by purchasing some put options. There were more companies than just the airlines involved, of course, but were these put options really as targeted as is sometimes claimed? The book "Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism" tells us that "the Bank of New York and Cantor Fitzgerald financial services were the stock brokerage companies that suffered the most damage on September 11", with Cantor losing nearly 700 people and the Bank of New York losing major telecoms facilities. But we've seen no suggestion of suspicious trading in either company directly (though there's a less quoted issue re: a Cantor network: see here). The reality is that when you get away from the airlines, most of the other targeting is considered in retrospect. That is, people were looking at companies with high put options prior to 9/11, considering those that might be said to be affected by the attacks, and presenting those as the most suspicious. But there were many different companies within the WTC, multiple insurers responsible for its insurance cover, and a host of other companies that would see their businesses seriously affected by 9/11. With the stock market falling, surely you would expect at least some of these to have put options "spikes" over any particular few weeks? Another common objection tells us the put options were too high to be normal trading. But is that really true? The first complication here comes in determining what the volumes actually were. Go to Prison Planet, for instance, and you might come across this archived story that seems to tell you: 4,744 on UAL over two days, then 4,515 on SMR in one day. That's all clear, right? Except it isn't. Another archived article at the same site tells us this: And an article on financial site The Street says there were 2,000 UAL put options purchased on the 6th of September, with 1,535 AMR puts bought on September 10. So which is correct? Figuring out the significance of these volumes is equally problematic. 9/11 Research uses the following quotes: That's 285 and 60 times more than average, then? Not according to the Chicago Tribune: The "285 times higher than average" becomes only "four times" higher than normal for United Airlines, while American's "60 times average" is now "nearly 11 times its average daily volume for the year". There could be many explanations for this. The calculations may be defining "normal" and "average" in different ways, for instance. Perhaps they're looking at different sets of put figures (it's a complicated business). Whatever the cause, it's plain that there are significant contradictions here, even between figures produced in mainstream media stories. Don't take any "x times bigger than usual" claims as necessarily true. It's also worth noting that put option spikes aren't uncommon, as Insight revealed: They're using the lower figure for American Airlines put options here. However, the United Airlines spikes of 8,212 and 8,072 (if accurate) show that the 9/11 figures, while high, were in no sense unique. And as the same article points out, these figures weren't high in terms of option trading. The volume could have been even higher, and there were safer ways to do it: If these volumes really weren't so exceptional then it raises a problem for another aspect of this story, a claim originated by Mike Ruppert and retold here by David Ray Griffin: This is applying hindsight in a fairly dramatic manner, and it’s also leaving out crucial information: the American puts followed the trading day after the company had released a major profit warning, when you’d expect investors to believe the shares had further to fall, and the United Airlines trade volumes were lower than the spikes that occurred in March and April. If a United Airlines spike of 8,072 in March didn’t suggest an imminent attack, then why should 4,744 puts over two days in September have any more effect? Related Issues. Mayo Shuttock III. On 9/11 Mayo Shattuck III] was chairman of Deutsche Banc Alex Brown, the US private client and asset management division of Deutsche Banc. This has been tied in some quarters to the put options purchased before the attacks, as History Commons illustrates: We've seen not the slightest evidence to support such a claim, though, and at first glance it makes no real sense. Why would Brown resign because of the put options, which weren't yet even being reported in the press? If anyone has an explanation that's based on more than conjecture then we've yet to see it. Further, while History Commons do their best to put a conspiratorial spin on this by saying "no reason is given" for the resignation, that simply isn't true. September 17, 2001 Monday Final Edition. SECTION: FINANCIAL; Pg. E01. . After 16 years with venerable Baltimore investment firm Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, Chairman Mayo A. Shattuck III has resigned. The 46-year-old executive led Alex. Brown through two mergers, the first with Bankers Trust and the second two years ago when the firm was acquired by German investment house Deutsche Bank. Shattuck is leaving the firm to get away from the strain of helming an investment bank that essentially has headquarters on two continents -- Baltimore and Frankfurt, Germany, company executive said. "The combination of a lot of travel to Frankfurt and 3 a.m. conference calls just got a bit wearying," said Ben Griswold, the Baltimore-based senior chairman at Deutsche Banc Alex. بنى. According to officials at the bank, Shattuck is to stay on indefinitely as a senior adviser and join the boards of two Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown subsidiaries, Bankers Trust Corp. and Bankers Trust Co. A reason for the resignation was given, and it turns out that Shattuck was maintaining a connection with the company. Anyone might claim that the reason is false, and doubtless they will, but without some - or indeed any - evidence to support that, it's hard to see where this story will go. استنتاج. We cannot prove that the pre-9/11 put options weren't made with foreknowledge of the attacks. And we suspect not even those who instigated the trades could do that. We now know that Steve Sarnoff was the author of the 9/9 newsletter recommending the purchase of American Airline put options, for example. The institutional investor is yet to be named, but even if they were, and they explained in detail their reasons for that decision, that will never constitute solid proof of anything. And so those who want to believe something else will continue to claim that maybe they had received a tip-off from elsewhere. What we can show, however, is that the usual discussion of these issues leaves out a considerable amount of relevant detail. Books like "The Hidden History of 9/11" claim the 9/11 Commission footnote was their only word on the topic, for instance, ignoring the details provided in the Terrorist Finance monograph we've quoted. We've not seen anyone even begin to fully address the economic circumstances of the time, including the general fall in share prices in the weeks before 9/11, and the bad news that specifically related to United and American Airlines. The significance of the put options volumes appears to be exaggerated. Previous spikes are rarely even mentioned. And while high level conspirators might be able to cover up investigations in the US, we've yet to see any explanation of why inquiries in other countries revealed nothing, despite dramatic headlines when the stories first appeared. In short, we believe there are explanations for the put options, other than 9/11 foreknowledge: it's just that you're not being told what they are. المراجع. These articles are neutral, or tend to support the idea that the put options may indicated 9/11 foreknowledge. These 9/11 articles tend to support the foreknowledge claims: These articles raise at least some questions about whether the put option purchases support any claim of foreknowledge about 9/11. Some concentrate only on terrorist or bin Laden connections, and so are of limited use in addressing whether insiders in the US were involved, however all have some useful points to make.

911 insider trading put options

Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks. FTW - October 9, 2001 – Although uniformly ignored by the mainstream U.S. media, there is abundant and clear evidence that a number of transactions in financial markets indicated specific (criminal) foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the case of at least one of these trades -- which has left a $2.5 million prize unclaimed -- the firm used to place the “put options” on United Airlines stock was, until 1998, managed by the man who is now in the number three Executive Director position at the Central Intelligence Agency. Until 1997 A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard had been Chairman of the investment bank A.B. بنى. A.B. Brown was acquired by Banker’s Trust in 1997. Krongard then became, as part of the merger, Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust-AB Brown, one of 20 major U.S. banks named by Senator Carl Levin this year as being connected to money laundering. Krongard’s last position at Banker’s Trust (BT) was to oversee “private client relations.” In this capacity he had direct hands-on relations with some of the wealthiest people in the world in a kind of specialized banking operation that has been identified by the U.S. Senate and other investigators as being closely connected to the laundering of drug money. THE SCOPE OF KNOWN INSIDER TRADING. Before looking further into these relationships it is necessary to look at the insider trading information that is being ignored by Reuters, The New York Times and other mass media. It is well documented that the CIA has long monitored such trades – in real time – as potential warnings of terrorist attacks and other economic moves contrary to U.S. interests. Previous stories in FTW have specifically highlighted the use of Promis software to monitor such trades. It is necessary to understand only two key financial terms to understand the significance of these trades, “selling short” and “put options”. “Selling Short” is the borrowing of stock, selling it at current market prices, but not being required to actually produce the stock for some time. If the stock falls precipitously after the short contract is entered, the seller can then fulfill the contract by buying the stock after the price has fallen and complete the contract at the pre-crash price. These contracts often have a window of as long as four months. “Put Options,” are contracts giving the buyer the option to sell stocks at a later date. Purchased at nominal prices of, for example, $1.00 per share, they are sold in blocks of 100 shares. If exercised, they give the holder the option of selling selected stocks at a future date at a price set when the contract is issued. Thus, for an investment of $10,000 it might be possible to tie up 10,000 shares of United or American Airlines at $100 per share, and the seller of the option is then obligated to buy them if the option is executed. If the stock has fallen to $50 when the contract matures, the holder of the option can purchase the shares for $50 and immediately sell them for $100 – regardless of where the market then stands. A call option is the reverse of a put option, which is, in effect, a derivatives bet that the stock price will go up. A September 21 story by the Israeli Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, entitled “Black Tuesday: The World’s Largest Insider Trading Scam?” documented the following trades connected to the September 11 attacks: - Between September 6 and 7, the Chicago Board Options Exchange saw purchases of 4,744 put options on United Airlines, but only 396 call options… Assuming that 4,000 of the options were bought by people with advance knowledge of the imminent attacks, these “insiders” would have profited by almost $5 million. - On September 10, 4,516 put options on American Airlines were bought on the Chicago exchange, compared to only 748 calls. Again, there was no news at that point to justify this imbalance;… Again, assuming that 4,000 of these options trades represent “insiders,” they would represent a gain of about $4 million. - [The levels of put options purchased above were more than six times higher than normal.] - No similar trading in other airlines occurred on the Chicago exchange in the days immediately preceding Black Tuesday. - Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., which occupied 22 floors of the World Trade Center, saw 2,157 of its October $45 put options bought in the three trading days before Black Tuesday; this compares to an average of 27 contracts per day before September 6. Morgan Stanley’s share price fell from $48.90 to $42.50 in the aftermath of the attacks. Assuming that 2,000 of these options contracts were bought based upon knowledge of the approaching attacks, their purchasers could have profited by at least $1.2 million. Merrill Lynch & Co., with headquarters near the Twin Towers, saw 12,215 October $45 put options bought in the four trading days before the attacks; the previous average volume in those shares had been 252 contracts per day [a 1200% increase!]. When trading resumed, Merrill’s shares fell from $46.88 to $41.50; assuming that 11,000 option contracts were bought by “insiders,” their profit would have been about $5.5 million. - European regulators are examining trades in Germany’s Munich Re, Switzerland’s Swiss Re, and AXA of France, all major reinsurers with exposure to the Black Tuesday disaster. [ FTW Note: AXA also owns more than 25% of American Airlines stock making the attacks a “double whammy” for them.] On September 29, 2001 – in a vital story that has gone unnoticed by the major media – the San Francisco Chronicle reported, “Investors have yet to collect more than $2.5 million in profits they made trading options in the stock of United Airlines before the Sept. 11, terrorist attacks, according to a source familiar with the trades and market data. “The uncollected money raises suspicions that the investors – whose identities and nationalities have not been made public – had advance knowledge of the strikes.” They don’t dare show up now. The suspension of trading for four days after the attacks made it impossible to cash-out quickly and claim the prize before investigators started looking. “… October series options for UAL Corp. were purchased in highly unusual volumes three trading days before the terrorist attacks for a total outlay of $2,070; investors bought the option contracts, each representing 100 shares, for 90 cents each. [This represents 230,000 shares]. Those options are now selling at more than $12 each. There are still 2,313 so-called “put” options outstanding [valued at $2.77 million and representing 231,300 shares] according to the Options Clearinghouse Corp.” “…The source familiar with the United trades identified Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown, the American investment banking arm of German giant Deutsche Bank, as the investment bank used to purchase at least some of these options…” This was the operation managed by Krongard until as recently as 1998. As reported in other news stories, Deutsche Bank was also the hub of insider trading activity connected to Munich Re. just before the attacks. CIA, THE BANKS AND THE BROKERS. Understanding the interrelationships between CIA and the banking and brokerage world is critical to grasping the already frightening implications of the above revelations. Let’s look at the history of CIA, Wall Street and the big banks by looking at some of the key players in CIA’s history. Clark Clifford – The National Security Act of 1947 was written by Clark Clifford, a Democratic Party powerhouse, former Secretary of Defense, and one-time advisor to President Harry Truman. In the 1980s, as Chairman of First American Bancshares, Clifford was instrumental in getting the corrupt CIA drug bank BCCI a license to operate on American shores. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and banker. John Foster and Allen Dulles – These two brothers “designed” the CIA for Clifford. Both were active in intelligence operations during WW II. Allen Dulles was the U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland where he met frequently with Nazi leaders and looked after U.S. investments in Germany. John Foster went on to become Secretary of State under Dwight Eisenhower and Allen went on to serve as CIA Director under Eisenhower and was later fired by JFK. Their professions: partners in the most powerful - to this day - Wall Street law firm of Sullivan, Cromwell. Bill Casey – Ronald Reagan’s CIA Director and OSS veteran who served as chief wrangler during the Iran-Contra years was, under President Richard Nixon, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and stockbroker. David Doherty - The current Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange for enforcement is the retired General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. George Herbert Walker Bush – President from 1989 to January 1993, also served as CIA Director for 13 months from 1976-7. He is now a paid consultant to the Carlyle Group, the 11 th largest defense contractor in the nation, which also shares joint investments with the bin Laden family. A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard – The current Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is the former Chairman of the investment bank A.B. Brown and former Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust. John Deutch - This retired CIA Director from the Clinton Administration currently sits on the board at Citigroup, the nation’s second largest bank, which has been repeatedly and overtly involved in the documented laundering of drug money. This includes Citigroup’s 2001 purchase of a Mexican bank known to launder drug money, Banamex. Nora Slatkin – This retired CIA Executive Director also sits on Citibank’s board. Maurice “Hank” Greenburg – The CEO of AIG insurance, manager of the third largest capital investment pool in the world, was floated as a possible CIA Director in 1995. FTW exposed Greenberg’s and AIG’s long connection to CIA drug trafficking and covert operations in a two-part series that was interrupted just prior to the attacks of September 11. AIG’s stock has bounced back remarkably well since the attacks. To read that story, please go to copvcia/stories/part_2.html . One wonders how much damning evidence is necessary to respond to what is now irrefutable proof that CIA knew about the attacks and did not stop them. Whatever our government is doing, whatever the CIA is doing, it is clearly NOT in the interests of the American people, especially those who died on September 11. [© COPYRIGHT, 2001, Michael C. Ruppert and FTW Publications, copvcia . كل الحقوق محفوظة. – May be reprinted or distributed for non-profit purposes only.] Commander in Chief. Back Off Bin Ladens. The Bushes and the Carlyle Group. How Bush and other ex-politic os profit from connections and access. What doesn't he want Americans to know? The sanctions have loopholes our vice president made millions from.
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